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ABSTRACT
Direct U.S. military intervention in the Third World 
featured prominently in American foreign policy during the 
post-World War II era. However, the Cold War placed 
restraints on where and how Washington could intervene. The 
collapse of the former Soviet Union appears to have removed 
many of the barriers to, if not the ideological 
justifications for, American intervention. Since the end of 
the Cold War, the United States has intervened militarily 
in several countries. However, these post-Cold War 
interventions seem to be guided by different motives than 
those traditionally given. Likewise, such operations, now 
free from the fear of counter-intervention by any other 
superpower, seem to be governed by a new set of rules.
This dissertation considers the efficacy of direct 
U.S. military intervention: when it will work, when it will 
not, and how to undertake such action in a manner that will 
bring rapid victory at an acceptable political cost. 
Consequently, this study develops a typology of the 
preconditions that tend to favor the success of direct U.S. 
military intervention in the post-Cold War era. The 
criteria considered relate to the various aspects of 
intervention, including: the motives underlying the 
decision to intervene, the nature of the situation in the 
target country, domestic political conditions, how the
viii
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operation is carried out, and exit strategies. In addition, 
aspects of civilian-military relations are considered, with 
an emphasis on the role of the theater commander in both 
the decision making process and the prosecution of the 
action. The propositions advanced are tested by the use of 
focused case studies of the major episodes of direct 
American military intervention since 1989: Panama (1989), 
Iraq (1991), and Somalia (1992-1994).
ix
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CHAPTER I
DIRECT 0.8. MILITARY INTERVENTION: AN INTRODUCTION
Introduction/Background
As Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. points out in his book, The 
Doctrines of American Foreign Policy, the doctrines that 
have guided U.S. foreign policy are not static. Rather, 
despite recurring themes such as anti-communism, they are 
pragmatically adjusted on a "need" basis. That is to say 
that they evolve, adapting to circumstances as the 
international environment and changing perceptions of 
national interests dictate. Bearing this in mind, it would 
seem that the American foreign policy has undergone a 
gradual, yet discernable, evolution since the end of World 
War II.
Like nothing before it, the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor in 1941 forced Americans to face the fact that, 
whether they liked it or not, U.S. security needs 
absolutely compelled defense of the nation's interests 
abroad. This became even clearer when, shortly after allied 
victory, the Soviet Union began to indicate that it would 
no longer be a friend, let alone an ally, of the United 
States.
Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, while condemned 
by the West, was in fact tolerated and accepted. Soon
l
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2afterward, however, Communist designs were perceived 
against areas outside the conceded Soviet sphere of 
influence. The U.S. response to this challenge, the Truman 
Doctrine, seems to have set into motion a series of phases 
though which American policy has passed. They are as 
follows (approximately):
1947-1957 The use (or at least the implied threat) of 
direct U.S. military intervention in order 
to defend established friendly governments 
from "armed minorities" acting with the aid, 
or at least the blessing, of the USSR and 
its allies. Examples of this include U.S. 
aid to Greece and Turkey, as well as direct 
military intervention in Korea. In defense 
of core U.S. interests, particularly 
Western Europe, the U.S. invokes the 
doctrine of "massive retaliation," a policy 
which remains in place until the 1960s.
1957-1973 The use of direct U.S. intervention in the 
Third World for two distinct, yet 
complementary, objectives. First, to 
contain communist expansion by whatever 
means necessary, including armed force. 
Second, to help immunize newly emerging 
nations from communism through the process 
of U.S. sponsored "nation-building" and 
Rostowian development policies. Prominent 
examples of this include Lebanon (1958), 
the Dominican Republic (1965), and most 
clearly South Vietnam (1962-1973).
1973-1980 This was a period of relative dormancy in 
U.S. foreign policy, perhaps bordering on 
neo-isolationism. Public paranoia over 
getting involved in "another Vietnam" as 
well as a general distrust of government due 
to ten years of lies from both the Johnson 
and Nixon administrations culminated in 
congressional micro-management of U.S. 
foreign policy. The passage of the War 
Powers Act, as well as the Clark and Tunney 
Amendments, virtually tied the hands of the 
executive for two administrations. Though 
there are some uses of armed force (freeing 
the "Mayaguez" in 1975, "Desert One" in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
31979, supplying Israel in 1973) and threats 
to use force (ongoing commitments to NATO, 
South Korea, etc), the U.S. avoids prolonged 
interventions that characterized earlier 
periods.
1980-1989 The era of the Reagan Doctrine. This policy 
took account of the fact that the USSR was a 
superpower only in the military sense. 
Furthermore, during the 1970s the Soviet 
,,empireM had become overextended. 
Consequently, the U.S. sought to exploit the 
many weak points, thereby rolling-back 
communism in the Third World while 
simultaneously bleeding Moscow by forcing it 
to engage in the costly task of defending 
its allies for a change. This task was 
accomplished by funding pre-existing 
indigenous rebel groups that could cost- 
effectively press U.S. claims without the 
need to commit U.S. land forces in a 
prolonged Vietnam-style conflict. Examples 
of this include U.S. aid to rebels in 
Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua. (It is 
interesting to note that, in the case of 
Nicaragua, while the Reagan administration 
denied any involvement, it used the CIA to 
mine Nicaraguan harbors and financed the 
rebels through the Iran-Contra arms sales to 
Iran as well as actively seeking the 
financial support of friendly Gulf 
emirates.)
1989-1995 This period is characterized by the threat
and/or use of direct U.S. military power for 
the achievement of two goals that seem, on 
the face of it, to be at odds with each 
other: (1) the protection of national 
interests such as Middle East oil and the 
Panama Canal and (2) humanitarian concern in 
areas of the world, the value of which to 
vital U.S. interests cannot be readily 
demonstrated. Examples of (1) include U.S. 
participation in the 1991 Persian Gulf War 
and the 1989 intervention in Panama.
Examples of (2) include the U.S. mercy 
mission in Somalia, the food airlift to 
Bosnia, as well as the stationing of some 
U.S. ground forces in Macedonia.
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41995 - ? Anticipated challenges to U.S. foreign 
policy:
1. The need to deal militarily with 
terrorists and the states that sponsor 
them (e.g. Libya, Iran, Sudan).
2. The need to deal with "loose cannons" 
that acquire nuclear weapons (e.g. North 
Korea)
3. The need to intervene again in the 
Persian Gulf so as to defend U.S. 
allies, access to oil, ensure freedom of 
navigation within the Gulf, and/or 
enforce the terms of surrender imposed 
on Iraq at the end of the 1991 war.
4. The need to intervene militarily so as 
to restore order, promote democracy, and 
prevent mayhem (Haiti, post-Castro Cuba)
5. The need to take direct military action 
to deal with drug lords (?)
6. The need to again engage in peacekeeping 
and/or humanitarian relief duties.
7. The need to deter Beijing from attempts 
to intimidate American friends in the 
Far East such as Taiwan, Japan, South 
Korea (or a weak Russia?).
It is these two most recent "periods" that will be the 
focus of this dissertation.
Purpose of This Study
The central purpose of this dissertation is to develop 
a new typology of successful direct military intervention
V
consistent with the needs and priorities of the post-Cold 
War world, as articulated by the Bush and Clinton 
administrations in the early-to-mid-1990s.
It is expected that the findings will show that, when 
the principles that will be presented below are adhered to, 
American forces will tend to enjoy success. Conversely, 
when these principles are deviated from, military failure, 
while perhaps not pre-ordained, is made more likely.
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Furthermore, the political aspects of the policy become 
either a domestic albatross for the President as American 
soldiers die for nebulous purposes that their families 
cannot understand (Somalia) or a source of decay of 
international credibility as the President makes threats 
that he cannot keep (Bosnia) or perhaps had no intention of 
ever seriously keeping (North Korea).
What then will this study add to our understanding of 
international politics? This study will yield a new 
framework which will greatly facilitate the scholarly study 
of actual and potential military intervention. It will 
provide criteria which can be used to dissect the various 
elements of motivation, action, and completion of such 
operations. As such, we can assess each phase of such 
operations and diagnose problems that, as a result, need 
not be repeated later. In a word, the key scholarly 
contribution of this work: clarity of understanding. 
Literature Review
Literature regarding intervention as a general topic 
of discussion is abundant. However, as Richard Smoke has 
implied, the task of building a body of literature which 
develops a typology of the number and nature of specific 
preconditions for successful intervention has largely been 
neglected. This is regrettable, especially in light of the 
fact that military options, by their very nature, "require 
more preconditions in place, for the options to have a
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reasonable chance of success at reasonable cost, than do 
non-military options" (Smoke, 1977: 39). The dearth of 
literature on this topic should not act as a deterrent to 
its scholarly pursuit. To the contrary, it is this very 
void which this study hopes to fill. Although it has been 
possible to locate only a very few authors who have 
featured such preconditions as a central concern of their 
writings, it is enough to get a picture of the intellectual 
heritage of the development of such typologies.
This literature review will begin with a brief 
discussion of why intervention will probably figure 
prominently in post-Cold War politics. The body of this 
survey, however, will concentrate specifically on 
literature dealing with typologies outlining the 
preconditions to be satisfied before an intervention policy 
can promise a favorable ratio of expected benefits to 
expected costs. This overview will conclude with a summary 
of what the literature has thus far provided the scholarly 
community and what still remains to be said.
Setting the Stage
In a recent article, former National Security Advisor 
to President Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, noted that "war 
has become a luxury that only poor nations can afford 
(Brzezinski, 1991: 5)." This is because the post-Cold War 
world is characterized by a dichotomy. On one hand, the 
threat of nuclear weapons still restrains the actions of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the world's "major players." On the other hand, many 
countries, due to a variety of reasons, have had loosened 
the restraints formerly imposed on their external behavior. 
At the same time, many of these same states have had their 
domestic dictatorial foundations undermined. The resultant 
instability, both internal and external, has made these 
states (primarily, but not exclusively, in the Third World) 
into sources and/or locations of conflict. Due to the ever 
increasing interdependence of the world community "it is 
just as likely that major threats could originate from 
within states, either through civil conflicts or because of 
the increased technological sophistication of terrorist 
acts."
He implies that pragmatically guided, prudently 
pursued intervention may be an answer to this challenge 
(Brzezinski, 1991: 6, 20). However, there is a question of 
sovereignty and its possible violation in such situations. 
The United States clings to what may be an antiquated 
notion: that sovereignty places absolute limits on 
circumstances where intervention is possible (recall that
the U.S. was "asked" to "assist" in Vietnam, Korea,
Grenada, etc.). Brzezinski, however, sees a possible 
opening: that the decision of when and where to intervene 
may necessarily have to downplay a strict view of
sovereignty in favor of an appreciation of the scope of a
given threat. Specifically, "there may develop situations
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
in which external intervention in the seemingly internal
affairs of a state...may be necessary and justified by the
potential consequences of activities that are otherwise of
internal character and that do not, of themselves, involve
interstate collision" (Brzezinski, 1991: 5-6).
Steven E. Goldman takes this argument further. In
essence, he argues that our traditional notions of
sovereignty are not only antiquated, but also unduly
legalistic. It is ridiculous to assume that all states are
equal, especially when it comes to this very central issue.
Goldman believes that, in order to exercise full
sovereignty, a condition that would legally proscribe
foreign intervention, a state must be legitimate in the
eyes of modern legality. This legitimacy, of necessity, is
predicated on the exercise of political self-determination
within the state in question. This self-determination is
clearly evident in liberal democracies, as manifested by
the conduct of their political institutions and
constitutional safeguards.
By contrast, states that are not democratic 
should not be viewed as possessing the same full 
untrammelled sovereignty, since the civil 
population, the nation that is the source and the 
possessor of sovereignty, has not been allowed 
even the rudimentary opportunity of expressing 
its political will. Sovereignty in such cases may 
be said to be in a state of suspension or 
impaired (emphasis added). The state in such 
circumstances is illegitimate and is not the 
bearer of any degree of sovereignty...(Goldman 
1994: 127).
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Since, in such cases, sovereignty is said not to 
exist, democratic states are free, and in some specific 
circumstances may be morally obligated, to intervene in the 
internal affairs of undemocratic states when circumstances 
there represent a threat to the world community, or if the 
state in question directly threatens its own citizens human 
rights (e.g. the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia 1975-1979).
It should be noted that Goldman clearly states that 
while a "right of" intervention exists legally in such 
circumstances, the "decision to" actually intervene is and 
"must always remain fundamentally a political judgement" 
(Goldman 1994: 128). It is the circumstances surrounding 
this "political judgement" that the next section of this 
literature review concerns itself.
Typologies of Intervention Preconditions
Typologies of intervention are not new to political 
science. Only a very few authors, however, have featured 
such preconditions as a central concern of their writings. 
In many cases, the discussion of this topic is overlapped 
by, or buried within, literature associated with other 
subjects such as deterrence, compellence, and political 
realism. However, these subjects are beyond the scope of 
this study. Our intent here is to confine discussion to the 
intellectual heritage of the issue at hand: specifically we 
will consider literature which lays out specific criteria 
which would seem to constitute preconditions to any
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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successful pursuit of interventionist strategies. Due to 
space constraints, however, this overview will necessarily 
be of a general and simplified nature.
A concern with direct military intervention seems 
justified for a number of reasons. First and foremost, with 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, there seems to be an 
increased reliance by the United States on the use of such 
direct force. Nowhere was this renewed enthusiasm for 
military options more evident than in the adoption of an 
uncharacteristically hawkish stance with regard to Haiti by 
the almost uniformly liberal Congressional Black Caucus.
Second, while other forms of intervention (e.g. 
economic sanctions) still have their place in the American 
arsenal of options, it is evident that an increasing number 
of dictators will respond only to military force. Whether 
this is due to their ability to insulate themselves from 
the effects of such sanctions, their fear that backing down 
in a confrontation with the U.S. would result in a loss of 
face that would threaten their hold on power, simple 
callousness, or possibly failure to comprehend their own 
interests, tyrants in the post-Cold War era seem 
increasingly intransigent and unresponsive to lesser forms 
of intervention.
Finally, as will be demonstrated below, there is a 
dearth of literature identifying and examining those 
preconditions favoring the success of direct military
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intervention. Because of the advance preparations, as well 
as the heavy investment of both military personnel and 
material required to undertake such operations, greater 
attention to the preconditions for successful intervention 
is a matter of great urgency and priority.
The most systematic scholarly consideration of 
intervention in terms of the development of a typology of 
preconditions was a 1971 study by Alexander George and his 
associates. This work, entitled The Limits of Coercive 
Diplomacy. compared three instances when the U.S. 
intervened with "coercive diplomacy," that is to say, 
diplomatic threats backed up with military force. These 
case studies led to the development of eight preconditions 
for successful intervention, at least by the United States 
under the historical conditions considered. These factors 
include:
1. The strength of U.S. motivation.
2. An asymmetry of motivation favoring the 
United States.
3. The clarity of American objectives.
4. The projection of a sense of urgency to 
achieve the objective sought.
5. The presence of adequate domestic support 
for the policy.
6. The availability of usable military 
options.
7. The development of the opponent's fear of 
unacceptable escalation.
8. Clarity concerning the precise terms of 
settlement. (George et al., 1971: 217- 
226) .
The above criteria rest, however, on several premises. 
First, force is used as part of a "carrot and stick"
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policy, employing both a positive inducement and threat of 
military force to achieve the desired result. Second, force 
should only be used to protect well-defined interests. 
George believed that force cannot be well tailored and 
successfully applied unless specific, clear objectives are 
formulated regarding its use. Third, when using coercive 
force, the coercing power must keep open its channels of 
communication with its opponent. In this way, the coercing 
power can transmit its demands, barter terms, and negotiate 
an agreement which will lead to compliance. Failure to 
maintain open communication may lead to the misreading of 
intentions and unnecessary escalation. Finally, a 
willingness to use force, if necessary, is needed in order 
for the threat to have credibility, especially if the 
coercing power's "bluff" is called.
Robert Jervis, while writing on the subject of 
deterrence, states that "unfortunately no well-structured 
or verified theory exists that tells us when force and 
threats work." He does, however, indicate that it is 
possible to set forth some propositions and draw some 
preliminary conclusions. Although he does not set out 
specific preconditions needed for successful intervention 
of the type articulated below, Jervis argues that threats 
(and thus deterrence) are more apt to work when the 
following conditions are present:
1. The other side sees the costs of standing 
firm as very high.
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2. The other side believes that the state 
making the threats sees its costs of 
standing firm as low.
3. The other side sees the costs of 
retreating as relatively low (Jervis,
1976: 100-101).
Jervis enumerates several sub-criteria, especially 
with respect to the first and third criteria, but does not 
attempt to develop any operational prerequisites regarding 
the actual undertaking of military action.
While Jervis is primarily concerned with deterrence, 
Richard Smoke more directly addresses the circumstances 
surrounding intervention per se. Smoke believes that an 
increase in the number of "players" and points of conflict 
probably yield a "rich menu of possibilities for low level, 
•sub-threshold' intervention of various kinds as well as 
more overt military intervention." When facing such 
possible intervention situations, decisionmakers often have 
a wide range of options available and generally will select 
one that is adequate, even ample, to deal with the existing 
opposition." In such situations, their decisions concerning 
the size of the military commitment is often influenced 
heavily by "the tradeoff between securing a rapid and sure 
victory on the one hand and minimizing costs on the other" 
(Smoke, 1977: 30).
Intervention to Smoke is not an "event." Rather, he 
conceives of it as an ongoing cycle: a diagnosis of the 
situation, then the choice of a response option, followed 
by a new diagnosis, and so on. This process, however, is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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clouded by what he labels as "reductionism." During 
diagnosis, this reductionism is manifest in the form of 
preconceived notions drawn from varied sources such as 
historical "laws," unwarranted historical analogies (e.g. 
the opponent as "another Hitler" or the situation as 
"another Vietnam"), or long term trends. Unfortunately, key 
information such as the opponent's doctrines or personality 
attributes are downplayed in favor of "hard information."
"In the context of option handling it [reductionism] 
appears in the guise of an underemphasis on the analytical 
preconditions for various strategies, in favor of 
emphasizing technical aspects of carrying them out" 
(emphasis added)(Smoke, 1977: 43).
The United States has an unprecedented number of 
options for action to choose from. There is, however, a 
problem in that policymakers, for whatever reason, tend to 
pass quickly through diagnosis to option handling. This 
haste is perhaps because of cultural bias toward action 
over deliberation. Smoke suggests that this bias leads to 
"premature closure" of the diagnosis stage.
An unfortunate consequence of this closure is that 
"the consideration of military intervention from the angle 
of ascertaining the number and kinds of preconditions for 
success is a productive analytical approach that is not 
always emphasized" (Smoke, 1977: 39). Smoke notes that in 
their haste, policymakers overlook the fact that "military
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options require more preconditions in place, for the 
options to have a reasonable chance of success at 
reasonable cost, than do non military options" (Smoke,
1977: 39). Furthermore, because of its often unilateral 
character, U.S. decisionmakers may not recognize that "in 
most circumstances there are more preconditions to be 
satisfied before this policy can promise a favorable ratio 
of expected benefits to expected costs" (emphasis 
added)(Smoke, 1977: 39).
Although the early 1990s have seen a marked increase 
of instances of United States direct military intervention 
(as well as the proliferation of potential "target 
countries"), there is surprisingly little writing on 
actual, specific preconditions necessary for the success of 
such operations. Thomas Perry Thornton, for example, 
discusses factors affecting whether intervention is, as he 
puts it "an appropriate and necessary deviation from a 
policy of support for regional autonomy" in conflict 
resolution. However he chooses to steer clear of the issue 
of preconditions for intervention except to admonish 
policymakers that in exercising their military prerogatives 
"an integral part of the planning process should be devoted 
to seeing how our involvement can be shaped to restore and 
enhance the autonomy of the nation or system" (Thornton, 
1986: 138).
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Ted Galen Carpenter points out that the legacy of 
involvement in Vietnam has "created a lasting element of 
caution in the calculations of U.S. leaders" concerning 
intervention. He refers to a 1984 speech made by then- 
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in which Weinberger 
laid out guidelines concerning the future use of American 
forces abroad. The speech emphasized that the U.S. should 
be much more selective in where it felt compelled to 
intervene, reserving such a drastic option only for areas 
deemed "vital" to American interests, and even then only as 
a last resort. Furthermore, Washington must send its forces 
only if it had "the clear intention of winning" the 
conflict. In contrast to previous interventions, Weinberger 
insisted that the United States should clearly formulate 
its goals, be they political or military, and then send the 
appropriate manpower to get the mission accomplished. 
Finally, Weinberger believed that before undertaking such 
an endeavor, there must be " 'some reasonable assurance' of 
popular and congressional support" (Carpenter, 1992: 158).
Peter J. Schraeder has articulated a three part test 
which he believes is an aid in establishing "those 
circumstances in which the use of force is both a 
legitimate and useful tool of intervention." These include:
1. Whether the forces enjoy "majority support within 
the target country."
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2. Whether the power that the U.S. intends to aid can 
muster "majority regional and international support."
3. Whether the proposed intervention is consistent 
with international law, which is valuable as a legitimizing 
agent (Schraeder, 1992: 396-397).
He concludes that "although the combination of these 
three guidelines cannot, of course, guarantee a successful 
intervention episode —  indeed, success depends on a host 
of factors, including the goal pursued —  they at least 
enhance the possibility for success and most certainly 
ensure that U.S. policies foster a legitimacy that will 
allow it to lead both regionally and within the 
international system" (Schraeder, 1992: 397).
As this analysis has demonstrated, while there is 
considerable literature regarding the general topic of 
armed intervention abroad, relatively little of it deals 
systematically with the preconditions that would enhance 
the chances of successful intervention by the United States 
abroad.
Most of the existing commentaries deal with general, 
theoretical preconditions for interventionism. While such 
works (especially that of Alexander George) have 
considerable validity, they do not seem sufficiently 
specific or applicable to contemporary conditions. To be 
more precise, a typology should, and can, be developed that 
identifies and explains those specific preconditions that
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tend to favor successful intervention by the USA overseas. 
Commentators on the subject, such as Smoke, Levite, and 
Jentleson, have asserted that the development of such 
"necessary and sufficient conditions is a crucial task for 
further research" (emphasis added)(Levite, Jentleson, and 
Berman, 1992: 318).
Furthermore, this typology should be one that reflects 
the realities of both the domestic and world political 
environments of the 1990s, as well as attempts to serve as 
a set of guidelines for the foreseeable future. A review of 
the literature indicates that such a project has not been 
undertaken previously.
It is clear, therefore, that there is a gap in the 
literature that needs to be filled. This work proposes to 
do so by articulating, and then evaluating the validity of, 
such a typology. This task is the objective of the 
following chapters of this paper.
Pursuit of the Study
As regards the methodology to be employed, it is clear 
that, due to the small number of instances available, the 
case study method is the only feasible approach. An 
additional advantage of this method is the factual richness 
that such qualitative methods lend to the establishment, 
and subsequent refinement, of the typology and its 
fulfillment indicators.
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The cases of American intervention in Somalia, Panama, 
and the Persian Gulf area have been selected for detailed 
evaluation. This is largely due to the fact they are, at 
the time of this writing, the only fully completed missions 
where the U.S. armed forces have been called upon to act, 
for whatever reasons, since the fall of the Soviet empire. 
(Haiti, the most recent case of American intervention, is 
still underway and thus cannot be evaluated as fully as the 
other cases.)
Three principal sources will be utilized in 
researching this study. First, scholarly works (monographs 
and articles) will be used to establish the academic 
"context" into which this study fits, as well to provide 
needed factual information and insights related to the 
cases dealt with here. Second, records of official 
proceedings —  such as congressional hearings, official 
statements of policy, as well as "unofficial" speeches of 
officials who were involved —  will be relied upon in 
presenting the case studies. Finally, "newspapers of 
record," such as the New York Times, as well as Facts on 
File and Keesing's. will be consulted in order to establish 
the necessary facts of each case. Together these should 
provide all the necessary information required to make this 
study possible.
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CHAPTER II
A BRIEF HISTORY OP U.S. DIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION
Introduction
Military intervention has long been a prominent 
feature of U.S. foreign policy. It may be recalled that one 
of the first acts of the Second Continental Congress was to 
authorize an invasion of Quebec in order to foment an 
uprising there and perhaps gain an ally - a "fourteenth 
colony" - in the rebellion against the British crown.
The purpose of this chapter is not to write the 
definitive history of U.S. military intervention. Rather, 
it is to give a broad overview of the historical 
development of American military intervention. For this 
purpose, our discussion will be general in nature. This 
chapter will survey intervention over the last century. 
Utilizing representative instances, the present discussion 
will illustrate the types of such actions, official U.S. 
attitudes toward the use of force, the legacy of the Cold 
War tradition, and the resultant post-Vietnam mindset.
Earlv Interventions
United States foreign policy, from the founding of the 
republic, has relied on a resort to the sword. In the late 
1790s, President Adams waged an undeclared naval war 
against France. His successor, Thomas Jefferson, dispatched
20
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the Navy and Marines to deal with marauding Barbary 
pirates. Furthermore, in 1818 Andrew Jackson was given 
unofficial approval to conduct an expedition into Spanish 
Florida (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. [CQWR], 
January 5, 1991, article by Ronald D. Elving: 37). Modern 
U.S. military intervention, however, finds its origins in 
the 1898 Spanish-American War. Prior to that conflict, U.S. 
foreign policy was largely guided by the principle of non­
intervention. Americans, concerned with fulfilling their 
Manifest Destiny, for the most part ignored the outside 
world. Conflicts, when they did come, were aimed at 
expanding the new republic's frontiers.
The organizing principle of U.S. foreign policy was 
the Monroe Doctrine. Promulgated in 1823, this policy was 
aimed at European colonial powers who were contemplating 
the reclamation of their recently liberated colonies in 
Latin America. While warning European powers from 
attempting to interfere in Latin American affairs, it also 
had the effect of demarcating a United States sphere of 
interest in Western Hemisphere (Gardner, 1992: 27). It 
bears noting that these bold words were unenforceable 
without the British Navy guaranteeing compliance. 
Nevertheless, the Monroe Doctrine, in one form or another, 
has been invoked well into the Twentieth Century.
The Spanish-American War, although a comic-opera 
affair in its pursuit, was a watershed event in the history
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of U.S. military intervention. Using the destruction of the 
USS Maine in Havana Harbor (allegedly by the Spanish) as a 
pretext, the United States invaded Cuba in support of an 
anti-colonial uprising. The Pacific Fleet under Admiral 
Dewey engaged the Spanish in the Philippines as well.
The war was short, barely longer than three months, 
and with surprisingly few combat fatalities. This "splendid 
little war" is significant not so much on its own merits, 
but rather because of what resulted from it (Musicant,
1990: 6). With the cessation of hostilities, the United 
States acquired a small empire. Added to U.S. territory 
were such far-flung locales as Puerto Rico, Guam, and the 
Philippine Islands. The United States was now a world 
power, and jingoists were eager to extend American 
interests to the four corners of the earth. President 
McKinley, however, believed that American security and 
interests did not require the addition of Cuba to American 
territory. Rather, Washington chose to exercise a European- 
style "protectorate" over Cuba. That is to say that Cuba 
would maintain its official independence, but Havana's 
freedom in foreign policy would be limited by the United 
States. This policy was codified by the Platt Amendment 
which, in addition, allowed the United States both basing 
rights in Cuba, as well as carte blanche to intervene under 
specific circumstances (Musicant, 1990: 50-51).
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Cuba would become a model for American military 
intervention throughout the Caribbean basin in the first 
third of the Twentieth Century. Such intervention was 
virtually institutionalized by President Theodore 
Roosevelt. Roosevelt added a "corollary" to the Monroe 
Doctrine which asserted that the U.S. could engage in 
unilateral military intervention anywhere within the 
Americas where conditions might entice a European armed 
response (Musicant, 1990: 3). As Roosevelt himself 
declared: "Brutal wrongdoing, or an impotence which results 
in a general loosening of the ties of a civilized society, 
may finally require intervention by some civilized nation, 
and in the Western Hemisphere the United States cannot 
ignore this duty" (Chessman, 1969: 97).
This broadened interventionist policy is largely 
associated with the 1904 Debt Default Crisis of the 
Dominican Republic, when the Santo Domingo government 
defaulted on loans made by European creditors. Roosevelt, 
fearing a European "repossession" of the Dominican Republic 
in violation of the Monroe Doctrine, sent U.S. troops to 
head-off such a possibility. By the following year, the 
situation had stabilized. With Washington acting as a loan 
collector, payments to European creditors resumed.
The most enduring legacy of Roosevelt's policy of 
hemispheric intervention, however, was his simultaneous 
construction of both a new nation and a new canal in
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Panama. In 1903, a treaty which would have granted the U.S. 
the right to build a canal across the isthmus in Panama 
province was rejected by the Colombian Senate. An enraged 
Roosevelt took advantage of an uprising in Panama. By 
sending American warships, most notably the USS Nashville, 
to waters off the Panamanian coast, Roosevelt was able to 
prevent Colombian troops from suppressing the rebellion. 
With Panamanian independence thus secured, the U.S. and the 
new regime entered into negotiations.
These efforts culminated with the signing of the Hay- 
Bunau-Varilla Treaty on November 18, 1903. This compact 
provided for a ten-mile wide zone, stretching from coast- 
to-coast, which would be leased in perpetuity to the U.S. 
for the purposes of canal construction, maintenance, and 
defense (Musicant, 1990: 136). In addition, the treaty 
"provided a clear and specific legal basis for...U.S. 
intervention in the event of disorder," making subsequent 
U.S. intervention unique in that it was based on treaty 
rights (Scranton, 1992: 344-45).
Woodrow Wilson, perhaps best known for his post World 
War I policy of national self-determination in Europe, was 
not above invoking Roosevelt's corollary in hemispheric 
affairs. Under the earlier Taft Administration, Washington 
had engaged in "dollar diplomacy," under which American 
businessmen were encouraged to invest in the Caribbean 
basin by guaranteeing their loans with the full diplomatic
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and, if necessary, military support of the U.S. government. 
As such, U.S. loans were made to a number of Latin and 
Caribbean states. In 1912, this policy was put to the test 
when U.S. troops invaded and occupied Nicaragua in order to 
safeguard U.S. lives and interests.
Over time, Wilson continued, yet refined, this 
interventionist policy. He sought political and economic 
stability in the Caribbean basin so as to engender 
"sustained economic growth and [help] to insure the prompt 
payment of foreign debt" which would keep U.S. [and 
European] bankers happy while keeping foreign troops out of 
the Western Hemisphere (Steward, 1980: 17).
In keeping with his established policy, in 1917 Wilson 
sent 2,600 Marines to prop up the corrupt Menocal regime in
Cuba. Likewise, Haiti was invaded in 1915 in order to
"prevent anarchy" or perhaps more accurately, to establish 
a government capable of maintaining a stable environment 
for foreign investment (Gardner, 1992: 30). The Dominican 
Republic, also, was invaded the following year and both it
and Haiti were placed under U.S. military rule.
During the period 1915-1934, 2,000 Haitians were 
killed by U.S.troops (Steward, 1980: 20). Indigenous 
government was not allowed in either Haiti or the Dominican 
Republic until 1924. It should, however, be noted that the 
U.S. trained paramilitary forces to maintain order. Steward 
claims that these groups were the forerunners of the
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Haitian secret police: the Tontons Macoute (Steward, 1980: 
18).
American intervention during this period was not 
limited to Caribbean island republics. Wilson ordered U.s. 
troops into Mexico twice. First, in 1913, American forces 
occupied Vera Cruz as part of an attempt to overthrow 
Mexican military dictator, Victoriano Huerta. Again, in 
1916 the President dispatched General John "Black Jack" 
Pershing on a punitive expedition to capture the bandit 
Pancho Villa, who had killed several U.S. citizens during 
raids into the American Southwest (Steward 1980: 17). Villa 
eluded his pursuer and was never apprehended.
Intervention in the Caribbean basin continued into the 
1920s, most notably in Nicaragua. U.S. Marines stationed 
there to prop up the Nicaraguan regime were thought to be 
no longer needed and were withdrawn in the mid-1920s. 
However, a new uprising in 1926 prompted the Marines' 
return. By 1927, U.S. forces deposed the incumbent regime 
and installed a new one. The rebels, labeled "Bolshevists" 
by Secretary of State Kellogg and armed by Mexico, were 
pursued by the Marines until the mid-1930s. In 1934, rebel 
leader Cesar Augusto Sandino was lured into a trap and 
killed by U.S.-trained National Guardsmen led by future 
Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Samoza (Steward, 1980: 24-5). 
(It may be interesting to note that Sandino's name was 
appropriated by a group - the "Sandinistas" - who,
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ironically overthrew the dictatorship of Samoza's namesake 
nephew.)
Isolationism
The election of Herbert Hoover marked a change in the 
direction of U.S. foreign policy. Going from 
interventionism to restraint, this policy during the 1930s 
would evolve into isolationism. The Hoover policy was most 
clearly articulated in 1930 with the issuance of the so- 
called "Clark Memorandum." This document, while not 
completely disavowing all possible future intervention, did 
renounce the Roosevelt corollary of the Monroe Doctrine. 
Henceforth, Washington would be more guarded in the 
utilization of military diplomacy. President Hoover, 
consequently, repressed the urge to send the Marines into 
Panama and Haiti (1931), and El Salvador (1932) (Steward, 
1980: 26). In 1933, Hoover withdrew all U.S. forces from 
Nicaragua.
This retreat from overt interventionism in Central 
America lasted beyond Hoover’s administration. Later, it 
led the way to "the Good Neighbor policy" during President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration (Gardner, 1992: 32).
During the 1930s, isolationism, a term usually 
associated with American policy toward European affairs, 
was the word that best characterized both the political 
atmosphere and the policy trends of the decade. The U.S. 
government largely declined to use American troops in
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hemispheric affairs, while the strange political 
bedpartners of communists, Lindburgh-Kennedy style fascist 
sympathizers, and the apathetic majority managed to 
forestall any U.S. intervention in Europe.
1947-1957; The Era of Containment
The ordeal of World War II, and the circumstances 
leading to it, tremendously reshaped the political 
landscape, especially with regard to American foreign 
policy. With victory, there was a renewed interest in how 
events beyond America's shoreline affected national 
security. This reassessment was fuelled by a number of 
factors. First among these factors was the belief by many 
in both government and the public that American non­
involvement in European affairs had left the democracies no 
choice but appeasement, and that appeasement had 
necessarily led to war.
Second, throughout the Nineteenth and early Twentieth 
Centuries, U.S. policies were, as a practical matter, 
enforced by British naval power. World War II, however, 
brought this arrangement to an end. The United States, as 
the heir to the fallen Euro-centric order that had been 
dominant in world affairs since the Sixteenth Century, 
perceived the Soviet Union as "a distinctive challenge" to 
American goals in the post-war era.
Third, these suspicious views of the USSR's ambitions, 
especially when taken with hostile Soviet conduct in the
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immediate post-war era, as well as the evil nature of 
Stalin himself, combined to become the what would be called 
the "Cold War;" an intense ideological competition between 
the superpowers. It was a challenge that American leaders 
were eager to take on (Gardner, 1992: 33).
A war-weary public supported the initial 
demobilization of U.S. forces that accompanied the 
immediate post-war period. This view had not changed 
substantially by the time the Greek Civil War erupted. 
President Truman, however, thought it important to stop the 
spread of communism; a threat that he believed, sooner or 
later, would more directly threaten the West if not halted 
in Greece. The result was the Truman Doctrine.
In a speech before Congress on March 12, 1947, Truman 
sought $400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey in order to 
help those countries fend off communism. Truman justified 
his request by arguing: "I believe that it must be the 
policy of the United States to support free peoples who are 
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by 
outside pressures." The clear implication of the Truman 
Doctrine was that the Soviets needed to be contained within 
Eastern Europe. Although this policy was originally 
intended to simply apply to the defense of Western Europe, 
Truman made it clear that it could be applied in other 
regions where Communism threatened American interests 
(Woods and Jones, 1991: 145).
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The first major expansion of the Truman Doctrine 
beyond Europe was not long delayed. In 1949, Chaing Kai- 
chek's Nationalist armies were defeated by Communist forces 
and driven off the mainland to Taiwan. This was a jolt to 
the United States. Congress, alarmed by the "loss" of 
China, became acutely concerned over the "rising Red tide" 
and what it perceived as its Soviet source.
On June 25, 1950, Communist North Korean forces 
stormed across the 38th parallel into South Korea. They 
rapidly captured Seoul, driving United States and South 
Korean forces back to the port city of Pusan. Until this 
invasion, Korea had not been perceived as a major strategic 
interest of the United States. The President, however, 
immediately invoked the Truman Doctrine and ordered 
American troops to repel the North Korean assault (Klare, 
1992: 40). United Nations forces (about 90% American) under 
General Douglas McArthur counter-attacked at Inchon and 
swept the North Koreans up the peninsula to the Chinese 
border. With the success of the intervention there was 
broad support for the "liberation of Korea" (MacDonald, 
1986: 57). However, much of this support dissipated with 
the entry of China into the conflict. The war eventually 
bogged down into a bloody stalemate and produced 
considerable public discontent in the U.S. In 1953, shortly 
after the election of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, an
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
31
armistice was signed which ended the conflict. The result 
has been an enduring, if uneasy, peace on the peninsula.
President Eisenhower adopted a scaled-down defense 
posture, which relied to a great extent on the new doctrine 
of "massive retaliation," with its implied threat of resort 
to nuclear weapons, in order to discourage Soviet 
adventures in the Third World. Emphasis was placed on 
getting "more bang for the buck" from defense spending. As 
such, conventional military capabilities were reduced in 
favor of increased procurement of, and reliance on, nuclear 
weapons. This "New Look" defense saved money by cutting 
land forces and the surface fleet. Defense planning during 
this period was concerned primarily with the Soviet threat 
and as such really did not contemplate the need for force 
projection into the Third World until the late 1950s. Only 
at the end of President Eisenhower's tenure, "with the 1958 
U.S. landing in Lebanon and the accompanying Eisenhower 
Doctrine (authorizing U.S. military action to prevent a 
communist takeover of Middle Eastern countries), did he 
envision a direct U.S. military role in regional, 
nonnuclear conflicts" (Klare, 1992: 40).
1957-1973: The Era of High Intervention
By the early 1960s, the Dullesian doctrine of Massive 
Retaliation was under attack. It was criticized as 
irresponsible in a nuclear age, as well as ineffective in 
fighting communist "liberation movements" in the Third
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World. Therefore, after 1960, the Kennedy Administration 
sought a new doctrine that would not require engaging in 
brinkmanship as a response to all provocations, regardless 
of how small.
The solution to this policy dilemma was found in the 
doctrine of "flexible response." Its major advocate,
General Maxwell Taylor, believed that, while the United 
States was in a position to deter a general war, it should 
be prepared to defeat smaller-scale, local aggression. 
Therefore, in order to provide a credible, realistic 
response to challenges arising in the Third World, there 
should be a significant expansion of U.S. conventional 
capabilities. This buildup would enable the president to 
choose from a wide variety of alternatives, ranging from 
nonnuclear to tactical nuclear options, the type of forces 
that would constitute the optimal response to any challenge 
(Kinnard, 1991: 42; Taylor, 1989: 206, 211, 214-215).
A key component of these expanded options was 
Kennedy's special emphasis on the creation of counter­
insurgency forces to respond to communist challenges in the 
Third World. Modelled on the British experience in Malaya, 
counter-insurgency's central purpose was to thwart 
communist rebels by "winning the hearts and minds" of 
potentially receptive peasants, while energetically 
engaging the rebels themselves with direct military force. 
In the early 1960s, Kennedy found a laboratory where it
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would be possible to try out these new ideas on low 
intensity warfare: Vietnam.
American interest in Indochina dated back to the early 
part of the Eisenhower administration. It was President 
Kennedy, however, who authorized a substantial increase in 
the U.S. military presence in South Vietnam. However, 
despite its initial role as a laboratory for newly 
developed weapons and counterinsurgency tactics, Vietnam 
rapidly generated its own inertia, becoming increasingly 
important as a symbol. "For, having designated Vietnam as a 
proving ground for counterinsurgency, it became essential 
for the United States to avoid defeat lest U.S. failure in 
Indochina encourage revolutionaries in other countries to 
undertake guerilla campaigns of their own" (Klare, 1992: 
41-42).
There were also other international implications that 
developed along with such policy concerns. As George C. 
Herring points out in his America's Longest War, during the 
Johnson Administration, Vietnam evolved into a showcase of 
U.S. resolve and credibility to honor its security 
commitments to current and potential allies. Herring 
observed that "the United States intervened in Vietnam to 
block the apparent march of a Soviet-directed Communism 
across Asia, enlarged its commitment to halt a presumably 
expansionist Communist China, and eventually made Vietnam a
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test of its determination to uphold world order" (Herring, 
1986: 279).
The test of American resolve that Vietnam represented 
was fought on a scale unprecedented for an undeclared war/ 
intervention. Although air sorties started earlier, the 
first American ground forces, two battalions of Marines, 
were landed at Danang in March 1965. Within a month, this 
number was increased to 40,000 (Herring, 1986: 131-132). At 
the peak of U.S. involvement, 543,000 service personnel 
were present in Vietnam (Lomperis, 1993: 82).
The style of combat ranged from guerilla/ 
counterinsurgency to strategic bombing to conventional 
warfare. Although U.S. forces never lost a major engagement 
against the enemy (even the 1968 Tet offensive was a U.S. 
military victory), by the early 1970s the situation was had 
become a stalemate. American troops maintained their secure 
points, yet were unable to fully stop communist activity in 
the countryside or traffic along the Ho Chi Minh trail 
(Herring, 1986: 191). The cost, however, was staggering. 
Between 1969 and 1973, 20,553 American soldiers were killed 
(Herring, 1986: 256).
While TJ,J5. troops were able to fend off communist 
forces, the South Vietnamese regime was largely ineffective 
in its efforts to engender any degree of internal 
efficiency of operation or loyalty from its populace. South 
Vietnamese government was a succession of dictators and
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military strongmen. Governmental infrastructure was rife
with corruption. The United States, utilizing techniques
covering the range from quiet diplomacy to outright
involvement in a coup d'etat (President Diem was deposed by
a U.S.-backed coup in 1963), sought to transform the Saigon
regime so that the "democracy" in the South that Americans
were dying for would, in fact, exist (Herring, 1986: 69-70,
77, 84, 105-107). Unfortunately, U.S. efforts at "nation-
building" in Vietnam ultimately met vith failure.
Transformation of the political system, if it were to come
at all, was going to have to be organic. It never
materialized.
President Nixon, tiring of both criticism and long
casualty lists, in 1969 started the phased withdrawal of
U.S. forces. This policy, called "Vietnamization," was
designed to shift the brunt of the fighting (and
casualties) from U.S. forces to the South Vietnamese Army.
By 1972, Nixon had withdrawn all but 25,000 American
soldiers. The effect was a dramatic reduction in the number
of casualties (Lomperis, 1993: 82).
Faced with clear evidence that U.S. intervention had
long since reached a point of greatly diminished returns,
the Nixon Administration entered into negotiations to end
the conflict. The result was the 1973 Paris Peace Treaty.
As Herring observes:
Only by the most narrow definition can the 
agreement be said to have constituted "peace with
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honor." It permitted American extrication from 
the war and secured the return of the POWs, while 
leaving the (Saigon) government intact, at least 
for the moment. On the other hand, North 
Vietnamese troops remained in the South and the 
(communist rebels were) accorded a position of 
status. The major question over which the war had 
been fought - the political future of South 
Vietnam - was left to be resolved later (emphasis 
added)(Herring, 1986: 255).
For all of the parties concerned, such "peace with 
honor" came at a very high price indeed. Although the U.S. 
was not nearly as damaged by the conflict as was Vietnam, 
the cost was nevertheless enormous. Total war dead for the 
American side was a staggering 58,000. Furthermore, "the 
war polarized the American people and poisoned the 
political atmosphere as had no issue since slavery a 
century before. Although Nixon had held out for peace with 
honor in order to maintain America's position in the world, 
the United States emerged from the war with its image 
considerably tarnished abroad and its people weary of 
international involvement" (Herring, 1986: 256).
1973-1980: Neo-Isolationism
To many Americans, both in Congress and the public-at- 
large, Vietnam was a traumatic experience. This eleven year 
debacle was America's longest military conflict, and her 
first defeat. Regardless of their political persuasion, 
Americans seemed to agree that the war and its outcome were 
"the politicians' fault." Liberals, for example, argued 
that President Kennedy was mistaken in involving the U.S. 
in a land war in Asia. Furthermore, some of those on the
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left believed that President Nixon had sinister motives 
behind his escalation of the conflict, especially the 
Christmas bombing campaign of 1971-72 and the invasion of 
Cambodia. Conservatives, on the other hand, argued that 
President Johnson had compelled U.S. forces to "fight with 
one arm tied behind their back" because of his rigid rules 
of engagement and his refusal to carry the ground war into 
the communist North.
What both camps had in common were concerns about 
alleged executive blundering and its root cause: an 
"imperial presidency." In this style of leadership, the 
executive could commit U.S. forces indefinitely under the 
aegis of the constitutionally ordained power as commander- 
in-chief, thus bypassing Congress and the need for a formal 
declaration of war. As a result, "U.S. citizens and 
policymakers sought to prevent any repetition of such a 
fiasco by imposing a number of important restrictions on 
U.S. military involvement in regional Third World 
conflicts. These restraints, inspired by the 'Vietnam 
Syndrome' - a clear and pervasive reluctance on the part of 
American citizens to support U.S. intervention in local, 
Third World conflicts - included the abandonment of 
conscription, a substantial reduction in U.S. military aid 
to unstable Third World governments, and, under the War 
Powers Act of 1973, a legislative ban on the extended
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deployment (without congressional approval) of U.S. troops 
abroad" (Klare, 1992: 42-43).
During the administration of Gerald Ford (1974-1977), 
this retreat from direct involvement in Third World 
conflict became more pronounced. Except for the insertion 
of U.S. Marines into Cambodia to liberate the USS Mavaguez 
and her crew from their Khmer Rouge captors in 1975, there 
was no direct American military intervention in the Third 
World. However, covert action continued as the U.S. 
attempted to curb Soviet and Cuban adventures in the Third 
World, particularly in Africa.
In the Angolan Civil War (1975-1976) Washington 
supplied the pro-Western National Front for the Liberation 
of Angola (FNLA) and Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the 
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Covert aid was 
supplied by the CIA which used friendly countries in the 
region, primarily Zaire, as conduits through which arms and 
supplies could flow. The timing of this aid, however, was 
historically unfortunate. The first year of major U.S. 
covert aid, 1975, was only two years after the American 
withdrawal from Vietnam. Angola was a "far away" war, 
involving people Americans knew, or cared, little about. 
This fact, as well as its appearance to many to be a 
conflict that had no end in sight, made the situation in 
Angola appear to many to be a "second Vietnam." Because of 
the powerful hold that the then-newly emergent "Vietnam
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Syndrome had on the American psyche, it was politically 
impossible to help UNITA to the extent that the Ford 
Administration wanted to” (Hyland, 1987: 15).
Consequently, congressional opposition increased with 
each passing day. This culminated with the passage of the 
Clark Amendment in 1975. By a margin of 55 to 22, the 
Senate voted to cut off funds for the CIA Task Force on 
Angola. It would be another five years before the U.S. 
would undertake another such covert operation (Bridgeland, 
1986: 155).
The Carter Administration was largely a period of 
isolation from intervention in Third World conflicts. 
However, as a result of Soviet aid and/or Cuban 
intervention, both direct and indirect, the list of what 
Washington often viewed as new Soviet client states 
expanded with breathtaking swiftness. Ethiopia, Angola, 
Mozambique, and Nicaragua were among the more prominent of 
the new allies that Moscow gathered during this period of 
U.S. inaction in the 1970s.
Eventually, the Carter Administration came to the 
realization that a post-Vietnam reassessment of U.S. 
foreign and military policy was needed. In 1979, against a 
backdrop of the fall of two American clients, Anastasio 
Samoza in Nicaragua and the Shah of Iran, the National 
Security Council concluded that the time had come to 
reassert American power and influence in the global arena.
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This new interventionist consensus was converted, in June 
1979, into new programs by several key presidential 
decisions. These initiatives included: "a commitment to the 
use of U.S military power to protect key economic resources 
in the Third World (especially oil); the activation of the 
Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), an assortment of units from 
all four military services earmarked for intervention in 
the Third World; the acquisition of new basing rights in 
the Indian Ocean area (Notably in Oman, Kenya, and 
Somalia); and the permanent deployment of a carrier battle 
group in the Indian Ocean" (Klare, 1992: 45). None of these 
initiatives was announced until the 1980 State of the Union 
message. Circumstances at that time, however, would give 
that speech far greater importance than anyone ever 
anticipated.
1980-1989: Neo-Interventionism and the Reagan Doctrine
On Christmas Day 1979, Soviet paratrooper and special 
forces seized the airport, as well as several other 
strategic locations in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. 
After executing the Afghan leader, Hafezullah Amin, the 
Soviets installed the more reliable Babrak Karmal as a 
puppet-dictator. Immediately, Soviet forces were "invited" 
by the Kabul regime to "help" it suppress an increasingly 
successful uprising by anti-communist tribesmen. Soviet 
troops poured across the border, secured the major cities 
and engaged rebel forces throughout the country.
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In his 1980 State of the Union address, President
Carter devoted most of the text to foreign policy and
defense concerns. He outlined a number of responses to the
Afghanistan crisis. Among these measures: (1) the U.S.
would impose an embargo on the export of grain to the USSR,
(2) Washington would curtail sales of high technology items
to Moscow, and (3) the U.S. would plan on boycotting the
1980 Moscow Summer Olympics (Goldman, 1994: 19).
The most important part of the speech, however,
reflected Carter's concern that Afghanistan was possibly a
prelude to a drive to dominate the Persian Gulf area
whether by further destabilizing Iran (where U.S. embassy
personnel were in their third month of captivity by the
Khomeini regime) or by an attempt at military intimidation
of Gulf States, if not outright conquest. "In this address,
Carter affirmed Washington's readiness to use military
force in protecting the oil flow from the Persian Gulf"
(Klare, 1992: 45). Articulating what would instantly be
dubbed the "Carter Doctrine," the President declared:
Let our position be absolutely clear. An attempt 
by any outside force to gain control of the 
Persian Gulf will be regarded as an assault on 
the vital interests of the United States of 
America, and such an assault will be repelled by 
any means necessary, including military force 
(New York Times. January 24, 1980, text of Carter 
address).
To this day, this policy continues to serve as the 
rationale for American military activity in the Persian 
Gulf area.
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On April 24, 1980, in his only "major" combat 
deployment of U.S. armed forces, President Carter sent a 
commando team into southeastern Iran in an attempt to 
rescue U.S. embassy personnel being held hostage by the 
Islamic fundamentalist theocracy in Teheran (Tower, 1987: 
157). Although ambitious, the plan was poorly executed. 
"Desert One" resulted in eight Americans killed, much 
equipment destroyed (including a C-130 transport) and 
abandoned, and an enormous embarrassment for the United 
States in general, President Carter in particular (Daggett, 
1992: 203). To the public this episode seemed to underscore 
conservative charges that Carter had, at the least, 
neglected the maintenance of American military power and 
called into question whether the U.S. was capable of 
projecting force in defense of her vital national 
interests.
Popular concern over both the fate of the hostages in 
Iran and the general decline of U.S. power and prestige 
loomed large in the 1980 elections. A renewed buildup of 
the armed forces and a resolve to use them were major 
themes of the victorious Reagan campaign. Once in office, 
the new President wasted no time in keeping his campaign 
promises.
In 1981, President Reagan initiated what would become 
a $2 trillion military build-up. Under this program, the 
highest priority was given to the development of expanded
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force projection capabilities. The focus of these 
enhancements centered on elite army Special Forces units, 
the navy's carrier and amphibious fleets, and the air 
force's long-range airlift capacity (Klare, 1992: 45).
The Reagan military build-up was accompanied by a more 
aggressive foreign policy posture, especially toward the 
Soviet Union and its communist/left-wing clients. To 
Reagan, the USSR was an "evil empire," based on a sinister 
ideology: communism. In Reagan's eyes, it was clear that 
Moscow desired to spread communism by destabilizing free, 
or at least pro-Western, governments. The Soviets were 
viewed, therefore, as at least indirectly behind the 
terrorism threatening the West and "revolutionary" upheaval 
in the Third World (Klare, 1992: 50).
In order to counter the Soviet threat to Europe, the 
U.S. deployed a new generation of Pershing and Cruise 
missiles. However, blunting the communist advances in the 
Third World was going to be considerably more difficult, 
given the then-still pervasive Vietnam Syndrome which 
placed a practical limitation on the use of direct U.S. 
force under such circumstances.
Given the limited options available. President Reagan 
decided that perhaps the most effective way to engage the 
Soviets and their clients was to pursue a strategy similar 
to that which Moscow had long-used to its own advantage: 
find a revolutionary group to back with both arms and money
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in an attempt to undermine, and press claims against, the 
incumbent Marxist government.
The ideological justification for this policy found 
its expression in what came to be known as the HReagan 
Doctrine.” Its theme was simple: America is the leader of 
the free world, and as such she must protect freedom where 
it exists and spread freedom to where it does not. As a 
practical issue, the Reagan Doctrine was this: ”the U.S. is 
prepared to help others protect or restore their freedom 
and independence, but not to assume responsibility for the 
task” (emphasis added)(Kirkpatrick, 1985: 12). The object 
was to help Third World peoples stop communism by aiding, 
with both arms and money, viable anti-Marxist rebel 
movements in a given country. As opposed to the traditional 
Cold War doctrine of "we will do it for you," as was the 
case in Vietnam, the Reagan Doctrine asserted "we will help 
you to do it, but if you want freedom, you must fight for 
it yourselves" (Kirkpatrick, 1985: 14) . The U.S. was 
willing to give financial aid and military support, but 
would not commit U.S. forces. Under the auspices of the 
Reagan Doctrine, U.S. aid was given to anti-communist 
rebels in Nicaragua, Cambodia, Afghanistan, and after the 
1985 repeal of the Clark Amendment, Angola.
President Reagan's use of direct force as an 
instrument of U.S. foreign policy also expanded. "Often 
disregarding the cautionary advice of his military
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advisors, Reagan deployed U.S. troops and advisors to 
Central America (El Salvador), Grenada, and Lebanon, 
authorized air strikes against Libya, and sent a powerful 
naval fleet into the Persian Gulf" (Klare, 1992: 46). This 
conspicuous readiness, on the part of the Reagan 
Administration, to use force in overseas conflict 
situations seemed designed to send two distinct messages. 
The first, intended for the American people, was that the 
U.S. needed to reaffirm its leadership of the Free World 
and in doing so begin to put the legacy of Vietnam behind. 
The second, intended for other countries, friend or foe 
alike, was that the U.S. was now ready to reassert itself 
in the global arena and would actively pursue its interests 
whatever and wherever they may be.
In a 1984 speech at the National Press Club, Reagan's 
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger articulated 
guidelines under which he believed U.S. uses of direct 
military forces should be conducted. Weinberger argued that 
American forces should be utilized only in defense of 
"vital" interests. If a situation were sufficiently 
important to warrant intervention, then the troops must be 
sent "with the clear intention of winning." Furthermore, 
American forces should utilized in pursuit of "clearly 
defined political and military objectives." Consequently, 
troop deployment should be limited to the levels necessary 
to achieve those objectives. Moreover, there must be "some
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reasonable assurance" of popular support for such action. 
Finally, "the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be 
a last resort" (Carpenter, 1992: 158).
Weinberger's guidelines governed American military 
intervention during the Reagan years (even if such force 
was not always used as a last resort). There is evidence 
that the Bush Administration was equally mindful of these 
caveats on the use of American military power (Carpenter, 
1992: 158). However, these principles were developed at the 
height of what some referred to as "Cold War II," the 
renewed hostility between the superpowers that followed the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Rooted as they were in an 
assumption that potential adversaries would have the 
backing of a hostile superpower, it remained to be seen 
whether these principles would retain their relevance in 
the post-Cold War era. As a practical matter, the Cold War 
ended with the success of the "Velvet Revolutions" that 
swept Eastern Europe in 1989. With the 1991 demise of the 
USSR, the United States became more free to dedicate 
greater emphasis, and resources, to the protection of its 
interests in the Third World. While Secretary Weinberger's 
guidelines showed considerable insight, they are still 
quite general in nature. To develop specific pre-conditions 
that would tend to favor the success of U.S. military 
intervention is a task that, until now, has yet to be
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undertaken. The specification of such criteria is the task 
of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER XII
A TYPOLOGY OF PRECONDITIONS FAVORING THE SUCCESS 
OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
Intervention Defined
To the practitioner of political science, the clarity 
of terms is important. Words are his tools, so their 
precise use is essential. The term "intervention" is one 
that is particularly troublesome to pin down. Its meaning 
dramatically shifts depending upon the context of use.
Eight common uses of this term in a political context may 
be identified.
1. In general terms, intervention can be defined as 
the involvement, by whatever means, of one state in the 
domestic affairs of another state.
2. The term may also be used to denote the entry of a 
previously uninvolved party into a conflict between states.
More specifically, the practice of intervention, in 
this century, has added several connotations to this 
elusive term, almost all of which carry the implication of 
the use of armed force. Arranging them in a spectrum of 
least-to-most violent, we have:^
3. Diplomatic Intervention: This idea in turn has two 
variants. On the benign side, this is involvement of the 
good offices of the diplomatic corps of a nation, acting as 
an arbitrator or a mediator, to end a conflict e XthcjL
48
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between or within states. For example, in the 1970s, U.S. 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger attempted, through 
"shuttle diplomacy,11 to bring an end to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. In 1994 he again attempted to use his stature as 
a respected diplomat to end violent conflict between 
loyalists of the African National Congress (ANC) and 
Inkatha Party in South Africa in the period immediately 
before the post-apartheid founding elections in April 1994.
However, diplomatic intervention is not without its 
more aggressive, or intrusive, side. In an effort to get 
China to adhere to humane standards of human rights 
conduct, the Clinton Administration dispatched Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher to Beijing. Armed with evidence 
that much of china's exports to the U.S. were manufactured 
with forced labor, Christopher warned Communist authorities 
that continued flouting of human rights would result in the 
loss of Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status with the 
United States. Furthermore, Clinton also endeavored to use 
diplomatic means to get North Korea to curtail its nuclear 
program, specifically to abandon further nuclear weapons 
development, as envisioned by the terms of the Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Treaty.
4. Economic Intervention: this entails the use of 
economic tools (often called "sanctions") by one state to 
compel a change in the position and/or actions of another 
state (Elliott, 1992: 97). A prominent example of this was
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President Carter's 1980 imposition of an embargo on grain 
exports to the Soviet Union. Undertaken in reaction to the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter sought to use the 
embargo as a means of showing that "business as usual" 
could not be conducted with Moscow under the circumstances 
at that time. The policy was undercut when Australia, 
Argentina, and France opportunistically filled in the void 
created by the U.S. abandonment of its market share.
In 1986 economic sanctions were also placed by the 
U.S. Congress on South Africa in an effort to persuade 
Pretoria to dismantle its apartheid laws. The Clinton 
Administration also placed minor economic sanctions on 
Taiwan in order to encourage Taipei to restrain its 
citizens who were trafficking in poached tigers and other 
endangered species. This is believed to be the first time 
that such measures have been used to advance purely 
conservationist goals.
5. Covert Intervention: this connotation is primarily, 
but not limited to, the use by a state of its intelligence 
agents to undermine the government of, or change the 
political situation in, another country (Ransom, 1992:
113). Considerable evidence exists that in 1973, President 
Nixon ordered the CIA to destabilize, and then assist the 
Chilean military to overthrow, the Marxist-oriented, yet 
democratically elected government of President Salvadore 
Allende. According to some reports, another instance
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occurred when the CIA had printed, and distributed, a large 
quantity of counterfeit Iraqi currency shortly before the 
1991 Gulf War, so as to destabilize Iraq's economy and to 
stir up popular discontent against dictator Saddam Hussein.
6. Coercive Diplomacy: this is more fully explored in 
Chapter I, but for our purposes here, it may be defined as 
the credible threat (perhaps underscored by the pre­
positioning of military units) to utilize force for the 
purpose of deterring an adversary from a course of action 
(deterrence), or to undo an action already undertaken 
(compellence). As Schelling notes: "coercion depends more 
on the threat of what is yet to come than on damage already 
done" (Schelling, 1966: 172).
This was the purpose behind 1990-1991's "Operation 
Desert Shield." Following Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, 
the U.S. and its coalition allies deployed their forces in 
a defensive perimeter which paralleled the Iraq-Saudi 
Arabia frontier. This operation was an effort to deter Iraq 
from advancing farther into the Persian Gulf oil fields; it 
was also intended to pre-position the forces and supplies 
necessary to dislodge Iraqi occupation forces from Kuwait, 
in the event that diplomacy and sanctions failed to do so 
(as proved to be the case early in 1991).
7. Low Intensity Warfare: this is also referred to as 
"coercion by proxy." It often involves, but need not be 
limited to, the utilization by an outside power of a pre­
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existing rebel group within a country in order to attain 
the redress of grievances against, and/or the overthrow of, 
the incumbent government (Antizzo, 1992: 11).
Fearful of the geostrategic implications of the 1979 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, under President Carter the 
United States undertook to utilize the CIA to aid covertly 
(and later overtly) Islamic rebels who were fighting both 
the army of the Communist government, as well as Soviet 
occupation forces (Schraeder, 1992: 137-8). Although they 
did not necessarily share the same ultimate goals (the 
rebels sought the overthrow of the communist government, 
while the U.S. simply desired the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops that were so close to the Persian Gulf and to allies 
in the region, such as Pakistan) the U.S. and the rebels 
enjoyed a nearly decade-long marriage of convenience, 
wherein Washington supplied the arms and money and the 
rebels supplied the manpower. The 1989 withdrawal of 
Soviet forces, resulting in the political mellowing of the 
Kabul regime, fulfilled U.S. objectives, and aid to rebel 
forces was terminated shortly afterward.
This pattern was repeated in Angola, Nicaragua, and 
Cambodia (Schraeder, 1992: 141-149), where officials in 
Washington thought that they could utilize pre-existing 
rebel groups both to press claims against hostile 
governments and simultaneously to counter Soviet abilities 
to protect its clients.
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8. Direct Military Intervention: this has evolved 
into three distinct subgroupings: active, reactive, and 
peacekeeping/order-restoring operations.
Active —  This occurs when forces of an outside 
power intervene directly and forcefully in order to 
seek to engage and defeat enemy forces. This was the 
case when the United States intervened openly, and in 
some cases massively, in Korea, Vietnam, Panama, and 
the Persian Gulf area.
Reactive —  In this form of military 
intervention, forces of the intervening power 
establish a security zone within another state's 
territory and seek to enforce its rules upon the 
"host" country within the zone. An example was the 
"no-fly" zones that the United Nations established in 
Iraq and that NATO tried to enforce in Bosnia. It is 
also illustrated by the security zone that Israel 
established earlier in south Lebanon.
Peacekeeping/Restore Order —  This occurs when 
forces of the intervening power (or powers) get 
involved out of largely, but not exclusively, 
humanitarian concerns. Such operations often involve 
separating belligerents, distributing food and medical 
supplies to civilians, establishing "zones of safety," 
and building new, viable structures of state. Examples 
of this include American and/or UN interventionism in
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Somalia (1992-1994), Lebanon (1983), and the efforts 
to restore democracy to Haiti (1994) (Klare, 1992:
53) .
As this review has demonstrated, a great variety of 
shades of meaning for the term intervention exists. For the 
purposes of this study, we will be concerned specifically 
with direct military intervention (#8 above), dealing with 
any other forms only as they relate to the cases being 
utilized.
This limitation of our discussion to direct military 
intervention seems justified for a number of reasons, not 
the least of which are personal interest and a desire to 
fit this work into a single volume. First and foremost, 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union there seems to be an 
increased reliance by the United States on the use of such 
direct force. Nowhere was this renewed enthusiasm for 
military options more evident than in the adoption of an 
uncharacteristically hawkish stance with regard to Haiti by 
the uniformly liberal Congressional Black Caucus.
Second, while other forms of intervention (e.g. economic 
sanctions) still have their place in the American arsenal 
of options, it is evident that an increasing number of 
dictators will respond only to military force. Whether this 
is due to their ability to insulate themselves from the 
effects of such sanctions, their fear that backing down in 
a confrontation with the U.S. would result in a loss of
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face that would threaten their hold on power, simple 
callousness, or possibly failure to comprehend their own 
interests, tyrants in the post-Cold War era seem 
increasingly intransigent and unresponsive to lesser forms 
of intervention.
Finally, as noted earlier, there is a dearth of 
literature identifying and examining those preconditions 
favoring the success of direct military intervention. 
Because of the advance preparations, as well as the heavy 
investment of both military personnel and material, 
required to undertake such operations, greater attention to 
the preconditions for successful intervention is a matter 
of great urgency and priority.
Hypothesis and Expected Findings
It is difficult to believe that there necessarily 
exists any "science of war" that yields rules which, when 
followed, automatically guarantee victory. However, when 
experience with intervention is carefully examined 
regularities emerge. The record of interventions carried 
out in recent history demonstrates that, when certain 
preconditions are present, military operations quite 
clearly tend to be more successful than when such 
preconditions are absent.
The demise of the Cold War was an important turning 
point, not only in East-West relations, but no less because 
of its implications for the pre-conditions that will affect
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future intervention by the United States in the Third 
World. On one hand, Washington is now substantially less 
fearful that its direct intervention will be met by 
counter-intervention by another superpower. The chance that 
global war between great powers would result is no longer a 
risk. On the other hand, now freed of a need to respond to 
all Third World crises reflexively lest Moscow gain 
additional strategic footholds, the United States now has 
the luxury to be more selective in where it chooses to 
intervene. However, does the absence of a great power rival 
with a comparable ability to project force abroad subject 
Washington to greater temptation to give in to future 
opportunities for intervention? This question is especially 
pertinent because for the foreseeable future there will be 
no other power able, or willing to oppose American action. 
Considering the United States' post-Cold War military 
involvement in places as varied as Panama, Iraq, Bosnia, 
Somalia, and Haiti, a preliminary answer would seem to be 
"yes" (Carpenter, 1992: 157-8).
Clearly, there is a greater potential for American 
intervention in the post-Cold War era. This potential, 
taken with the aforementioned circumstances, seems to 
differentiate the nature of such military involvement today 
from earlier, pre-1989 forms. Therefore, the specification 
of pre-conditions favoring the success of interventionist 
behavior acquires even greater importance. With this in
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mind, it may be anticipated that this study will find that 
the following existing preconditions tend to be associated 
with successful interventions in the post-Cold War era:
1. A clear and attainable goal of U.S. policy exists.
This can be defined, for purposes of this study, as a
goal which is clearly and specifically articulated by
political and/or military leaders (e.g. to capture General
Noriega, to liberate Kuwait). The goal has clear criteria 
which, once met, signals the time for the termination of 
interventionist action. By "attainable," it is meant that 
the goal does not require indefinite or ongoing military 
action for its fulfillment. For example a major factor 
leading to the failure of American policy in Vietnam was 
the seeming inability of the Johnson and Nixon 
Administrations to articulate such goals, even as the war 
proceeded. The questions asked both on Capital Hill and 
within the general public were "Why are we there?," and 
"What are our sons dying for?" Such questions were never 
satisfactorily answered by executive policymakers.
An ancillary concern is whether the political 
leadership of the intervening power has established an 
"exit policy," based on such proclaimed goals. It has 
become clear that the public is weary of open-ended 
commitments to be assumed by their sons and daughters 
abroad. In order to placate and hold the support of public 
opinion, silence congressional and media critics, and
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maintain his own clarity of purpose, the president and his 
advisors at some point need to formulate a timetable for 
the withdrawal of American forces. This schedule can be 
derived either by chronology (e.g."the troops will be home 
by Christmas") or by circumstances (e.g. "the troops will 
be withdrawn when order is restored").
2. The intervention is not a peacekeeping operation.
Peacekeeping operations, by their very nature, require 
an ongoing, open-ended commitment of U.S. forces. This 
reality has the potential of becoming a quagmire from which 
the United States is unable to extricate itself. To a 
significant degree, this danger derives from "peace­
keeping's" overall lack of strategic objectives, as well as 
nebulously defined goals which largely defy measurement or 
exactitude. In general terms, how does one know when 
"peace" has actually been achieved within a particular 
society, meaning that military intervention is no longer 
needed? More to the point perhaps, in volatile and 
conflict-prone societies such as Lebanon, Iraq, and Haiti, 
how does one know what "peace" really is?
Furthermore, experience has shown that in order to be 
successful, peacekeeping operations require tremendous 
restraint. For example, on several occasions American 
troops used for such purposes have either been too lightly 
armed or worse, not armed at all. The latter was the case 
in Lebanon (1983), for example, when U.S. forces were
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issued guns but not allowed to load them. Their lightly
defended compound/barracks at the Beirut airport made the
Marines stationed there "sitting ducks." This point was
underscored when the barracks were car-bombed by an Islamic
fundamentalist faction. Shortly afterwards, U.S. forces
were recalled and the Reagan Administration was taken
strongly to task by Congress for the misadventure.
3. The intervention is not a b«manjfcarian mission within a 
war zone.
Despite the most noble of intentions, humanitarian 
interventionism often goes awry. For instance, in a 
laudable pursuit of relieving privation in a foreign 
society, an intervening nation is often confronted with a 
problem that it did not originally foresee: the temptation 
to deal with what it sees as the "root cause" (or causes) 
of the problem. Since this "root cause" is often perceived 
in the final analysis to be political, the result can be 
that, deliberately or undeliberately, the intervening power 
takes sides in what is essentially a tribal or civil war. 
This development, in turn, clearly undercuts the 
intervening power’s credibility as a "disinterested" 
humanitarian provider of relief, as well as dragging it 
deeper into a conflict that it neither wanted nor was 
prepared to resolve.
A valid question to be asked of operations of this 
kind is: "How do such humanitarian operations advance the 
intervener’s interests?" What advantage accrues to the
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nation engaged in interventionism, making it worth the risk
of lives and the expense involved? Are not private relief
agencies sometimes better suited to provide such relief?
Alternatively, if relief distribution is being interfered
with by marauding paramilitary units within the society,
would the problem not be better dealt with by relying on
military protection provided by neighboring states more
directly threatened by the instability in the target
nation? Finally, how is the success, and thus point of
termination, of such operations determined?
4. United States forces are not subject to a multilateral 
authority.
Great powers in general, and the United States in 
particular, are fearful of being labeled "imperialist," 
regardless of the lack of substance of the charge. 
Frequently, unilateral military action seems in the eyes of 
critics to be de facto proof of such imperialistic intent. 
Therefore, for its part the United States often seems to 
seek multilateral backing for its large military 
interventions as a means of acquiring a "fig leaf." That is 
to say that there is often an attempt to rely on or exploit 
multilateralism as a means of the legitimating, and 
deflecting criticism from, the use of military force by 
great powers. This was clearly the case, for example, in 
1950, when the United States sought, and was granted,
United Nations sponsorship for its intervention in Korea. 
Essentially, the conflict was a United States war effort
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(over 90% of the troops were American, with the whole 
operation always under a U.S. commander) under the UN flag, 
and this fact was satisfactory to Washington.
Yet over the last forty years, the UN has become 
increasingly unresponsive to American wishes. By the end of 
the Cold War the UN was more able to assert its own wishes 
and goals when giving its authority in behalf of such 
military enterprises. While U.S. commanders might still 
enjoy some considerable discretion on the battlefield, the 
scope of such discretion has gradually been eroded. A 
cursory glance at such operations seems to indicate that in 
recent years the UN Secretary General has become 
increasingly involved in the micro-management of conflicts 
that involve UN forces. For example, it had been argued by 
members of the Senate that UN Secretary General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali, by declaring Somali General Aidid a war 
criminal and authorizing his capture by UN forces, had 
effectively "hijacked" U.S. foreign policy by forcing 
Washington to take sides in the fighting among Somali war 
lords and factions. .Because of UN mandates, American forces 
engaged in interventionism may be effectively beyond the 
control of their Commander-in-Chief. The result is that 
such mandates for the use of force, even if initiated by 
Washington, may be exploited by the United Nations as a way 
of securing maximum American participation, with a minimum 
of U.S. control over the operation once it has commenced.
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Because they are subject to the scrutiny and approval 
of the member nations, United Nations "use of force" 
authorizations may present additional problems. 
Specifically, the mandate may be so narrow that the 
military action taken treats only the symptoms, and not the 
cause, of the society's problems. As a result, Washington 
may find that it has its "hands tied" politically: it is 
unable to take the action that its leaders deem necessary 
to resolve fully the situation that led to intervention 
initially. During the 1991 Gulf War, for example, U.S. Army 
General Norman Schwartzkopf believed that his forces could 
have marched on Baghdad virtually unopposed and unseated 
the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. However, President 
George Bush stopped military action early in the ground 
campaign, justifying his action by citing the U.N. 
resolution authorizing the use of force. Bush noted that 
the mandate was for the sole purpose of expelling Iraqi 
occupation forces from Kuwait and nothing more.
Congressman Tom Lantos (D-Calif.) warned that because this 
premature termination of the war allowed Hussein to retain 
power and prevented America from rooting out and destroying 
all Scud missiles and centers for the development (and 
stockpiles) of chemical and biological weapons, it was a 
virtual certainty that the United States will have to 
return to "finish the job" in the near future.
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5. Force is used to defend tangible assets or other vital 
national interests.
A definition of "vital national interests," as used 
in our analysis is required. For our purposes it can be 
conceived as any asset (e.g. oil), place (e.g. Europe) or 
principle (e.g. the freedom of navigation in international 
waters) the unavailability of which places a state at a 
strategic or severe diplomatic disadvantage, if not 
directly threatening its independence and/or national 
security. The most enduring legacy of the Vietnam War is 
the universally held belief among Americans that as a 
nation they are no longer willing to sacrifice lives 
lightly for goals of dubious value (such as "nation- 
building"). Today, however, there is little debate that the 
defense of some assets, of which oil is one of the most 
important, is worth the commitment of forces, when 
necessary.
It is clear that the defense of important assets such 
as oil or strategic "choke points," such as the Panama 
Canal, the North Atlantic sea lanes and the Straits of 
Hormuz, is a priority for the U.S. The importance of such 
assets to the national health, and perhaps to the very 
survival of the nation, acts as not only a powerful 
motivator to action, but also presents clear goals for 
policy makers and military planners.
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6. The political situation in the target country is not one 
of civil var.
This pre-condition requires answers for several 
questions that speak to the issue of regime legitimacy. 
Among these questions are: Is the government that the U.S. 
proposes to support viable? Does it have the support of the 
population that it purports to govern, and if so, are the 
people willing to fight to defend it? Is U.S. support 
necessary to turn the tide of battle decisively in the 
favor of the government it is supporting or is such 
intervention merely a prop which is delaying the inevitable 
collapse of the client regime? If the U.S. were to enter 
the conflict, would it, during battle, be able to 
distinguish "hostiles" from "friendlies?" Would American 
soldiers be able to distinguish successfully combatants 
from non-combatants, or would the line between them be 
obscured, as was often the case in Vietnam? If most of the 
answers to these questions are in the negative, then this 
is probably the type of conflict that is likely to become a 
quagmire from which Washington will find it increasingly 
difficult to extricate American forces.
7. There is a strong probability of public support for 
intervention, or at least indifference.
As was demonstrated during the Vietnam War, basic 
differences within public opinion may lead to official 
indecision regarding the war effort. Attempts to rectify 
this situation by efforts to balance interests (e.g.
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purchasing support for Vietnam with Great Society programs) 
may lead to the war effort's being held hostage to domestic 
concerns. Furthermore, the emergence of significant protest 
may present two additional problems. First, it may convey 
to the opponent that there is sufficient discontent within 
American public opinion so that threats made by the 
president need not be taken seriously. Second, there is the 
real chance that the opponent may seek to exploit the 
domestic situation in the United States for its own 
propaganda purposes.
In an earlier era, the absence of overt opposition to 
interventionism could be interpreted by the chief executive 
as a kind of tacit support for the action, on the theory 
that: "if no one is complaining, then it must be all 
right". However, in this newer age of electronic media, 
especially with such sophisticated news organizations as 
CNN that broadcast 24 hours a day, a commitment of direct 
U.S. force on any scale is most unlikely to escape media, 
and thus public, scrutiny as might have been the case 
earlier.
Even today, however, it may be possible to present the 
public with a fait accompli, especially if the 
interventionist operation is narrow or limited in scope.
For example, in the case of the invasion of Grenada in 
1983, the operation was well underway before the public 
ever became aware of it. The mission was complete before
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any organized opposition could challenge it, and protest 
was largely limited to a handful of college campuses. 
Similarly, it is not inconceivable that the president can 
bypass congressional opposition by commencing an operation 
while Congress is in recess.
Nevertheless, as a general rule, it may be impossible 
to overestimate the power of the media in shaping public 
opinion either for, or against, particular interventions. 
Because of the emotional power of the images beamed into 
living rooms across the country, television especially can 
be decisive in determining whether intervention will be 
pursued as a policy option. On the one hand, television may 
present pictures so horrifying and/or pathos-evoking that 
the state is dragged by public outcry into a conflict that 
leaders wish to avoid. Comparable considerations led to 
pressure brought to bear on Washington to get involved in 
Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti.
On the other hand, stories and/or pictures of 
extensive carnage (especially if it comes from a "least 
developed" country) may so horrify the public that 
intervention is made more difficult. The people may become 
afraid of getting deeply involved in a situation that may 
become a morass for intervening forces. Despite stories and 
pictures of the genocide taking place in Cambodia after the 
communist victory there in 1975, for example, the American 
people were loath to do anything about it. This also
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appeared to be the case with public opinion toward possible 
involvement in Rwanda and Liberia.
8. The proposed intervention has the support of the 
military leadership.
Support of the military, as usually manifested by the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, is a necessity for two reasons. 
First, it generally signals that the military has been able 
to formulate several possible military options, capable of 
bringing military power to bear in pursuit of the proposed 
objective. Second, the military is generally much more 
cautious in urging the president to use force than critics 
of the military establishment often imagine. Such an 
endorsement would, therefore, seem to indicate a strong 
probability of success, as assessed by those who study and 
engage in warfare as a career.
9. A willingness exists to support forces in the field.
During the debate in Congress over the authorization 
of the use of force, which resulted in the 1991 de facto 
declaration of war on Iraq, opponents of the measure went 
to great pains to emphasize that once hostilities 
commenced, they would vote to see to it that American 
forces were given everything needed in order to ensure a 
rapid and complete victory. This position may have been due 
to sensitivity in Congress over charges that it was the 
"politicians” who lost the war in Vietnam. Clearly, 
throughout the Persian Gulf crisis, there was a desire by 
congressional liberals to avoid being seen as somewhat less
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
68
than patriotic in a time of crisis. However, most members 
of Congress contended that such a position was not taken 
for reasons of political opportunism, but stemmed from the 
need to convince the enemy that America was unified and 
that legislative support for President Bush's policy was 
not to be underestimated.
Such a show of unity is important not only to preserve 
high morale both among the troops and the general public, 
but it is also an influential propaganda tool that may 
unnerve actual or potential adversaries.
On a more practical level, if they are to accomplish 
their mission, the armed forces must be adequately 
supplied. There must, therefore, be a commitment to provide 
the troops with what they need when they need it. As one 
illustration of the principle, in Somalia, Secretary of 
Defense Aspin's rebuff of a field commander's request for 
additional armor seems to have lead to the military defeat 
of a company of U.S. Army troops. This defeat appears to 
have emboldened the Somalian warlords as well as prompting 
a movement at home seeking the sudden recall of U.S. forces 
similar to the public outcry that followed the bombing of 
the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983.
10. A recognition must exist that air strikes alone mav not 
be sufficient to accomplish the policy goals 
established.
Since the 1980s, the military option of choice has 
normally been the use of air strikes, usually carried out
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by carrier based F-14s. This is largely because such 
missions require a minimum of preparation and entail a low 
level of risk. Due to the incredible accuracy and 
destructive power that "smart bombs" and cruise missiles 
possess, thus revolutionizing conventional air warfare, the 
term "surgical air strike" has acquired renewed relevance 
in the layman's military lexicon. Video presentations of 
the apparent success of such weapons, especially in the 
Persian Gulf War, seems to have solidified the appeal of 
air strikes among the military options available to 
political leaders. A recent example of this appears to be 
the rapidity with which the Clinton Administration chose to 
publicly threaten Bosnian Serb forces with NATO air 
strikes if they fired on U.N. peacekeeping forces.
However, it should be clearly evident that air power 
is not without its limitations. First, often certain 
targets, such as Scud missiles in Iraq or artillery pieces 
in Bosnia, are highly mobile. Given the propensity of 
American leaders to give warnings before bombings, often 
the weapons are moved out of harm's way before they are in 
danger. Any personnel or material left behind either can be 
camouflaged so as to avoid detection or placed into 
hardened bunkers so as to heighten their survivability.
Iraq also made skillful use of decoy Scud launchers so as 
to divert U.S., British, and French bombers from their true 
targets.
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Second, often the situation on the ground requires the 
introduction of ground forces in order to "clear and claim" 
a disputed area or asset. For example, even after a 
withering two- month air war, it still was necessary to 
launch a ground offensive to drive the Iraqi occupation 
army from Kuwait in 1991.
Third, air strikes are not without propaganda value to 
the enemy. At the least, because of their destructiveness 
(often against civilians) they can be used to rally support 
around an otherwise unpopular ruler and thus harden the 
enemy's resolve to resist. They can also be used in an 
attempt to rally international public opinion against the 
intervening power. Perhaps the most famous example of this 
was the Iraqi protest of the bombing of a "baby formula" 
plant in Baghdad by U.S. forces during the 1991 conflict.
Once American armed forces have been committed abroad, 
certain other requirements must be met if they are to 
accomplish their mission:
11. A willingness exists to utilize ground forces if 
necessary.
Since this issue is largely discussed above, let it 
suffice to say here that to preclude specifically the use 
of ground forces before an operation begins is to give what 
may be a decisive advantage to the enemy. The enemy knows 
at once that there are limits upon how much force the 
intervening power is willing to commit in order to
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accomplish its objectives; and thus, the opponent can 
tailor his strategy of resistance accordingly.
12. The war is limited in geographic scope.
Most of the armed conflicts being fought today can be 
described as civil warfare. If such hatred-fuelled 
conflicts can be said to have a "good" side, it is that 
they rarely seem to become broadened in scope by "spilling- 
over" international boundaries.
Greater care must be taken if the intervention being 
considered is international, that is between states (as 
opposed to civil war). If, for example, the region 
concerned is perceived by other major powers to be 
strategically important, the chance of counter­
intervention, either by neighboring countries or other 
outside powers, will almost certainly rise dramatically. 
This prospect was a fear leading to the Carter Doctrine 
(1980) which was a clear warning to the USSR that if it 
attempted to move beyond Afghanistan into the Persian Gulf 
area, Washington would consider this a direct threat to its 
vital interests.
Finally, prudence must be used in attempting to 
intervene in nations bordering other great powers. The 
nature, scope, and intensity of the Korean War changed 
dramatically from Washington's original expectations when 
the People's Republic of China believed its vital interests 
were jeopardized and counter-intervened.
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13. There is a willingness by officials in Washington to 
commit adequate forces to accomplish the established 
goals.
This speaks to the scale of the intervention. Are the 
number and nature of the troops being utilized sufficient 
to complete the job asked of them in a timely manner? Much 
of the discussion concerning the point was covered in 
points 9, 10, and 11 above.
14. Theater commanders must be allowed input into decisions 
related to the conduct of the war effort.
It would seem clear that no one is more intimately 
acquainted with the war theater conditions or with the 
progress of the fighting than the field commander. His 
advice should be sought before final decisions are made on 
how to conduct the war. The requirement for the theater 
commander's input is not tantamount to turning over the 
formulation of national policy to military leaders; their 
suggestions are not necessarily binding on the political 
leadership. Rather, this principle recognizes that 
experienced military leaders will have important insights 
concerning how most effectively to pursue the mission. Such 
a unique perspective may not otherwise be available either 
to civilian leaders, who may have had no military 
experience or to White House military advisors who are 
removed from the arena of conflict and unfamiliar with 
conditions there.
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15. The theater commawdftr must be allowed discretion in the 
pursuit of the war effort.
In effect, this criterion is a plea for liberal rules 
of engagement. Although civilian political leaders must 
remain in ultimate control of the military, there is 
sometimes a real danger that civilian officials will become 
prone to "micro-manage" the war effort. The resultant 
effect is to tie the hands of field commanders, who often 
must be in constant contact with Washington before 
returning fire. Obviously, it is not in the national 
interest to allow over-zealous or excessively nervous 
commanders to engage in hostilities unilaterally. However, 
when such hostilities have already commenced, and a certain 
level of violence is considered acceptable by the political 
leaders, it would seem to be in the interest of all 
concerned to allow the theater commander to carry out his 
assigned mission with a minimum of interference by civilian 
leaders in the actual prosecution of the war. The evidence 
provided by the war effort in Vietnam, the denial of 
permission by the Reagan White House allowing the Marines 
in Lebanon to carry loaded weapons, and the extensive 
political involvement by civilian officials in military 
operations in Somalia all provide prima facie evidence of 
the need to permit field commanders flexible rules of 
engagement with the enemy.
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Format/Research Questions
In order to most completely and expeditiously examine 
the case studies, it is necessary to utilize an appropriate 
common format. Accordingly, a common framework consisting 
of fifteen research questions will be applied to the case 
studies. Each of these questions will serve as the heading 
for a principal section within each case study. These basic 
questions are as follows:
1. What were prevailing conditions initially within 
the "target” country?
2. Why did the United States choose to get involved?
3. What were the intended results, or objectives, of 
American intervention?
4. What was the nature of the operation? (i.e. 
peacekeeping, humanitarian, nation-building)
5. What was the American domestic political climate 
(public and congressional mood about the particular 
case) during this crisis?
6. What was the position of the military leadership 
regarding the operation? (i.e. the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff)
7. How was the operation actually carried out?
(i.e. unilaterally, multi-laterally, air strikes 
only, ground warfare, naval blockade, peacekeeping 
duties only)
8. What types and quantities of forces were used?
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9. Was the conflict limited in scope? (no spillover
into the territory of other states)
10. What was the nature of the theater commander's 
power and influence? (was his advice sought and/or 
heeded? How much discretion was he given on the 
battlefield)
11. Was there an "exit strategy?" If so, was it 
adhered to?
12. What were the immediate results of the 
intervention?
13. What was the long-term situation? (perhaps one- 
year later or more)
14. What elements about this case are unique?
15. Was the intervention "successful?" (As well as a 
discussion on how success or failure is determined 
in each case)
The answers gleaned from these questions can then be 
compared against the hypothesized pre-conditions listed 
above. In doing so, the validity of the typology can be 
assessed, and if needed, alternatives can then be 
suggested.
Justification of Cases Selected
As noted in Chapter One, the cases selected for 
detailed consideration are, in chronological order, Panama 
(Operation "Just Cause," 1989), Iraq (Operation "Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm," 1990-91), and Somalia (Operation
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"Restore Hope," 1992-94). These three have prima facie 
similarities which seem to make them the best cases 
available for this study.
First, they all involved the commitment of U.S. forces 
in armed conflict. Second, all three have occurred in the 
period since the 1989 "velvet revolutions," which 
effectively destroyed communism and ended the antagonisms 
that marked the cold war. Third, unlike past interventions, 
no ideological (East-West conflict) justification was given 
for why intervention was necessary.
A fourth, and related point of commonality is that in 
none of these cases was there any real fear that entry into 
the conflict would prompt counter-intervention by any other 
great powers (i.e. the Soviet Union). Fifth, official 
justifications for using armed force seemed to center on 
humanitarian impulses. Perhaps it was a desire to end human 
suffering (Somalia), or punish "baby-killing, incubator 
smashing sadists" (Iraq), or to bring to justice a "key 
figure" in the international narcotics trade (Panama). 
Sixth, and finally, implicit in the objectives of each 
operation seems to have been a neo-Wilsonian concern with 
the development of a more stable and democratic system 
within the "target" country, which would, in turn, lead to 
the development of a "New World Order" of peacefully 
coexisting democratic states.
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CHAPTER IV
Operation Just Causes The Invasion nf p m b m m  
Introduction
At 1:00 A.M. on December 20, 1989, six United States 
military task forces went into action in Panama, seizing 
control of the country within hours. This invasion of 
Panama was the culmination of nearly three years of decay 
in the relations between the two states, ones that 
traditionally enjoyed a close, if not always smooth, 
relationship. This action was, at the time, the United 
States' largest military undertaking since Vietnam.
However, it also marked two equally, if not more notable, 
"firsts." It was the first time that a drug indictment 
against a foreign head of state had been used (at least 
partially) as a justification for deposing that leader. It 
was also the first use of American direct military 
intervention in the post-Cold War era.
1. What were the prevailing conditions initially within the 
"target" country?
With the death of long-time Panamanian dictator 
General Omar Torrijos in 1981, the way was paved for the 
rise to power of a new strongman: Manuel Antonio Noriega. 
Noriega, who in 1983 assumed the command of the Panama's 
armed forces, the National Guard, was able to use his 
position to secure his control over the nation.
77
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The Reagan administration believed that U.S.- 
Panamanian relations would continue to be cordial. This 
assessment seemed to be well-founded, especially 
considering the assistance that Noriega gave to "various 
U.S. covert initiatives in the region, including the Contra 
war, training Central American forces in Panama, and 
Panamanian cooperation in Israeli covert operations" 
(Scranton, 1992: 347). To Washington, Noriega seemed to be 
a frontline soldier in the Reagan administration's war on 
drugs by "providing assistance in disrupting drug 
trafficking operations" which were then using Panama as a 
conduit to the American market (Drohan, 1992: 25). For the 
United States, Panama also proved to be "a strategic asset 
in its interventionist policies in Central America. This 
process was facilitated by Noriega's firm control over the 
expanded and renamed Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF)" 
(Scranton, 1992: 347).
During the mid-1980s, however, Noriega became an 
increasingly greater source of embarrassment for 
Washington, one from which the Reagan administration was 
eager to distance itself. "Opposition to Noriega among U.S. 
officials had been growing since 1985, when Panamanian 
activist Hugo Spadafora was brutally murdered by the PDF 
and President Nicolas Ardito Barletta, who antagonized the 
PDF by calling for an investigation of the murder, was 
removed. Of greater concern to the Reagan administration,
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however, was a growing scandal surrounding Noriega's 
involvement in the Iran-Contra affair, particularly 
Panama's central role in international narcotics 
trafficking and money laundering" (Scranton, 1992: 347).
The Reagan administration quickly came to the 
realization that it was time for Noriega to go. Starting in 
1987, Washington attempted to use quiet diplomacy in order 
to persuade Noriega to depart gracefully. Using officials 
perceived by the Panamanian dictator to be "friendly," 
American emissaries met with Noriega, urging him to 
continue Torrijos' transition to democracy. Ultimately, 
these efforts proved to be fruitless. The reason for 
failure, it seemed, was that Washington wanted to preserve 
Panamanian stability; it was not willing to reinforce 
diplomacy with the coercive measures that might have forced 
Noriega to come to the conclusion that he had no choice but 
to depart (Scranton, 1992: 349).
On February 4, 1988, U.S. federal grand juries in 
Miami and Tampa, investigating Noriega's activities issued 
two indictments against him and 14 others for involvement 
in drug trafficking (Keesing's, April 1988: 35817). Noriega 
was accused of turning his country into a "vast criminal 
enterprise." Specifically, he was charged with helping a 
Colombian drug cartel to ship more than 4,000 lbs. of 
cocaine into the United States via Panama. Furthermore, he 
was accused of conspiring to import over $1,000,000 worth
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of marijuana into the USA. For his efforts, Noriega was 
said to have received $4,600,000. If convicted, the general 
faced a possible 145 years in an American federal prison 
(Keesing's, April 1988: 35817). At the time, however, 
prosecution was highly unlikely because U.S. law 
enforcement agencies did not have any legal authority to 
take him into custody unless he was within United States 
j urisdiction.
Another concern for Washington was the direction of 
Panama's foreign policy. As United States-Panamanian 
relations deteriorated, Noriega drew closer to the 
communist regimes in Cuba and Nicaragua, states which were 
loath to align themselves with the United States on any 
issue. American animosity was increased by reports that 
Panama was seeking closer ties with Libya and the Soviet 
Union (Keesing's, April 1988: 35817).
The Crisis Escalates
In response to the criminal allegations and Panama's 
increasing diplomatic isolation, on February 25, 1988 
Panamanian President Eric Arturo Delvalle dismissed General 
Noriega as PDF commander. In a televised address, Delvalle 
delivered the decree authorizing the firing as well as 
announcing his replacement by Chief of Staff of the Defense 
Forces Col. Marcos Justines. (Keesing's, April 1988:
35818). Noriega's Legislative Assembly promptly responded 
by dismissing the President. President Delvalle promptly
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went into hiding and vowed to fight to return to office.
The Reagan administration made it clear that it considered 
Delvalle still to be the legitimate leader.
On March 1, 1988, the Reagan administration tightened 
the noose on Noriega when it "decertified" Panama under a 
1986 law requiring the executive to "certify" the countries 
cooperating with the United States against drug trafficking 
and to impose sanctions against those that do not. The U.S. 
then acted to block loans to Panama by international 
organizations.
The pressure was intensified when, on March 11, 
Washington ordered the suspension of all U.S. payments to 
Panama, including $7,000,000 in Panama Canal fees due that 
month, as well as preferential trade arrangements with 
Panama (Keesing's, April 1988: 35818). The White House 
announced that it would direct the placement of all U.S. 
payments due to Panama into an escrow account controlled by 
President Delvalle (Watson and Tsouras, 1991: 203).
Throughout 1988, continuing widespread Panamanian 
domestic opposition and American economic sanctions failed 
to dislodge Noriega from power. In March, faced with a 
general strike, Noriega was able to use the coercive means 
at his disposal to break the action and jail its leaders.
Having rallied some support in his country and 
throughout Latin America, Noriega felt emboldened to begin 
taunting the United States. On June 16, 1988, a U.S. Army
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private and his 18-year-old wife were assaulted by a 
probable member of the PDF. The American soldier was beaten 
and locked in his car's trunk while his wife was raped.
This was to be only one of several such incidents in the 
increasing war of nerves between Washington and Noriega 
(Watson and Tsouras, 1991: 204).
By April, 1988, American concern about the situation 
in Panama led Washington to send an extra 1,500 troops to 
supplement the 10,000 already stationed there. Despite this 
enhanced presence, Noriega managed to resist American 
pressure. In May 1988, negotiations between Washington and 
Noriega collapsed, leaving the General in control 
(Keesing's, October 1988: 36215).
The 1989 change of administration in the United States 
brought no change in U.S. policy. Almost immediately, 
President Bush authorized funds ($10 million) for covert 
aid to encourage a possible coup by PDF members tiring of 
Noriega and his increasingly paranoid behavior. In 
maintaining continuity with his predecessor, Mr. Bush 
refused to re-certify Panama as "cooperating fully" with 
American anti-drug efforts, as well as renewing all of the 
existing economic sanctions imposed by the United States on 
Panama (Watson and Tsouras, 1991: 205).
The 1989 Elections 
Under escalating international pressure, as well as 
ever-increasing political isolation, Noriega consented to
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holding general election on May 7, 1989. An international 
team of election observers, led by former United States 
President Jimmy Carter, was on hand to make sure that the 
elections were fairly conducted. On election day, 90 
percent of those Panamanians eligible to vote did so 
(Keesing's, Kay 1989: 56645).
Exit polls taken forecast a 3-to-l margin of victory 
for the opposition over Noriega's hand-picked candidates 
(New York Times. May 5, 1989: article by Lindsay Gruson). 
However, when the votes were being counted, about 4,3 00 
voting tally sheets, certified by both the government and 
the opposition, were removed, "sometimes at gunpoint, and 
substituted with faked tally sheets" (Keesing's, May 1989: 
36645). One observer noted that Noriega never considered 
the prospect that people would "vote against him in such 
numbers" (Keesing's, May 1989: 36645).
President Carter was quick to denounce the fraud. 
Carter told the international press: "The Government is 
taking the election by fraud. It's robbing the people of 
Panama of their legitimate rights" (New York Times. May 5, 
1989, article by Lindsay Gruson).
Guillermo Endara, the opposition candidate for 
President, declared himself president-elect on May 9 and 
appealed to the international community for recognition. At 
a rally on May 10, Endara and his two vice-presidential 
running mates, Guillermo "Billy" Ford and Ricardo Arias
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Calderon, were severely beaten by paramilitaries of the 
pro-Noriega Dignity Battalions. Fearing for their lives, 
opposition leaders went into hiding (Keesing's, May 1989: 
36645).
On May 11, President Bush announced a seven-point plan 
dealing with Panama. "The plan provided for co-operation 
with and support for initiatives taken by Latin American 
governments through the OAS (Organization of American 
States) and other channels; the recall of the U.S. 
ambassador from Panama, and the reduction of U.S. embassy 
staff; the immediate removal of U.S. employees and 
dependents to safe housing in Panama; a call to U.S. 
businesses in Panama to move employees' dependents outside 
Panama; the continuation in force of economic sanctions; 
the assertion and enforcement of U.S. treaty rights in 
Panama under the Canal Treaties; and the dispatch of 'a 
brigade-size force,' described as about 2,000 troops, to 
Panama to augment military forces already there with the 
possibility of 'further steps in the future'"(Keesing's,
May 1989: 36645-6).
Events Accelerate
A turning point in the crisis came on June 21, 1989, 
when the United States Department of Justice issued an 
opinion "that granted the president legal authority to 
direct the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to abduct 
a fugitive residing in a foreign country for violation of
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United States law, even if the arrest was contrary to 
customary international law" (Leonard, 1993: 103). Armed 
with such authority, President Bush privately ordered the 
Pentagon to undertake a review of existing military options 
in Panama.
The Bush administration soon got an opportunity to 
move against Noriega. On October 2, rebel officers within 
the PDF, led by Major Moises Giroldi, attempted a coup 
against the General. Giroldi sought American help, 
requesting that U.S. forces block major roads into Panama 
City in order to prevent troops loyal to Noriega from 
interfering with the planned coup. In addition, the Major 
appealed to the United States to provide sanctuary for his 
wife and children (Leonard, 1993: 104). Although safety for 
Major Giroldi*s family was granted, SOUTHCOM commander, 
General Maxwell Thurman, believed the "coup" to be a trap 
laid by Noriega and, consequently, recommended against 
involvement with the coup plotters.
Once initiated, the coup failed miserably. The central 
objective of the coup, the apprehension of Noriega, was 
accomplished by the rebels, and he was held captive for 
four hours (Keesing's, October 1989: 36971). They could not 
agree, however, on what to do with him. Noriega was allowed 
by his captors to telephone his mistress, who in turn 
called for troops to rescue him. (Scranton, 1991: 190). 
Troops loyal to Noriega, specifically the praetorian
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Battalion 2000, quickly responded. The rebels were 
surrounded and, after several hours of fighting, they 
surrendered later that morning (Keesing's, October 1989: 
36971). The coup leaders were captured, tortured, and 
killed (Scranton, 1992: 355).
It was later acknowledged by Secretary of Defense 
Richard Cheney that American troops had blocked certain 
roads for the coup plotters, as well as launched U.S. 
aircraft and helicopters for possible direct U.S. 
intervention. Cheney disclosed that, as the attempt came to 
an end, the U.S. gave no response to a rebel request to 
help defend routes to the military headquarters which they 
had seized. The reason for this silence was that the rebels 
had refused a demand from a U.S. officer to hand over 
Noriega, preferring him to retire in Panama rather than 
face charges in the United States (Keesing's, October 1989: 
36971).
On October 8, Secretary of State Baker confirmed that 
General Thurman had been authorized by the new Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, to seize 
General Noriega if it could be done "without risking 
bloodshed, significant loss of American life and without 
open military involvement" (Keesing's, October 1989:
36971). Unfortunately, the coup attempt had failed before 
the directive could be carried out.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Congressional reaction to the failed coup and Baker's 
disclosures was swift and furious. Democrats especially 
criticized the Bush administration for its inaction and 
subsequent failure to capture Noriega when the opportunity 
had evidently presented itself (Leonard, 1993: 105). 
Conservative and well-respected Democrats such as Senators 
Sam Nunn (D-GA) and David Boren (D-OK) faulted the 
administration for failing to construct contingency plans; 
blaming top advisors in particular for poor decisionmaking. 
Furthermore, they criticized Bush, Cheney, and others for 
keeping appointments scheduled for that day rather than 
focusing their attention on the unfolding events in Panama 
(Scranton, 1991: 191). From the Republican side of the 
aisle, scathing criticism came from Sen. Jesse Helms (R- 
N.C.) who, in lengthy floor speeches, challenged the Bush 
administration's version of the events (Scranton, 1991:
191).
The sting of the overwhelming criticism from both 
parties on Capitol Hill, as well as from the press, 
prompted President Bush to review all of his options, 
especially military ones. General Woerner, the S0UTHC0M 
commander until September 30, had been opposed to direct 
military involvement. However, in light of the failed coup, 
such action had renewed appeal. The administration even 
reassessed the ban on the assassination of foreign leaders,
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as no policy option was left unconsidered (Scranton, 1991: 
193-4).
General Thurman, SOUTHCOM's new commander, was charged 
with developing a new contingency plan. The existing plan, 
•'Operation Blue Spoon," was a multi-phase plan intended to 
be implemented over the course of several days. Thurman and 
Powell were able to compress the plans into an overnight 
operation (New York Times. December 24, 1989, article by 
Michael R. Gordon and Andrew Rosenthal). Bush, however, 
choose not to give immediate approval.
In November and December 1989, the tension between the 
two sides reached a crescendo. Panamanian authorities 
harassed and provoked American personnel in Panama. For its 
part, the United States ran readiness exercises in Panama 
on virtually a round-the-clock basis. This was done largely 
to prepare, but also served to mask a massive U.S. troop 
build-up as well as the actual time of H-Hour (Crowell, 
1991: 68).
On December 14, 1989, the National Assembly defiantly 
declared General Noriega to be "Maximum Leader," confirming 
his dictatorial status. The following day, the legislative 
body issued a declaration of war on the United States, thus 
intensifying the conflict (Leonard, 1993: 106).
The final straw came on December 16 when a U.S. 
soldier, Lt. Robert Paz, was killed by PDF soldiers at a 
roadblock. Another American soldier and his wife, both of
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whom had witnessed the incident, were arrested. While in 
custody, the soldier was beaten, and his wife was sexually 
intimidated (Scranton, 1991: 198-9). On December 17, 
President Bush decided that "enough is enough." The order 
was given to initiate the invasion (Leonard, 1993: 107).
2. Why did the United States choose to get involved?
The proximate cause of United States intervention in 
Panama was the murder of U.S. Army Lt. Robert Paz by PDF 
soldiers at a roadblock and the subsequent detention of an 
American couple who had witnessed the killing (New York 
Times, December 20, 1989, article by Michael R. Gordon). 
This incident was the climax of a policy of systematic 
violence and psychological warfare being waged by the 
Noriega dictatorship for over a year. There were, however, 
several far more basic and serious interests at stake that 
eventually would compel the United States to act.
First, and perhaps most importantly among these 
interests, was a concern for the future security of the 
Panama Canal. Despite the inability of the Canal to 
accommodate the very largest of U.S. warships, its 
importance to American commerce made it one of the United 
States' principal commercial assets (Watson and Tsouras, 
1991: 19). Consequently, there was a nagging fear among 
policymakers in Washington, specifically: to whom would the 
U.S. have to turn over the Canal in 2000 when the Panama 
Canal Treaties mandated its return to Panama? The thoughts
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of relinquishing control either to a hostile military 
dictatorship or to a state experiencing revolutionary 
turmoil were equally unpalatable to the Bush administration 
(Drohan, 1991: 19-22).
The second major concern was Panama's increasingly 
prominent role as a center for drug trafficking and 
associated money laundering activities. For years, Noriega 
benefitted financially from his arrangements with Colombian 
drug cartels to allow his country to serve as a transit 
point for massive drug operations (Scranton, 1991: 80) .
A third major concern was the need "to defend 
democracy in Panama" (New York Times. December 21, 1989, 
transcript of President Bush's press conference). It is 
indeed difficult to say that real democracy, as it is 
commonly understood in western societies, ever fully 
existed in Panama. However, the "stolen" May 1988 
elections, with their massive turnout and evidently 
decisive results, showed that Panamanians were willing 
finally to embark down the path to democracy in a 
meaningful way. The blatant fraud during the election, and 
the subsequent nullification of its results, served as both 
a powerful rallying point for the democratic opposition, as 
well as a powerful propaganda instrument for Washington in 
its battle with Noriega for world public opinion. Noriega 
gave himself an additional public relations "black eye" 
when his Dignity Battalions viciously beat victorious
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opposition leaders at a post-election rally (Keesing's, May 
1989: 36645). As of May 1989 there was now at least the 
potential for democracy, and there finally existed 
legitimate democratic leaders for Washington to support.
The political and psychological power of the image of the 
United States acting to uphold democracy in Latin America 
clearly provided an impetus for action.
A fourth major concern was regional security. Panama 
and the United States have always enjoyed a uniquely close 
relationship, mostly owing to the presence of the Canal and 
the American role in Panamanian independence in 1903. 
Although there was some resentment of "Yankee imperialism" 
because of a long history of U.S. involvement in Panamanian 
politics and the presence of a virtual American colony in 
the form of the Canal Zone, most Panamanians, at least by 
Latin American standards, had a favorable view of 
Americans. A reservoir of good will existed among 
Panamanians due to their access to employment with the 
Canal Company and U.S. military installations. This good 
will received a strong boost with the 1977 Panama Canal 
Treaties which provided for a phased return of the Canal 
and the Canal Zone to Panamanian jurisdiction.
As the crisis leading up to the invasion deepened, 
United States-Panamanian relations became strained. Groping 
for support, Noriega pursued an increasingly anti-American 
foreign policy, which ingratiated him with the Soviet Union
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and radical Arab states like Libya. Most alarmingly, 
however, was Noriega's increasingly tight embrace of fellow 
Latin American tyrants Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua and 
Cuba's Fidel Castro (Keesing's, April 1988: 35817). By 
playing his "leftist card" Noriega signalled a willingness 
to shift alliances that perhaps gained him some support, 
both politically and financially, in the short term 
(Scranton, 1991: 15-16).
Noriega himself is largely believed to be a reason for 
Bush's decision to intervene. There was a well documented 
personal animus between President Bush and General Noriega. 
This mutual enmity can be traced back to their common 
connection with the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as 
a personal meeting when the then-Vice President visited 
Panama in 1983 (New York Times. December 24, 1989, article 
by Maureen Dowd). During the crisis, Bush was said to have 
become angry and frustrated by Noriega's intransigence in 
negotiations and by the General's defiance. A source close 
to the White House told the New York Times that Bush felt 
that Noriega "was getting more and more abusive and that at 
some point he would have to be dealt with..." (New York 
Times. December 24, 1989, article by Maureen Dowd).
Noriega acted as a virtual "human security leak."
There is evidence that he used his position for profit by 
allowing Panama to be used by interested parties to evade
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"the U.S. embargo on technology sales to communist nations" 
(Drohan, 1991: 25).
Furthermore, the General clearly acted as a double­
agent. Although he was originally considered an asset by 
Washington for his support for U.S. and Israeli 
intelligence operations (a fact that Bush was made aware of 
during his tenure as CIA director), evidence shows that he 
also spied on the United States (Drohan, 1991: 23-4). These 
charges were documented in a 1985 series of articles by 
Seymour Hersch in the New York Times. "He also bought arms 
from Cuba and sold them to leftist guerrillas in El 
Salvador" (Leonard, 1993: 98). [For a more detailed 
account, see Rother, Larry, "America's Blind Eye: the U.S 
for Years has Ignored Corruption in Panama," The New York 
Times Magazine. May 28, 1988].
Finally, there were factors personal to President 
Bush. Clearly by December 1989 the president and his 
closest advisors had come to the conclusion that 
negotiations had failed and that economic sanctions only 
were hurting the Panamanian people. It was concluded that 
all options had been exhausted and that it was impossible 
to accomplish anything further without the resort to force 
(New York Times. December 21, 1989, text of President 
Bush's speech).
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3. What were the intended results, or objectives, of 
American intervention?
The intended results of the invasion of Panama can 
best be understood by dividing them into two categories: 
the "political" and the "operational."
The political objectives were clearly articulated by 
the President in his December 20, 1989 address on Panama. 
During the speech he stated: "the goals of the United 
States have been to safeguard the lives of Americans, to 
defend democracy in Panama, to combat drug trafficking, and 
to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaty" (New 
York Times. December 21, 1989: text of President Bush's 
speech). Not specifically mentioned, but certainly implicit 
was also the apprehension of General Noriega on drug 
trafficking charges. Since most of these goals have already 
been discussed, they require no further elaboration here.
In pursuit of the political goals, several operational 
goals were established in the invasion plans developed by 
the military. First and foremost, American forces were to 
destroy quickly the combat capabilities of the Panamanian 
Defense Forces. This was to be accomplished by rapidly 
striking strategic points throughout Panama and 
overwhelming the PDF.
The second operational goal was to seize facilities 
related to the operation of the Panama Canal. This was 
necessary so as to prevent sabotage of the Canal, as well 
as to protect and defend civilians associated with its
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operation. Early seizure of the Canal also would help keep 
the interruption of traffic through the waterway to a 
minimum.
A third, and final, operational goal was to apprehend 
Noriega and to liberate political prisoners being held by 
government forces (Crowell, 1991: 69-70). (The details of 
Noriega's apprehension are discussed later in this 
chapter.)
4. What was the nature of the operation?
The nature of Operation Just Cause is difficult to 
classify. It exhibits elements of both a humanitarian 
mission and efforts aimed at nation building.
The concern of the Bush administration with human 
rights and the suppression of liberties within Panama 
certainly indicates a humanitarian motivation. The 
President was very clear in his conviction that it was 
necessary to allow democratic norms a chance to become 
established (New York Times. December 21, 1989, text of 
President Bush's speech). Human rights organizations, 
notably Amnesty International, had long reported on the 
sharp increase of human rights abuses since the beginning 
of the crisis in Panama in 1988. Such violations involved 
arbitrary arrests, torture, harassment, and sexual abuse 
(Keesing's, April 1988: 35819). It became increasingly 
clear that the only way a democratic transformation of
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Panama would occur was if Noriega were forced from power by 
an American invasion.
This intervention, however, also exhibited 
characteristics indicative of a nation-building enterprise 
in the sense that democratic institutions were to be 
restored. One of the main goals was to allow the results of 
the May 1989 elections to be reinstated. As one of the 
first acts of U.S. intervention, the Endara government was 
installed, thus fulfilling its electoral mandate and 
bringing 21 years of military dictatorship to a close.
Key among Washington's objectives was the destruction 
of the Panamanian Defense Forces. This was not sought to 
render Panama permanently dependent on the United States 
for its defense. Rather, American concern with the PDF was 
focused on its traditional role as a power base, the 
institutional support for, and "cradle" of, Panamanian 
dictators. If it were not eliminated as a source of power 
independent from civilian control, it would continue to be 
a potential threat to any embryonic democracy. A successful 
intervention would undoubtedly have the result of giving 
Panama a "clean slate" by allowing for civilian-directed 
change far wider than otherwise would have been possible 
(Scranton, 1991: 227).
5. What was the American domestic political climate during 
this crisis?
The Bush administration was very secretive about any 
intention to intervene in Panama. In fact, during a press
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conference held only hours after hostilities commenced, 
Secretary of State Baker stated: "The President made his 
decision [to intervene] last Sunday" (New York Times. 
December 21, 1989: transcript of Secretary of State Baker's 
press conference). This places the decision at two days 
before the act. While an invasion was always a possibility, 
the conventional wisdom was that it was unlikely. This 
impression was reinforced by the incremental approach 
toward applying diplomatic and economic pressure pursued by 
the Bush administration. Only with the events of December 
1989, however, was it finally apparent that only a use of 
force would bring the situation to a final resolution 
favorable to the United States fNew York Times. December 
21, 1989: text of President Bush's speech).
When Americans awoke on the morning of December 20 and 
heard the announcement of the invasion on the morning news, 
most were surprised, which is just the way the Bush 
administration seemed to want it. This need for surprise 
stemmed from two important reasons. First, the military 
wanted to be able to surprise the PDF so as to keep 
casualties low. Any discussion of plans to invade would 
have cost lives on both sides. Secondly, the secrecy would 
allow the administration to deal a fait accompli to both 
the public and critics in Congress. Once the invasion 
started, the public would support it, due to the usual 
"rally around the flag" effect. Members of Congress,
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reluctant to appear even remotely unpatriotic, would not be 
able to express any displeasure with the action as long as 
American troops were in combat (for Congressional reaction 
see New York Times. December 24, 1989, article by Maureen 
Dowd).
Before the invasion, the public mood had generally 
been anti-interventionist. Any time that the prospect of 
intervention was raised, the public would shy away, fearful 
of "another Vietnam." Opinion polls conducted around the 
time of the aborted May 1989 Panamanian elections, however, 
show the beginning of a change in American public opinion 
regarding a possible invasion. A New York Times/ CBS News 
poll showed that "Americans grew much more supportive of 
the use of United States troops to restore order if 
necessary" in Panama (New York Times. May 13, 1989, 
dispatch by Adam Clymer). When President Bush announced 
that he was sending 2,000 additional troops to Panama as 
the crisis worsened, 53% of those who said that they had 
heard about the situation supported the President's 
actions. This same group was evenly divided on whether 
troops should be sent in to restore order if violence 
occurred (New York Times. May 13, 1989, dispatch by Adam 
Clymer). While the poll seemed to indicate rising support 
for intervention, the public showed little general 
enthusiasm for ousting dictators. Asked "should the United 
States try to change a dictatorship to a democracy where it
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can or should the United States stay out of other countries 
affairs?" 29 percent supported intervention and 60 percent 
favored staying out. (These were basically the same numbers 
that emerged from a 1986 poll taken during political 
turmoil in the Philippines.) Intervention tended to be more 
popular among those with higher incomes, Republicans, 
veterans and Southerners. Those from the Northeast and 
college graduates were most critical of engaging in such a 
policy (New York Times. May 13, 1989, dispatch by Adam 
Clymer).
Congressional interest in the situation in Panama 
dated back to 1986, when conservative Senator Jesse Helms 
(R-N.C.) first conducted hearings into Noriega's 
activities. These hearings, in turn, spawned others such as 
those headed by Senator John Kerry (D-MA), whose 
international narcotics subcommittee later launched an 
exhaustive investigation covering Panama and the Medellin 
cartel (Scranton, 1991: 97) .
Concern over Noriega, Panama, and the Canal was not 
the exclusive domain of any particular political party. One 
of the first signs of this solidly bipartisan approach to 
Panama came on June 26, 1987 when Senate Resolution 239 was 
passed by a vote of 84 to 2. This resolution called on 
Noriega and his cronies to step down from power, and it 
expressed American "support for human rights and the 
evolution of genuine democracy in Panama" (Scranton, 1991:
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111). Although it was non-binding, the passage of the 
resolution showed how few friends Noriega had in Washington 
(Scranton, 1991: 111).
As the crisis intensified, congressional liberals and 
conservatives would repeatedly find common cause against 
Noriega. For example, in May 1988, while negotiations were 
underway that would have resulted in the dropping of drug 
charges against Noriega if he were to step down, the Senate 
passed a resolution opposing such a deal by an 86-10 vote 
(Scranton, 1991: 150). Throughout the 1988-89 period, this 
"full spectrum" coalition gained strength. In both the 
House and Senate, this group frequently proposed 
resolutions to urge the White House to take stronger 
action, including the use of military force against 
Noriega. Such resolutions, however, seldom garnered 
majority votes on the floor (Scranton, 1991: 136).
The mood of Congress seemed to become considerably 
more hawkish after U.S. forces failed to act in support of 
the failed October 1989 coup by PDF officers. Congressional 
critics severely criticized the White House for its 
apparent inaction. Despite this, even on the eve of the 
invasion, there seemed to be no consensus on Capital Hill 
in favor of the use of force. In the wake of the Dec. 17 
murder of a U.S. Marine by the PDF, the voice of caution 
could still be heard loud and clear in the halls of 
Congress. Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT), a prominent
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liberal and chair of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee's subcommittee dealing with Western Hemispheric 
affairs, urged President Bush not to act abruptly in 
responding to Panamanian provocations. Recalling earlier 
criticism that his colleagues had leveled at Mr. Bush, Dodd 
stated: "My concern would be that some of the political 
advisors around him are reminding him of those [critical] 
headlines and may cause him to act precipitously here" (New 
York Times. December 20, 1989, article by Michael R.
Gordon).
As noted above, the preparations for the December 20, 
1989 invasion were so secret that most of Congress, 
including its leadership, was kept uninformed. President 
Bush told the public that he had "contacted the bipartisan 
leadership of Congress...and informed them of this 
decision" to intervene on the night before the operation 
was initiated (New York Times. December 21, 1989: 
transcript of President Bush's speech). This assertion, 
however, was disputed by Speaker of the House Thomas S. 
Foley (D-WA), who said on the night of the invasion that he 
had not been alerted by the White House (New York Times. 
December 20, 1989, article by Michael R. Gordon). In either 
case, the President had, for all practical purposes, 
bypassed Congress in his decision to intervene in Panama. 
With the invasion, the legislative branch had been dealt a 
fait accompli to which it could do little more than react.
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6. What was the position of the military leadership 
regarding the operation?
In the case of Panama, the position of the military 
toward possible intervention was literally a tale of two 
(perhaps three) generals. The answer to this question can 
be discovered by examining the views of Generals Frederick 
Woerner, Maxwell Thurman, and Colin Powell.
General Woerner was the commander of SOUTHCOM (U.S. 
forces in Panama) from June 1987 until September 1989. 
Throughout his tenure, Woerner was "reluctant to support 
large-scale military action in Panama" (New York Times. 
December 24, 1989, article by Michael R. Gordon and Andrew 
Rosenthal). It was his position that the only durable 
solution to Panama's situation was for the Panamanians to 
solve their own problems without outside interference from 
the United States. During an interview he stated that: "the 
only chance that democracy really had in Panama was for the 
Panamanians to go through the catharsis of removing 
Noriega" (Woerner interview in Scranton, 1991: 194). In 
September 1989, when General Woerner advised President Bush 
how to proceed in Panama, he was quite straightforward: "I 
can tell you how to go in. What I cannot tell you is how to 
get out of it and leave behind something worthwhile" 
(Woerner interview in Scranton, 1991: 194).
The failure of the coup made it obvious that 
irrespective of the existing strategy to get rid of 
Noriega, a military coup, along with U.S. aid to the
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rebels, was unlikely to work. By late 1989, Noriega had 
become too well entrenched for such an option to have a 
realistic chance of success (New York Times. December 24, 
1989, article by Michael R. Gordon and Andrew Rosenthal).
At the end of September 1989, the military awarded two 
promotions that were to have a profound influence on United 
States policy toward Panama, especially with regard to 
military options. On September 30, General Maxwell Thurman 
replaced General Woerner as the commander at SOUTHCOM. The 
next day, General Colin Powell assumed the position of 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Powell was both the 
youngest chairman in history (age 53) and the first black 
to hold the post (Leonard, 1993: 103). A trait that the two 
generals had in common is that they tended to be more 
"hawkish" toward Panama than was General Woerner. Powell, 
in particular, had begun to review the existing military 
plans for Panama and found them deficient. Those plans, as 
one administration official put it, "would have kept us 
from doing anything. It would have taken so long to 
assemble a large force that by the time you got it 
together, it would be impossible to do anything" (New York 
Times. December 24, 1989, article by Michael R. Gordon and 
Andrew Rosenthal).
Thurman, as commander in Panama, was not just given 
input into the planning, but he was instrumental in the 
drafting of a new plan. Thurman and Powell's new strategy
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compacted the existing plans for a large-scale attack down 
into an overnight timetable (New York Times. December 24, 
1989, article by Michael R. Gordon and Andrew Rosenthal).
7. How was the operation actually carried out?
In updating the existing military plans for use by the 
Bush Administration, General Thurman developed three usable 
options. Option One relied on the use of massive force. Its 
goal was to overwhelm Noriega with numbers so that he 
would have to conclude that he had "no realistic chance of 
survival" (Crowell, 1991: 68). Option Two was to use 
Special Forces in a raid to seize Noriega, with support 
from U.S. troops already stationed in Panama. The Third 
Option was to utilize Panama-based troops to seize PDF 
headquarters.
When the decision was finally made, President Bush 
selected Option One. This was dictated by several factors, 
the most important of which was a fear of prolonged 
resistance by Panamanian forces. Bush was concerned to keep 
casualties low on both sides of the conflict. Inflicting 
massive casualties on Panamanian forces would have had the 
potential of needlessly stirring up nationalism within the 
country; and this in turn could prolong resistance and have 
damaging long-term effects on U.S.-Panamanian relations.
Secondly, the Bush administration wanted to avoid a 
prolonged engagement that would almost certainly have 
brought a firestorm of domestic and international criticism
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and pressure. Finally, Options Two and Three would have 
depended on perfect intelligence and surprise for success. 
Anything less would have allowed Noriega to evade capture; 
and his apprehension was, after all, of central importance 
to American policy toward Panama. Furthermore, Option One 
would almost certainly have the result of quickly 
eliminating the PDF as a power in Panamanian politics (New 
York Times. December 21, 1989, dispatch by Bernard E. 
Trainor).
As carried out, the United States intervention was a 
unilateral military action. Under SOUTHCOM were 13,000 
United States troops permanently stationed in Panama. In 
preparation for action, reinforcements from bases 
throughout the United States were airlifted to Panama, 
boosting the American presence to 23,000. It was an 
integrated operation, that is to say that General Thurman, 
as SOUTHCOM commander, had access to units from all 
branches of the armed services. The operation was to be 
carried out by the "simultaneous application of 
overwhelming military force against all significant centers 
of Panamanian resistance" (New York Times. December 21, 
1989, dispatch by Bernard E. Trainor).
For weeks, massive C-130s had been transporting in 
additional troops and equipment. In the days immediately 
before the intervention, these C-130s and C-141s flew 
around the clock, bringing men and material, including
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tanks and attack helicopter gunships (New York Times. 
December 24, 1989, article by Michael R. Gordon and Andrew 
Rosenthal). When the attack finally was to commence, 
American units already based in Panama would isolate and 
capture General Noriega's headquarters and neutralize other 
Panamanian forces in Colon. Paratrooper, ranger, and light 
infantry units flown from the United States, meanwhile, 
would launch surprise air assaults on outlying units (New 
York Times. December 21, 1989, dispatch by Bernard E. 
Trainor).
There were two keys to success that American forces 
could count on: night operations and complete air 
superiority. U.S forces were unchallenged in the air; the 
PDF had no aircraft. An ability to fight at night, provided 
by accessories such as infra-red gunsights contributed to 
the element of surprise critical to low-casualty success in 
the urban environment presented by Panama City (Crowell, 
1989: 75).
Generally, American intelligence was quite good. The 
failed October 1989 coup proved to be a boon to military 
intelligence officers. An analysis of the rebels' actions 
pointed out the primary targets that U.S. forces would 
later attack. Also, because of the presence of American 
bases in Panama, invading troops had a tremendous advantage 
in that many soldiers were already familiar with both the 
target sites and local roads (Crowell, 1991: 79-80). There
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were, however, some gaps in the intelligence. The most 
damaging of these was the "lack of precise, reliable 
intelligence information, in this case pinpointing the 
location of Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega" (New York Times. 
December 21, 1989, dispatch by Bernard E. Trainor).
Deception was skillfully exploited by U.S. forces. For 
weeks, readiness exercises were frequently held. As the 
invasion date approached, exercises were held around the 
clock. This disguised both the scope of the operation to 
come and H-Hour (New York Times. December 20, 1989, article 
by Michael R. Gordon). Although news reports and careless 
conversation between soldiers on December 19 gave the 
Panamanians a tip that "something" was planned, the actual 
date and time of H-Hour were never divulged.
The United States intervention force was organized 
into six task forces. Each group was given a set of goals 
to accomplish when H-Hour arrived. Below is a quick summary 
of each task force and its duties:
Task Force Black was assigned to rescue imprisoned 
Americans held at PDF prisons. It also had the 
responsibility to raid sites Noriega was believed to be at. 
Although it failed to capture Panama's "Maximum Leader," it 
successfully cut-off possible air and sea escape routes. It 
later cornered him at the Papal Nunciature.
Task Force Bayonet immediately moved on the 
Commandancia (PDF Headquarters) and other strategic points
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in Panama City. Tanks and Apache helicopter gunships, many 
of them flown into Panama especially for the invasion, 
provided massive firepower used to "soften-up" the 
Commandancia before the final assault.
Troops from Task Force Bayonet also captured PDF 
installations at Fort Amador. Navy SEALs attached to this 
battle group were dispatched to Patilla Airport in order to 
cut off a possible Noriega escape route. The SEALs were 
able to accomplish their mission by destroying Noriega’s 
plane. SEALs also secured boats in Panama Harbor to prevent 
an escape by sea.
Task Force Atlantic defeated a PDF force at the 
coastal city of Colon. At Gamboa, it moved to seize canal- 
related facilities.
Task Force Red was composed mostly of soldiers flown 
in from the United States. Stealth fighters dropped 2,000 
lb. bombs near PDF barracks at Rio Hato, which so 
disoriented the Panamanian defenders that they ran for 
their lives. Rangers units then parachuted in. Fighting was 
fierce, but successful. With support from AC-130 gunships, 
the Rangers were able to take Tocumen/ Torrijos 
International Airport. Later, they linked up with Task 
Force Red to cut-off reinforcement routes utilized by the 
PDF's elite Battalion 2000.
Task Force Semper Fi, as its name implies, was 
composed of Marines. The Marines secured U.S. military
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installations from possible PDF attack or sabotage. Later, 
they joined with forces from Task Force Bayonet to secure 
the Bridge of the Americas.
Finally, Task Force Pacific was flown overnight from 
Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina in 20 C-I41s. This 
group staged a jump at the international airport and the 
Madden Dam in order to reinforce U.S. forces there 
(Crowell, 1991: 83-92).
Mop-up and the Apprehension of Noriega 
Within eighteen hours of the start of Operation Just 
Cause, organized resistance ended as the PDF was defeated 
(Scranton, 1991: 203; Crowell, 1991: 94). However, Dignity 
Battalions, a pro-Noriega militia, continued resistance for 
several more days. Yet by the seventh day of the invasion, 
Panama was pacified (Scranton, 1991: 204).
Nevertheless, General Noriega eluded capture. He 
managed to evade his pursuers for four days. On Christmas 
Eve, Noriega showed up at the residence of the Papal Nuncio 
in Panama City with ten of his followers (Scranton, 1991: 
205). Begging for asylum, Noriega and his entourage were 
admitted. When the American command discovered that Noriega 
had been granted sanctuary, troops were dispatched to the 
embassy and the building was surrounded. Papal ambassador 
Monsignor Laboa refused calls to turn the General over to 
the USA to face charges in Florida. A stand-off ensued.
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The American troops could not violate the sanctity of 
an embassy, so they tried to coax Noriega out. Soldiers 
set-up bright lights to shine into the Nuncio. Loudspeakers 
placed around the building blasted loud hard rock music in 
order to make life miserable for Noriega.
In early January 1990, Noriega received assurances 
from the USA that he would not be subject to the death 
penalty for his crimes. This guarantee, along with 
Monsignor Laboa’s argument that asylum in a third country 
was not a viable option, began to work on Noriega's mind 
(Keesing's, January 1990: 37181). On January 4, 1990 at 
8:45 P.M., Noriega surrendered to U.S. forces. Although 
General Thurman was present, he did not allow a formal 
military surrender. Noriega was taken into custody as a 
criminal (Keesing's, January 1990: 37181 and Scranton,
1991: 207).
8. What types and quantities of forces were used?
Operation Just Cause was, at the time, the largest 
operation of its kind since Vietnam. It was the intention 
of General Thurman to overwhelm the 5,000 man Panamanian 
Defense Force with both superior numbers and firepower. 
Therefore, in order to supplement forces already in Panama, 
a massive airlift brought an additional 9,500 troops in 
from bases across the United States (Keesing's, Dec. 1989: 
37112). At its peak, 26,000 soldiers were committed to the
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American intervention in Panama (New York Times. December 
24, 1989, dispatch by Lindsay Gruson).
Not only were massive numbers of troops used, but also 
a wide variety of forces were employed, drawn from the full 
range of the armed services. This section will present a 
brief overview of this broad cross-section that was 
utilized. Forces were organized according to type, 
geographic area of use, and by their assigned objectives 
(Crowell, 1991: 70-1).
Air Units
The then-top secret F-117 Stealth Fighter got its 
first combat test in the early stages of the invasion. Six 
of the planes were called in from their air base in Nevada, 
two of which dropped 2,000 lb. bombs near PDF barracks in 
Panama (McConnell, 1991: 35). The use of the F-117 was part 
of a plan which called for using ultra-high technology 
weapons systems in order to selectively prepare the ground 
for the assaults that would follow. (McConnell, 1991: 31, 
35) .
In support roles, SOUTHCOM relied on helicopters. As 
noted earlier, American forces enjoyed the advantage of 
uncontested control of the skies. Therefore, helicopter 
gunships, including such advanced models as the Apache as 
well as AH-1 Cobras, were used as aerial artillery 
platforms to pound enemy forces in anticipation of the 
impending surface attack. Other helicopters, such as the
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UH-1 Huey and the UH-60 Blackhawk were used to transport 
troops, for firepower, and for observation purposes. In 
addition, some fixed wing aircraft, specifically A-7 
fighter-bombers were used. On December 20, a 20 mile by 20 
mile square of airspace over Panama City was crowded with 
"111 transports, 7 AC-130 gunships, 173 helicopters, 21 OA- 
37s, 6 A-7s, and 6 F-117s" (Crowell, 1991: 76-78).
Ground Units
Impressive firepower was not limited to the aircraft. 
Indeed, tanks had been moved into Panama "several weeks 
before the invasion was launched" (New York Times. December 
24, 1989, article by Michael R. Gordon and Andrew 
Rosenthal). Originally intended to support a possible coup 
attempt by PDF officers, the tanks also were included in 
military intervention preparations. Plans called for tanks 
to be used in conjunction with the Apache gunships to 
freeze the Panamanian military in place (New York Times. 
December 24, 1989, article by Michael R. Gordon and Andrew 
Rosenthal).
Ground forces were drawn from across service lines, 
many of them among the most elite units that each branch 
had to offer. The Army sent Special Forces teams, totalling 
3,500 men. They drew the assignment of tracking and 
attempting to capture Noriega, as well as quickly seizing 
strategic locations throughout Panama. The 82nd Airborne 
and various Ranger units were dropped in to seize airports,
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Canal facilities, and other strategic assets. Delta Force, 
the United States' quick reaction force was also dispatched 
to Panama and saw action. Other elite units participating 
were the Marines (Task Force Semper Fi) and Navy SEALs (see 
the preceding section)(Crowell, 1991: 72-3).
Of particular interest was the use of Psychological 
Operations Groups. Trained in psychological warfare and 
fluent in Spanish, these soldiers would attempt to reason 
with PDF forces they faced before a ground assault was 
launched. Often they were able to convince the Panamanians 
of both the hopelessness of their position and of the good 
intentions of the American intervention. Consequently, they 
managed to persuade many PDF units to surrender without 
firing more than a few shots. (Crowell, 1991: 90, 94).
Sea Units
Not much information is available about the role of 
naval forces in Operation Just Cause beyond the use of 
SEALS and frogmen to disable vessels that could have been 
used by Noriega to escape. There is good reason to believe 
that carrier-based planes provided air cover for transports 
en route from bases in the United States to Panama 
(Crowell, 1991: 75).
9. Was the conflict limited in scope?
The answer to this question is a simple "yes." The 
fighting never spilled over the borders of Panama. As a 
matter of fact, the overwhelming force utilized helped to
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bring about such a rapid victory that it is highly unlikely 
that other governments or political groups could have acted 
in support of Noriega, even if they wanted to.
There was, in the minds of Thurman, Powell, and 
others, a concern about the possible interdiction of U.S. 
transports by Cuban and/or Nicaraguan jets. However, as 
mentioned earlier, the United States utilized carrier-based 
air cover to deal with this problem in the unlikely event 
such interference occurred (Crowell, 1991: 75). The threat 
never materialized.
10. What was the nature of the theater gftmnmnder1s power 
and influence?
Throughout the Panama crisis, the SOUTHCOM commander's 
opinion was given great weight by the White House. During 
General Woerner's tenure as SOUTHCOM, the Bush 
administration heeded the General's admonition against 
intervention. When Woerner was replaced by Maxwell Thurman 
at the end of September 1989, the new commander's advice 
was equally well heeded. As a case in point, even at the 
very start of his tenure at SOUTHCOM, Thurman was able to 
convince his superiors not to get involved with Major 
Giroldi and other rebel PDF officers during the October 
coup. (McConnell, 1991: 10).
General Thurman was a key player in the development of 
new plans to get Noriega. Thurman and Powell reworked the 
existing plans, taking into account a broad range of 
possible responses (New York Times. December 21, 1989,
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dispatch by Bernard E. Trainor). President Bush was advised 
that a "surgical" strike to grab Noriega would accomplish 
very little, and warned him that it could prove quite 
embarrassing if it failed (New York Times. December 24, 
1989, article by Maureen Dowd). As was noted above, General 
Thurman compacted Blue Spoon down into an overnight 
operation (see above and Scranton, 1991: 196 for more 
details.) (New York Times. December 21, 1989, dispatch by 
Bernard E. Trainor).
The President withheld immediate approval, and Thurman 
had nine weeks to refine his plan. On the morning of 
December 17, 1989, Thurman phoned General Powell in 
Washington with the recommendation that the plan be 
executed. Bush and Powell agreed with Thurman's assessment, 
and the order was given for Thurman to proceed (McConnell, 
1991: 19).
Freedom on the Battlefield/Rules of Engagement
In formulating the rules of engagement, General 
Thurman was given one guideline to follow: to find a 
balance in the use of force that would both hold down U.S. 
casualties and Panamanian deaths and destruction to a 
minimum while successfully destroying the PDF's combat 
capability (Crowell, 1991: 81). There were two main reasons 
for this. First, in the interest of good long-term 
relations, the Bush administration felt that it was 
imperative to accomplish operational objectives with as
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little destruction, and as few casualties, as possible. 
Second, it was thought by those in Washington that if some 
sort of restraint were not practiced there would be a 
backlash against the new Endara government, and this would 
exacerbate legitimacy problems that surely would be present 
due to its installation by force of U.S. arms.
The commanders and planners of "Just Cause," 
consequently, laid down strict rules of engagement (ROE). 
General Thurman, as SOUTHCOM commander, ordered "the 
minimum use of power required" to achieve battlefield 
victory (Crowell, 1991: 81). In practice, Thurman ordered 
that no one below the rank of Lt. Colonel could order the 
use of indirect fire weapons such as artillery, mortars, 
aerial strafing, or bombing. One of Thurman's subordinates, 
General Stiner, acted to place even more stringent 
limitations on American forces. He restricted the use of 
artillery and bombing in Panama City by requiring the 
approval of a Major General for artillery, himself for 
bombing (Crowell, 1991: 81).
Thurman also ordered that infantry units attacking PDF 
barracks be accompanied by Psychological Operations teams. 
Although discussed earlier, it bears repeating that, using 
their training and Spanish language skills, members of 
these teams would call on PDF soldiers to surrender within 
15 minutes. If the demand was not complied with, a small 
burst would be fired as a warning and the demand repeated
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with a new time limit. If this second deadline passed, 
field officers were instructed to call senior officers for 
authorization to use greater firepower.
Bombing, when used, was usually near, not on, targets. 
F-117 Stealth fighters dropped their bombs near PDF 
barracks, a tactic which caused a minimum of damage and a 
maximum of confusion and panic among enemy forces.
Surrender was swiftly obtained. These measures were highly 
successful in reducing Panamanian losses without raising 
American casualties (Crowell, 1991: 80-82).
11. Was there an "exit strategy?11 If so. was it adhered to?
The answers to these questions are a simple "yes" and 
"no." There was no formal exit plan because none was 
needed. Some 13,000 of the U.S. troops are permanently 
stationed in Panama in accordance with the provisions of 
the 1977 Panama Canal Treaties.
As a matter of politics, the answer was "yes." As 
President Bush declared: "The United States intends to 
withdraw the forces newly deployed to Panama as quickly as 
possible" (New York Times. December 21, 1989: transcript of 
President Bush's speech). In accordance with this pledge, 
on January 3, 1990, 300 troops were sent home to bases in 
the USA. By January 7, the total of the recalled forces had 
reached 3,300 (Keesing's, January 1990: 37818).
It was Washington's intention to turn over authority 
to Panamanian civilian leaders as quickly as possible. A
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
118
key element of this transition was a need to allow the new 
Endara government to assume the duties associated with the 
maintenance of public order. However, the new Endara 
regime faced a problem similar to that encountered by Lenin 
in Russia in 1917: What does the new government do when the 
only personnel with the necessary training to carry out 
such an essential task are those most closely associated 
with the old regime? The need to use at least some former 
PDF officers as the foundation of a new national police 
force tarnished the new government (Scranton, 1991: 227). 
The result was that American troops had to remain in a 
constabulary capacity for an extended period. During 1990, 
U.S. troops were involved in stopping looting, restoring 
order, and were even called on to put down a new coup 
attempt fNew York Times. December 21, 1990: Editorial).
This extended role for American troops was not 
completely unwelcome by the Panamanian public. A January 
1990 CBS News poll taken in Panama revealed that 78 percent 
believed that the United States should stay at least six 
months or "as long as necessary" (New York Times. January 
6, 1990, dispatch by Michael R. Kagay).
12. What were the immediate results of the intervention?
The intervention left the United States in control of 
Panama. Washington's central concern in Panama, the Panama 
Canal, was secured within hours. Although the invasion 
forced the Canal's closure for the first time ever, the
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interruption of traffic lasted only one day. This minor 
inconvenience was more than offset by the successful 
protection of the Canal and its associated facilities. The 
primary objective of the invasion, the capture of General 
Noriega was accomplished by January 4, 1990. He was 
promptly sent to Miami, Florida to face trial on drug 
charges. Finally, on December 20, 1989, just as the 
invasion began, Guillermo Endara and his new government 
were sworn in at an American military base.
To Americans watching news reports of the invasion, no 
image was more gratifying than that of U.S. forces being 
welcomed by the people of Panama. Crowds that greeted 
American troops throughout the country hailed them as 
liberating heros (Scranton, 1991: 207). As previously 
noted, Panamanian public opinion was pro-interventionist. A 
January 1990 CBS News poll reported the following results: 
92% approved of the invasion, with 64% strongly approving; 
67% said that they wished that the United States had 
intervened at the time of the failed October 1989 coup. 
Seventy-four percent of the respondents believed that 
American troops had used the right amount of force and 87 
percent said "the price paid by Panama to overthrow the 
Noriega regime was worth it" (New York Times. January, 6, 
1990, dispatch by Michael R. Kagay). Panamanians seemed 
very optimistic about their country's future, with 90% 
predicting that their nation's situation over the next few
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years would improve as a result of the invasion, and 88 
percent expressing confidence that Panama would remain a 
democracy" (New York Times. January 6, 1990, dispatch by 
Michael R. Kagay).
There were, however, several unanswered questions 
surrounding the Endara government. Clearly it was legal, 
but was it legitimate? After all, some argued, it needed an 
invasion by a foreign power to put it in office. After the 
conclusion of the U.S. intervention, the new Panamanian 
regime still relied on American troops to control looting 
and maintain order (Scranton, 1992: 357). Some critics 
suggested that, in order to leave no doubt as to its 
legitimacy, Endara should have re-submitted his government 
to a popular vote (New York Times. December 21, 1990, 
Editorial). It should be noted, however, that much of this 
criticism did not garner support from the Panamanian 
people, most of whom supported letting Endara finish his 
term before holding new elections. Furthermore, as noted 
earlier, there was concern about the inclusion of former 
PDF members in the new national police (Sullivan, 1991: 
169-170).
Although the invasion was extremely popular in Panama, 
the United States was roundly criticized by the world 
community. For the first time ever, the USA was condemned 
by a resolution from the Organization of American States
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(OAS), which held that the invasion was a violation of 
international law (Scranton, 1991: 207).
Washington faced similar troubles at the United 
Nations. On December 30, 1989 the UN General Assembly 
passed a resolution "deploring the American intervention by 
a vote of 75 to 20, with 40 abstentions" (Goldman and 
Biggers, 1991: 182). While formally condemning the 
invasion, Moscow did not seem troubled by it. Soviet 
objections seemed rather perfunctory, as they indicated 
that the intervention would not stand in the way of the 
improvement of East-West relations.
Latin American reaction, however, proved to be much 
more strenuously opposed to the invasion. Peru, in 
particular, seemed quite upset. Peruvian President Alan 
Garcia condemned the U.S. intervention as "brutal, 
excessive, and arrogant." Venezuela's President Perez, 
while critical of the invasion, also assessed some blame 
upon the Latin American community for lacking "the 
necessary determination to force the Panamanian de facto 
government to change its stand and permit the free exercise 
of the people's sovereignty." Perez reassured the Endara 
government that formal relations would be restored when 
American troops were withdrawn (Goldman and Biggers, 1991: 
183) .
On January 18, 1990, President Endara appealed to the 
world community for international aid. In response, on
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January 25, President Bush announced a $1 billion aid 
package to help Panama recover. Half of these funds were 
earmarked for housing, public works, and economic 
assistance. The remainder consisted of export assistance 
and trade benefits (Keesing's, January 1990: 37181). In an 
effort to provide immediate assistance, the United States 
offered $6,500 per family in emergency aid to those in the 
"El Chorrillo" neighborhood, which had been particularly 
devastated by the fighting. However, the distribution of 
this aid proved to be a long, frustrating process 
(Scranton, 1991: 215).
13. What was the long-term situation?
From a political perspective, although Guillermo 
Endara did serve his full term as President, his popularity 
declined. His government came to be seen as white and upper 
class, either unwilling or unable to reach out to Panama's 
poor, colored majority. It certainly did not help that the 
coalition ruling Panama after the American intervention had 
no governing experience. Once the common enemy, namely 
Noriega, was gone, the coalition began to splinter. 
(Leonard, 1993: 111).
Panama's infant democracy faced a critical problem:
How do you socialize people to embrace democratic norms, 
when they never have had any real exposure to a democratic 
system? Despite popular desire for democracy, questions 
remained about how well it had taken root. In 1990, police
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officers staged what was widely characterized as a coup 
attempt. American troops had to be called in to suppress 
the unrest (New York Times. December 21, 1990, Editorial).
Another problem that plagued the new government is 
that it was seen not only as excessively pro-American, but 
also too dependent on U.S. advisors. Opposition leader 
Miguel Bernal summed up the views of many: "If you want 
something done, you talk to the Americans. Then they tell 
the government what it needs to do. That's a source of deep 
shame to the Panamanian people" (Scranton 1991: 228). This 
image was reinforced by the fact that, as much as a year 
later, U.S. troops were still patrolling Panamanian streets 
(New York Times. December 21, 1990, Editorial).
There is reason to believe that, even with all of the 
trouble that it has had to deal with, Panama has finally 
completed the transition to democracy with the peaceful 
transfer of power, as a result of the 1994 general 
elections. On May 8, left-of-center businessman Ernesto 
Perez Balladares of the Democratic Revolutionary Party 
(PRD), was elected president with a 33.3% vote plurality.
An opposition leader, Mr. Balladares was quite open in 
identifying himself with the legacy of the late General 
Omar Torrijos Herrera, national hero and founder of the PRD 
(Keesing's, May 1994: 40003).
Mr. Balladares' successful campaign benefitted from 
popular discontent with the austerity policies of the
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Endara government. The new President's successful platform 
pledged an attack on poverty, corruption, and unemployment, 
as well as advocating higher social spending. Furthermore, 
Balladares promised to honor his country's debt obligations 
and to maintain tight fiscal policies. He vowed to prevent 
a return to the militarism of the past, as well as 
promising continued good relations with the United States 
(Keesing's, May 1994: 40003).
Conducted under the watch of some 2,000 local and 
international observers, among them former U.S. President 
Jimmy Carter, the voting was judged to be free and fair 
(Keesing's, May 1994: 40003). ''Panamanians turned out in 
large numbers early in the day and the process was widely 
reported to have been orderly" (New York Times. May 9,
1994, dispatch by Howard W. French).
Also held on May 8 were legislative elections to send 
representatives to the 71-seat Legislative Assembly. 
Balladares's PRD won 21 seats. The right-wing Arnulfist 
Party (PA) finished second with 12 seats; Papa Egoro 
(center-left) won 6 seats and MOLIRENA (center-right) won 5 
seats. The other seats were won by minor parties. It is 
perhaps interesting to note that "of 1,500,000 voters 
eligible, 26.33 per cent abstained" (Keesing's, May 1994: 
40003).
From the viewpoint of Panama's police force, the 
United States was faced with a dilemma in the immediate
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post-invasion period. Washington did not desire an open- 
ended commitment as a constable in Panama, nor did it want 
the old PDF to continue to act in any police function.
After all, the elimination of the PDF as a power in Panama 
had been a goal of the United States and the Panamanian 
democratic opposition. But what alternatives were 
available?
Some in Panama advocated abolishing the PDF and 
replacing it with a "national police," based on the Costa 
Rican model. Such a force would serve a police function, 
but the military role would be abandoned. An alternative 
proposal called for a "dual force" structure which provided 
for a national police which would be supplemented by 
specialized para-military units that would serve an anti­
terrorism function. The Costa Rican model was adopted, 
however; a fast reaction anti-terrorism/anti-crime unit was 
established in August of 1990 in the wake of a series of 
major bank robberies (Scranton, 1991: 218).
The United States and Panama agreed that it would 
benefit both countries if the use of American MPs were 
phased out. However, a dearth of trained police without 
connection to the old regime compelled a decision to allow 
members of the former PDF to serve in the new national 
police, with the worst elements, of course, screened out by 
the American authorities in Panama. Nevertheless, there was 
criticism over the decision to reemploy so rapidly those
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who simply declared their loyalty to the new government. 
This apprehension was reinforced by comments made by police 
officers that were rumored and reported in the press, such 
as, "when the gringos go home, we'll take over again" 
(Scranton, 1991: 221). As a result, many Panamanians came 
to view the police as little more than the PDF minus 410 
pro-Noriega officers (Leonard, 1993: 115).
In order to calm public fears, as well as to maximize 
civilian control of the armed forces, the roles of the 
service branches were redefined. A prime example was that 
the air force and navy were relegated to performance of 
transport services only. The government sought to abolish 
the army outright; however a November 1992 referendum on 
this issue was defeated at the polls.
On August 23, 1994, the Legislative Assembly passed a 
constitutional reform abolishing the army. The members of 
the legislative body defended their move by arguing that it 
was essential to avoid a return to militarism. (Keesing's, 
August 1994: 40138).
A key question in the wake of the abolition of the 
army was: who will defend the Canal when it reverts to 
Panamanian sovereignty? A partial answer may have been 
found in a June 1992 poll, in which it was reported that 70 
percent of Panamanians wanted the United States to maintain 
a military presence in the republic beyond 2000. For its 
part, the U.S continued to act as if it were "sovereign
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regarding the Canal's defense" (Leonard, 1993: 117). What 
the final settlement will be remains to be seen.
14. What elements about this case are unique?
Perhaps most striking about this case is the extremely 
close relationship that has been the hallmark of United 
States-Panamanian relations. Panama came into existence in 
1903 because of the exercise of American gunboat diplomacy 
against an intransigent Colombian government (See Chapter 
II). The United States has always been involved in 
Panamanian politics. As a result, Panamanian leaders have 
always believed that they could solicit the USA as an 
arbiter in their affairs. Over the years, Washington came 
to be viewed as the provider of a political "safety net" 
for Panamanian politics. Central to the relationship has 
been the Panama Canal, arguably America's most important 
interest in Latin America. The treaties under which the 
Canal was built and operated had long given certain rights 
to the United States, not the least of these being the 
right to intervene in Panama to defend the Canal. As a 
practical matter, such provisions have given the U.S. a 
legal justification to get involved in Panama whenever its 
interests have been threatened. Although the 1977 Panama 
Canal Treaties greatly reduced the degree of American 
"sovereignty" over Panama, the provisions of the treaty 
dealing with the defense of the canal allowed considerable 
latitude in interpretation. The practical result of the new
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pact was to leave the basic relationship between the two 
countries unchanged. In addition, Washington has frequently 
been called on to supervise Panamanian elections (Scranton, 
1992: 343-47).
A byproduct of this close relationship was the 
enthusiastic support Panamanians gave to United States 
intervention in 1989. Because of Washington's long­
standing, tacit support for dictatorship in Panama, an 
invasion was seen by many Panamanians as an attempt by the 
United States finally to correct a wrong that it had 
created. America's military intervention was seen as an 
acceptable price for getting rid of Noriega, a dictator who 
currently has the dubious honor of being the most hated 
leader in Panamanian history. As noted earlier, public 
opinion polls indicted that the invasion was welcome and 
that an overwhelming majority of Panamanians favored an 
American presence for "as long as necessary" (New York 
Times. January 6, 1990, article by Michael R. Kagay).
A second variable that makes this case unique was the 
fact that this was not an "invasion" in the conventional 
sense. Unlike the 1983 Grenada invasion, wherein all troops 
were shipped in, Panama had been serving as host to over 
13,000 U.S. troops permanently stationed there in 
accordance with the Panama Canal Treaties. This presence 
lead to an important advantage for American forces.
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Officers attached to SOUTHCOM were able to draft effective 
invasion plans due to a first-hand familiarity with Panama.
Likewise, the troop presence helped to screen the 
American force build-up and invasion preparations. General 
Thurman was able to use "routine" maneuvers as a cover for 
U.S. invasion rehearsals. Such exercises served an 
additional purpose. Round-the-clock movements without any 
incidents lulled Noriega into a false sense of security, 
thus effectively concealing the exact time of H-Hour. 
Washington was able to maintain the element of surprise.
The presence of U.S. forces in Panama accrued other 
benefits as well to the invaders. Officers were already 
familiar with most of the targets selected. Because of 
their intimate knowledge of Panama, SOUTHCOM intelligence 
officers were able to directly observe, and thus more fully 
analyze, the October 1989 coup. The result was that those 
targets considered most important were identified and the 
invasion plans were formulated to take them into account, 
giving them top priority (Crowell, 1991: 79). A third 
factor was that the United States had complete control of 
the air. American superiority was never challenged. Thus, 
Washington was able to make use of slower flying aircraft, 
such as Apache helicopter gunships, as mobile artillery. 
(Crowell, 1991: 67, 75).
A fourth variable unique to this case is the Canal 
itself. Its importance to United States commerce is clearly
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evident. Because it cannot be moved or easily replaced, it 
must be carefully safeguarded. This need for defense by the 
USA has been codified by the 1977 Panama Canal Treaties, 
which oblige Washington to defend the Canal until 2000. 
Owing to the provisions of the treaty, there is a legal 
basis for American intervention that may not exist in other 
cases.
Fifth, and perhaps one of the most striking things 
making Panama a unique case is that it is believed to be 
the first time ever that drug indictments against a foreign 
leader were used as a legal justification for military 
intervention. On June 21,1989, the Justice Department 
issued an opinion that granted the president the legal 
authority to direct the FBI to abduct a fugitive residing 
in a foreign country for violation of U.S. law, even if the 
arrest was contrary to customary international law 
(Leonard, 1993: 103). This opinion cleared the way for the 
use of military force to obtain jurisdiction over General 
Noriega (Drohan, 1991: 25).
A final unique element was the personal animus between 
President Bush and General Noriega. According to a report 
in the New York Times, this invasion was largely based on 
visceral feelings Bush had about Noriega and a belief that 
all diplomatic means to resolve the crisis had been 
exhausted. The enmity between the two leaders dated back to 
the early 1970s when Mr. Bush was CIA director under
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President Nixon, and a personal meeting between the two in 
1983. Noriega's name became synonymous with doubts about 
the President's judgement. Some have argued, "why was 
Noriega not dealt with while Bush was at the CIA?" (New 
York Times. December 24, 1989, dispatch by Maureen Dowd).
Early in his administration, Bush was tagged with a 
"wimp" lable for his failure to deal sternly with foreign 
crises, Panama being the most prominent among them 
(Scranton, 1992: 358). This was compounded by Noriega's 
harassment of U.S.personnel in Panama. The result was an 
escalating war of nerves between the two leaders (Scranton 
1991: 39-41).
15. Was the intervention "successful?"
There are two ways to assess the success of American 
intervention in Panama. The first is on the operational 
level. In other words, did the operation actually work 
out as planned? The other is on the political level. Did 
the intervention accomplish those goals that prompted its 
undertaking?
Operationally, Operation Just Cause was almost 
flawlessly successful. As observed earlier, nearly all 
operational goals were accomplished within the first 18 
hours of the initiation of the mission. Furthermore, the 
principal object of the invasion, General Noriega, was 
cornered by U.S. forces at the Papal Nunciature by December 
24, 1989, and was captured on January 4, 1990. He was
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sent back to the United States to face his drug indictments 
and was eventually sentenced to 40 years in a federal 
prison (New York Times. May 9, 1994, article by Howard W. 
French). Shortly afterward a Panamanian Court tried and 
convicted Noriega in absentia for murder (Keesing's, March 
1994: 39910).
The best way to assess the success of Operation Just 
Cause in a political sense is to evaluate it in terms of 
the fulfillment of President Bush's stated objectives. In 
a December 20, 1989, speech to the nation, the president 
outlined his objectives: to safeguard American lives, to 
defend democracy in Panama (and bring Noriega to justice), 
to combat drug trafficking, and to protect the integrity of 
the Panama Canal Treaties (New York Times. December 21, 
1989, transcript of President Bush's speech).
In terms of safeguarding American lives, the operation 
was a resounding success. Once the invasion commenced, 
only 3 of 35,000 U.S. civilians in Panama died. Even 
military casualties were much lower than expected: Only 23 
U.S. servicemen died in action, and 323 were wounded. 
Panamanian casualties too were low, considering the scale 
of the operation. The PDF experienced only 314 dead, 124 
wounded. American estimates put Panamanian civilian 
casualties at 500-1000 (Scranton, 1991: 204).
The second goal, the defense of democracy in Panama, 
would seem ostensibly to have been fulfilled. Within
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hours, American troops had deposed the dictatorship and the 
democratically-elected Endara government was installed.
The Panamanian military, a traditional impediment to 
democracy, was at first restrained and, in 1994, abolished. 
A national police force now exists, although questions as 
to its loyalty and integrity may still remain due to the 
presence of former PDF officers within its ranks. Free and 
fair elections were held in 1994. This marked the first 
peaceful transfer of civilian power since 1960, and only 
the second time in Panamanian history. While the prospects 
for the survival of democracy appear to be favorable, it is 
the next national elections which will provide a truer 
measure of its endurance.
The third goal was to combat drug trafficking. 
Obviously, the capture of General Noriega had a serious 
effect on the drug trade. First, it established the 
precedent that the United States would act, even against a 
foreign head of state, if the charges were sufficiently 
serious, documented, and apprehension was possible. 
Secondly, the elimination of Noriega removed the Panamanian 
state from the drug business. Unfortunately, the effect 
has not been as long-lasting as everyone would have liked. 
In 1990, the United States ambassador to Panama complained 
the no drug cases were prosecuted by the Endara government. 
There were even signs that matters were in fact getting 
worse. "During 1991, numerous commentators asserted that
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the drug trade had not only resumed but actually reached 
levels higher than before the invasion" (Scranton, 1991: 
228). As regards this criterion, the intervention was less 
than a complete success.
A final articulated American goal was "to protect the 
integrity of the Panama Canal Treaties" (New York Times. 
December 21, 1989, transcript of President Bush's address). 
As discussed above, the canal was secured almost instantly 
by U.S. forces. No damage was done to canal facilities and 
the fighting only forced the closure of the waterway for 
one day. The successful installation of a democratic 
government has been reassuring to both Panamanians and 
Americans concerned with the final implementation of the 
Canal Treaties on December 31, 1999. The 1994 abolition of 
the Panamanian military by the nation's Legislative 
Assembly has, however, posed some questions about Panama's 
ability to defend the canal when it takes control at the 
turn of the century. There is the possibility that events 
since the 1989 invasion have only increased Panama's 
dependence on the United States to solve its problems 
(Sullivan, 1991: 173-6). Oddly, this dependence on its 
benefactor is not unwelcome to most Panamanians. A poll in 
1990 showed that 70% of Panamanians want a joint U.S.- 
Panama administration of the canal (New York Times. January 
6, 1990, dispatch by Michael R. Kagay). Although the 
official position of the United States is to fulfill the
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treaty "as is," there has recently been sentiment to review 
the defense provisions of the agreement and allow an 
extended U.S. role in the waterway's defense.
Finally, a goal not articulated by the Bush 
administration, but certainly not unwelcome, was its effect 
on the President's political fortunes. The invasion was 
instrumental in helping Bush shake his "wimp" label. To 
most Americans, the president finally appeared as a 
decisive leader in the foreign policy realm. The 
President's popularity skyrocketed. The action was so 
popular that even an adversarial Democratically-controlled 
Congress generally supported the action. Senator Gore went 
so far as to send his congratulations to the President.
Only those on the far left of the political spectrum, like 
Rep. Charles Rangel (D-NY), expressed criticism. Clearly 
this intervention was a turning point in President Bush's 
administration. In terms of popular perception of his 
leadership, Operation Just Cause was a great success (New 
York Times. January 5, 1990, article by Michael Oreskes; 
December 21, 1989, article by Thomas L. Friedman).
In conclusion, Operation Just Cause seems to have been 
an impressive success by almost any standard. However, the 
goal of stemming the flow of drugs through Panama may have 
been too ambitious, given both the weakness of the new 
democratic government, and the pervasiveness of drug 
activities globally. This failure notwithstanding, U.S.
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intervention seems, on the whole, to have been a success 
and Panama is much better because of it.
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CHAPTER V
IRAQ: OPERATION DESERT STORM
Introduction
For most of the decade following the proclamation of 
the Carter Doctrine in 1980, it was taken for granted that 
any threat to the Middle East that would trigger an 
American military response would surely come from the 
Soviet Union. During the 1980s, the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism in Iran appeared to emerge as another 
serious threat to friends of the United States in the 
Persian Gulf. In order to contain Iran, as well as to 
present the possibility of prying an ally away from Moscow, 
the Reagan and Bush administrations tilted United States 
policy in the region toward Iraq. Despite his clearly 
aggressive and militaristic nature, few in Washington 
seemed to foresee the possibility that Iraq's President 
Saddam Hussein would turn his war machine on a fraternal 
Arab nation, especially one that had supported Iraq during 
its eight-year war against the Teheran theocracy. For this 
reason, when the dormant border dispute between Iraq and 
Kuwait was revived in 1990, few expected that armed 
conflict would be the result. The world community was, 
therefore, taken off guard when on August 2, 1990 Iraqi
137
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troops poured across the border and conquered its hapless 
neighbor.
1. What were the prevailing conditions initially within the 
"target" country?
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was prompted by a number 
of considerations. One such concern, which had been 
festering for nearly thirty years, was Baghdad's claim that 
Kuwait was a "lost" nineteenth province of Iraq. According 
to the Baathist dictatorship, Kuwait had been carved out of 
the former Turkish province of Basra by the British 
following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (Spencer,
1994: 87). The dispute was ostensibly settled by the 
recognition of Kuwait by the Baathist regime in 1963.
Tensions over the territorial dispute again flared in 
the late 1980s, as the border had split the valuable 
Rumalla oil fields between the two states. Consequently, 
Iraq charged that Kuwait was cross-drilling the oil fields 
in such a way that the emirate was stealing millions of 
dollars worth of crude oil. Baghdad charged that, after its 
"theft," the oil was being dumped on the international 
market, an action which depressed oil prices below OPEC 
targets. These actions robbed Iraq of the hard currency 
that it needed to finance its war with Iran and subsequent 
rebuilding.
Therefore, in 1990, a dispute flared-up when Kuwait 
refused Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein's demand for 
reparations which included: up to $10,000 million in aid;
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"$2,400 million in compensation for 'stolen' oil; the 
cancellation of 10,000 million in debts; the renunciation 
of Kuwaiti claims to the southern section of the Rumalla 
oil fields; and a long-term lease on the islands of Bubiyan 
and Warba, both of which lay off Iraq's short Gulf coast" 
(Keesing's, August 1990; 37632).
Another motivating factor was most likely Saddam 
Hussein's thirst for personal power and influence. He 
craved to be acknowledged as leader of the Arab world. 
Hussein openly sought to become the "New Nasser." Only as 
such a great leader could he be assured that he would be 
accorded respect and that his demands would be taken 
seriously. To have his demands so flatly rejected by his 
peers was both personally infuriating and frustrating, no 
doubt motivating him to action.
Such power could be achieved most effectively and 
rapidly by bold, specifically military, action to seize 
what Saddam saw as rightfully his. To gain control over 
Kuwait would give Hussein over 20% of the world's known oil 
reserves and thus grant him tremendous influence over oil 
prices should he choose to exercise his prerogative. For 
Saddam, the invasion of Kuwait would simultaneously force 
reluctant Middle Eastern leaders to recognize his "destiny" 
to lead all Arabs, while giving him access to the 
tremendous wealth that would allow him to "fulfill his 
anti-Western, anti-Israel ambitions" (Brune, 1993; 21).
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When it finally commenced on August 2, 1990, the Iraqi 
offensive was swift and decisive. Advance elements of 
Baghdad's army reached Kuwait City within 3 1/2 hours of 
the start of the operation. Spearheaded by elite Republican 
Guard units, the invasion proceeded along a three-prong 
battle plan (Watson and Watson, 1993: 15). One army 
proceeded directly down the main highway, straight to 
Kuwait City. The second prong swept west, seizing Kuwait's 
inland oil fields. The third group moved directly to the 
Kuwaiti border with Saudi Arabia. The ultimate purpose of 
this particular drive, at that moment, was unknown.
The invasion was completed by the fourth day of the 
operation. On August 8, 1990, Kuwait was formally annexed 
by its conqueror (Keesing's, August 1990: 37635).
The swiftness of the invasion and the resultant 
proximity of the world's fourth largest army to the Saudi 
Arabian border was of great concern in capital cities both 
on the Arabian peninsula and around the world. A fearful 
Saudi Arabia mobilized its armed forces on August 4. In 
support, British and French warships in the region moved 
into the Persian Gulf (Blair, 1992: 13). In a highly 
unusual move for the monarchy, Saudi Arabia welcomed 
American offers to arrange a deployment of United States 
troops onto its soil to defend the Kingdom from a possible 
Iraqi invasion. Negotiations between Riyadh and Washington 
quickly produced an agreement. With the consent of the
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Saudi Ulemma, the deployment of American forces on Saudi 
soil began immediately (Brune, 1993: 57).
In Kuwait, the initial post-invasion situation was 
fairly calm. Highly disciplined republican guard units 
maintained order. Such units, however, were soon relieved 
by the Iraqi General Army, conscripts who lacked the 
professionalism of the more elite units. Almost 
immediately, this "uniformed rabble" began to engage in 
atrocities and various crimes against their newly 
incorporated countrymen (Rezun, 1992: 72-3). Women, both 
Kuwaiti and foreign alike, were subject to a vicious orgy 
of rape. Soldiers also engaged in widespread looting, 
particularly in affluent Kuwait City, much of it organized 
by the Baghdad government. Between $3 and $5 billion in 
gold, foreign currency, and goods were transferred from 
Kuwait to Iraq. Finally, and perhaps most ominously, the 
Iraqi secret police dispatched operatives to Kuwait City in 
order to round up Iraqi opposition exiles, focussing on 
Communist and fundamentalist Shia opposition figures 
(Keesing's, August 1990: 37633).
In order to intimidate civilians and discourage 
resistance, torture became a prominent feature of Iraqi 
occupation. In one particularly heinous episode, Iraqi 
secret police cornered a prominent Kuwaiti banker in his 
house and gouged his eyes out, while shouting insults and 
ridicule at him. In a final act of disdain, the Iraqis
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chainsawed him in front of his family, tossing his 
dismembered head into the gutter (Rezun, 1992: 73). The 
story that most outraged world opinion, however, was the 
one told before a United States Congress committee, in 
which Iraqi troops removed Kuwaiti infants from their 
hospital incubators, only to have the machines wantonly 
destroyed. The accuracy of this tale was subsequently 
called into question, but its effect was decisive in 
galvanizing world opinion against Iraq.
The reaction of the world community to the invasion 
was outrage. The problem was immediately brought before the 
United Nations in search of a peaceful resolution through 
diplomatic pressure. Between August 2 and November 29,
1990, the UN Security Council passed 12 resolutions aimed 
at securing an Iraqi withdrawal. The first was UN Security 
Council Resolution 660, which passed unanimously, with 
Yemen not participating. This resolution demanded the 
immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi 
forces from Kuwait, as well as calling for negotiations to 
settle outstanding issues. This was the diplomatic 
"cornerstone" upon which all subsequent resolutions would 
be based. The more important of these resolutions included:
UNSC Res. 661 (Passed 13-0, with Cuba and Yemen 
abstaining). This resolution imposed mandatory sanctions 
against trade with Iraq and occupied Kuwait.
UNSC Res. 662 (Passed unanimously) This act voided the 
Iraqi annexation of Kuwait.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
143
UNSC Res. 665 (Passed 13-0, with Cuba and Yemen 
abstaining). This allowed the use of military force to 
enforce the embargo. (Keesing's, August 1990: 37639).
The resolution with the greatest potential effect on 
the situation, however, was UNSC Res. 678. This resolution 
set the deadline for the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait on 
January 15, 1991, after which time the world body 
authorized allied military action to eject the invaders. It 
was generally understood that January 15 was the deadline 
at which time military operations would in fact commence if 
the resolutions were not complied with (Keesing's, January 
1991: 37934).
Military Build-Up
Within days of the Iraqi invasion, President Bush and 
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher met at Aspen, 
Colorado, where Thatcher convinced Bush of the seriousness 
of the situation and of the need to send troops to head off 
a possible Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia. The Prime 
Minister believed that only the United States was capable 
of projecting enough force, with sufficient rapidity, to 
deter Saddam from proceeding farther. The President agreed, 
but needed to get support from within the Gulf region 
before he could deploy the ground forces necessary to 
contain the invaders (George et al., 1993: 21).
The Saudi Arabian Ambassador was consulted by 
Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and General Colin 
Powell in an effort to secure approval to station American
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troops on the Saudi frontier with Kuwait. Although 
traditionally reluctant to allow foreign troops on their 
soil, the Saudis were convinced that it was necessary when 
they were presented with reconnaissance photos showing a 
massive Iraqi build-up on their border.
Once Saudi Arabia granted permission for troop 
deployment on its territory, other states promptly followed 
suit: Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman. The next task for the 
United States was to begin to forge an alliance of nations 
to face down Iraq. This was done not just to avoid the 
appearance of the deployment as a case of American neo­
colonialism, but also to distribute the burden, both 
fiscally and militarily, of deterring Hussein among those 
nations which would benefit from doing so. Furthermore, the 
formation of such a coalition would make it unmistakenly 
clear to the Iraqi dictator that it was the entire world 
community that stood against him (George et al., 1993: 22).
The number and variety of forces committed to 
Operation Desert Shield varied greatly. Nonetheless it is a 
tribute to the diplomatic skills of President George Bush 
that he was able to forge an alliance of some 34 nations, 
spanning six continents (Blair, 1992: 125). Although the 
largest and most operationally diverse forces came from the 
major powers (the United States, United Kingdom, France, 
Canada, and Italy), it is indeed important to note that 
other nations also sent fairly large contingents. The fact
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that Egypt provided 40,000 troops and Syria some 20,000 men 
made it substantially more difficult for Saddam Hussein to 
rally support from other Arab governments by portraying the 
standoff as Iraq defending Arabs and/or Islam from 
"American imperialism." Rather, the scope of the coalition 
underlined to the Iraqi dictator that he was indeed 
isolated, an international pariah. Only Jordan and the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) would offer Saddam 
any support.
Immediately after the invasion, President Bush ordered 
a carrier group to the Persian Gulf (CQWR, August 4, 1990, 
article by Carroll J. Doherty, 2533). On August 13, 1990, 
allied warships in the region began enforcing a naval 
blockade against all Iraqi shipping violating UN-imposed 
sanctions.
On August 7, Defense Secretary Cheney announced the 
dispatch of United States aircraft to Saudi Arabia. These 
planes were to be based principally at the Saudi air base 
at Dahran, near the Kuwaiti border. That same day, the 
first U.S. ground troops began to arrive. The largest 
American deployment since Vietnam was underway (Keesing's, 
August 1990: 37636).
By August 25, over 86,000 allied troops had arrived in 
Saudi Arabia, over 40,000 of which were American.
Meanwhile, a massive show of United States naval power 
began to develop in the waters surrounding the Arabian
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peninsula. Four carrier groups poised for action should it 
prove necessary: The USS John F. Kennedy in the eastern 
Mediterranean Sea, the USS Eisenhower in the Red Sea near 
Suez, the USS Saratoga, also in the Red Sea, and the USS 
Independence off the coast of Oman (Keesing's, August 1990: 
37634).
In order to free more troops for possible action in 
the Persian Gulf, yet maintain deterrent strengths at other 
American vital points (i.e. Germany, Korea), President Bush 
issued an executive order which called up reservists. Such 
mass mobilization had not occurred since 1968, the height 
of the Vietnam War.
The projection of American air power from the 
continental United States and Europe to the Middle East, in 
terms of both time and distance, was the largest in 
history. The deployment of warplanes entailed some 46% of 
the total combat force based in the United States. The 
airlift of personnel and munitions was equivalent to one 
1948 Berlin airlift occurring every six weeks (Alonso et 
al., 1993: 61).
Air power was deployed in two phases. Phase One, which 
lasted five weeks, gave the coalition forces superiority in 
both defensive and offensive aircraft. Phase Two, which ran 
from November 8, 1990 through January 15, 1991 succeeded in 
doubling the number of coalition aircraft present in the 
Kuwait theater (Alonso et al., 1993: 62).
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As the January 15, 1991 deadline approached, 
diplomatic efforts to break the impasse failed. Saddam 
Hussein was intransigent and the increasing international 
pressure seemed only to stiffen further his resolve to 
resist. By the deadline, however, the coalition forces were 
in place. The allies were poised for war.
2. Why did the United States choose to get involved?
The most obvious reason why the United States chose to 
get involved in this crisis is that the Middle East is 
considered to be a region vital to the national interest, 
indeed to national survival. The magnitude of this 
commitment was underscored by the enunciation of the Carter 
Doctrine during the 1980 State of the Union speech. During 
this address, the President made it clear that any attempt 
to disrupt the free flow of oil by any power would be 
considered an act of war which would, if necessary, be 
responded to with military force (Brune, 1993: 52) (For a 
more detailed discussion of the Carter Doctrine and the 
circumstances prompting its formulation, see Chapter II.)
This 1990 episode was particularly threatening to 
American interests because the conquest of Kuwait raised 
Iraq's control of total known oil reserves to 20%. If 
Saddam's army were to overrun Saudi Arabia, the dictator 
would then hold some 60% of the world's most important 
commodity. Even without the conquest of Saudi Arabia, 
Hussein's share was sufficient that he could effectively
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
148
disrupt the free flow of oil at market prices; an action
that would play havoc with the economies of the Western
democracies, and thus the world (Brune, 1993: 53).
Another reason for United States involvement was the
need to check Iraqi aggression. With the rise of democracy
in Eastern Europe, and elsewhere, it was hoped that a "New
World Order" was emerging, at least in the sense that
nations would shun war as a policy instrument. Hussein's
naked aggression was, therefore, an apparent attempt to
"swim against the current" of recent history. Considering
its implications for the U.S. economy, as well as stability
in the Middle East, President Bush was determined that,
regardless of the means employed, Iraqi aggression must be
rolled back. As he stated in a September 11, 1990 speech to
a joint session of Congress:
America and the world must stand up to 
aggression. And we will...An Iraq permitted to 
swallow Kuwait would have the economic and 
military power, as well as the arrogance, to 
intimidate and coerce its neighbors, neighbors 
who control the lion's share of the world's 
remaining oil reserves. We cannot permit a 
resource so vital to be dominated by one so 
ruthless and we won't.
Recent events have surely proven that there 
is no substitute for American leadership. In the 
face of tyranny, let no one doubt America's 
credibility and reliability (CQWR, September 15,
1990, transcript of address by President Bush:
2954).
To the world, and now to official Washington, Saddam 
was a monster, or as President Bush put it: "another 
Hitler." It is common knowledge that Hussein's Iraq is in
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an "elite" group of nations (along with the likes of Iran, 
North Korea, and Cuba) that has set the standard by which 
political repression and human rights violations are 
measured. Thousands of opponents have been killed or 
exiled. Hussein's most "outstanding" achievement, however, 
has been the use of chemical weapons on his own subjects 
during the suppression of a Kurdish rebellion in the 1980s. 
His existing reputation for ruthlessness was magnified when 
he detained foreigners in Iraq, as well as kidnapping 
Kuwaiti civilians, for use a "human shields" so as to 
discourage retaliation for his aggression (Brune, 1993:
66). When President Bush, therefore, compared Saddam to 
Hitler, and the situation in the Gulf to that on the eve of 
World War II, many in the public agreed that there should 
be no accommodation for Hussein, no Middle Eastern Munich 
Pact (Rezun, 1992: 76).
In the immediate aftermath of the invasion there was a 
genuine fear of Iraqi military capabilities with regard to 
the Persian Gulf region. With 1,000,000 men under arms,
Iraq possessed the world's fourth largest army; an army 
that had become seasoned by eight years of war with Iran 
(Keesing's, August 1990: 37633). As awesome as such a large 
military force was, it paled in comparison with the threat 
posed by Iraq's nuclear weapons program. Although its 
original breeder-reactor was destroyed by a 1981 Israeli 
air raid, by 1990, Iraq's nuclear program was sufficiently
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advanced that experts predicted that an operational nuclear 
device was within three years of completion.
Soviet-built Scud missiles, modified to increase their 
range, would allow Baghdad to hit targets throughout the 
Middle East and Turkey. Furthermore, Iraq was developing 
significant chemical and biological warfare capabilities. 
Polling data showed that most Americans favored war if Iraq 
posed a nuclear threat (Brune, 1993: 67).
This fear of Iraqi capabilities lead to a concern 
that, if the United States did not get involved in the 
crisis, Israel might be tempted again to knock-out Saddam's 
ability to produce weapons of mass destruction. After all, 
it was a virtual certainty that this arsenal was developed 
with the intention of eventual use on the Jewish state.
Reasons for the Offensive War 
The discussion above has outlined the reasons for 
initial American involvement in the Persian Gulf. Operation 
Desert Shield, however was ostensibly a "defensive" 
deployment. There are several additional reasons why it was 
decided that offensive operations should be undertaken in 
January 1991 to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
The most prominent reason was a belief that, after six 
months of an extremely tight embargo, sanctions were not 
having their desired effect; all that they in fact 
accomplished was to starve the poor. In the view of 
American military experts, the expected degradation of
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Iraqi military readiness never came (U.S. News and World 
Report [U.S. News], 1992: 187). Although some in the White 
House (principally General Powell) argued for more time, 
perhaps up to a year more, for sanctions to work, other 
concerns more than offset their arguments.
The most important of these arguments was that the 
international coalition, composed as it was of extremely 
disparate states, could not be held together indefinitely. 
The state of readiness of coalition troops was a second 
factor. Because of the need to "rotate out" forces, 
readiness could not be maintained under the operational and 
environmental conditions imposed by Desert Shield for a 
prolonged period. Furthermore, if Saddam managed to turn 
the situation into a Arab-Israeli conflict during the 
additional waiting period, there was a real possibility 
that the coalition could be shattered by essential Arab 
participants withdrawing their forces (Brune, 1993: 97; 
Hilsman, 1992: 84).
There was also a concern about the effect of the 
weather on military operation against Iraq. Optimal 
conditions for warfare on the coalition's terms would exist 
only for a brief period between mid-January and mid-March. 
To launch offensive operations any later would put the 
coalition at a disadvantage due to summer heat (Tsouras and 
Wright et al., 1993: 89).
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There was a cultural factor that affected the timing 
of the ground war. Ramadan, the Muslim holy month of 
fasting and repentance, was scheduled to begin on March 17. 
To fight during this period would cause undue friction 
within the coalition, as well as allowing some propaganda 
advantage to accrue to Saddam in the eyes of fellow 
Muslims.
Finally, it was President Bush's strong conviction 
that negotiations had reached an impasse. Any further talks 
were viewed as a cynical attempt by Saddam to stall for 
more time (Hilsman, 1992: 92-3).
All of these factors, combined with the growing
realization that sanctions alone would not force Hussein
from Kuwait, lead to the decision to launch the offensive
fCOWR. January 19, 1991, transcript of address by President
Bush: 197). Desert Shield would now become Desert Storm.
3. What were the intended results, or objectives, of 
American intervention?
During an August 8, 1990 address, President Bush 
enumerated those goals which would form the basis of United 
States policy regarding Iraq. These goals included (1) the 
immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces 
from occupied Kuwait, (2) the restoration of the legitimate 
Kuwaiti government (the al-Sabah monarchy), (3) the 
protection of the lives of U.S. citizens in Iraq and Kuwait 
[as noted above, many were being held as "human shields"], 
and finally (4) the establishment of regional security and
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stability in the Persian Gulf basin (Keesing's, August 
1990: 37638).
There seemed to be, however, an additional, hidden 
objective. The fourth goal, the one concerning regional 
stability, seemed to indicate the specific goal of removing 
Hussein from power and neutralizing Iraq’s war machine, as 
well as its stockpile of weapons of mass destruction. This 
was at least partially confirmed by Bush himself during his 
January 16, 1991 address from the Oval Office when he 
stated:
We are determined to knock out Saddam Hussein's 
nuclear bomb potential. We will also destroy his 
chemical weapons facilities. Much of Saddam's 
artillery and tanks will be destroyed (COWR.
January 19, 1991, transcript of address by 
President Bush: 197).
Although Bush would later deny any intent to kill or 
remove Saddam, it was made clear by the selection of 
certain targets, in particular a bunker that he was known 
to use, that the Iraqi dictator was a target. The air force 
even developed, and used, a new "bunker-buster" bomb that 
could penetrate layers of concrete and reinforcement (for a 
detailed discussion, see U.S. News, 1992: 3-6).
Bush's speech also revealed a fifth, more long-term 
objective: the establishment of a "New World Order." In the 
aftermath of the Cold War, Bush envisioned a world system 
that recalled Kissinger's A World Restored: international 
relations guided by certain principles that were enforced 
by the world community at large. In Bush's conception, the
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United Nations would fulfill this role as a global enforcer
in order to insure compliance. As the President stated:
Out of these troubled times...A New World Order - 
can emerge: a new era - freer from the threat of 
terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and 
more secure in the guest for peace, an era in 
which the nations of the world...can prosper and 
live in harmony fCOWR. September 15, 1990, 
transcript of address by President Bush: 2953).
Later, he defined the New World Order as "a world
where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs
the conduct of nations." Furthermore, Bush foresaw "an
order in which a credible United Nations can use its
peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise envisioned of the
UN's founders" fCOWR. January 17, 1991, transcript of
address by President Bush: 197).
The Bush objectives were largely, although not
totally, codified into UN policy by UNSC Res. 678 which
authorized the use of force to enforce the earlier UN
resolutions concerning Kuwait. Specifically, it was the
"enabling legislation" which would allow enforcement of
Resolution 660. It was careful, however, to limit the
United Nation's commitment simply to eject Iraq from
Kuwait. Given the broader American objectives, however,
there seemed to be a tension between Washington's and New
York's objectives. The most obvious question emerging from
this tension was: could the armed forces of the United
States "legally" remove Hussein from power during the
course of the war? [The full text of all U.N. resolutions
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can be found in the appendix of U.S. News and World Report, 
1992].
Operational Goals
The operational goals for the Gulf War were developed 
by the Central Command (CENTCOM) commander General Norman 
Schwartzkopf and his staff as early as 1990. The first 
phase of the war was going to be an extensive air campaign. 
The allies were to establish air superiority at the 
earliest possible time. If command of the skies could be 
quickly achieved, it would have the dual effect of both 
simplifying the achievement of the other operational 
objectives as well as reducing coalition casualties 
(Hilsman, 1992: 84).
The initial air campaign would not be aimed at Kuwait, 
but rather against Iraq itself. This is because it was 
considered important to "blind" the enemy by destroying 
radar facilities and to knock out the Iraqi command and 
control system, much of it located in Baghdad. By 
destroying these command facilities, it was hoped that 
enemy forces could largely be immobilized. Since the 
bunkers where these facilities were located also would be 
the place that Hussein would most likely be once 
hostilities commenced, it was hoped that air strikes 
against them would, perhaps, yield the added benefit of 
killing the Iraqi dictator (Brune, 1993: 108).
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The next operational goal would be to neutralize the 
Iraqi army in Kuwait by disrupting supply lines, as well as 
destroying both armor and artillery. Such intense bombing 
would also have the ancillary effect of demoralizing Iraqi 
conscripts who made up the bulk of the occupation army in 
Kuwait (Alonso, 1993: 64). The third goal would be to 
destroy industrial targets essential to the war effort, 
such as factories, warehouses, and communications 
facilities, as well as infrastructure targets such as 
bridges roads, and railways (Hilsman, 1992: 96).
Finally, once the ground campaign had begun, coalition 
armies would swing around the far side of Kuwait and cut­
off Iraqi forces from their reinforcements. The liberation 
of Kuwait would then be achieved with a direct drive of 
coalition forces from northeastern Saudi Arabia to Kuwait 
City.
Once hostilities began, however, priorities shifted 
slightly. Going to the top of the list was the destruction 
of chemical/biological/nuclear weapons facilities and the 
hunt for both stationary and mobile Scud missile launchers. 
The latter was especially important because success would 
mean destruction of a capability to deliver weapons of mass 
destruction against coalition bases and/or urban centers. 
Failure to achieve this goal, however, would leave open the 
possibility that the Scuds could be used as a V-2 style 
terror weapon against Israel. If that were to occur,
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Jerusalem's entry into the conflict would dramatically 
change the scenario.
4. What was the nature of the operation?
Operation Desert Shield was a multilateral operation. 
The coalition forces were drawn from 34 nations, united 
under the auspices of the United Nations. Despite the 
official classification as a UN mission, the command of 
military forces was clearly under American leadership. It 
should be noted, however, that because President Bush 
sought, and obtained, a use of force authorization from the 
world body, he was now bound to act within the parameters 
allowed by the resolutions that the Security Council had 
passed since August of 1991.
Getting the blessing of the United Nations had both 
advantages and disadvantages. In the months leading to 
January 1991, Bush was able to use the UN resolutions as 
both a tool to rally domestic and world opinion and as a 
means to coerce (or embarrass) the Congress to grant him a 
use of force resolution (which was passed in January 1991). 
However, once committed to the UN, Bush was reluctant to 
exceed the mandate that provided the legal basis for the 
use of force.
Although the public rationale for action was rather 
Wilsonian, specifically the desire to roll back aggression 
and restore Kuwaiti sovereignty, clearly there was a 
deeper, underlying motive. It is a matter for debate
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whether the major powers, which dominate the UN Security
Council, would have been as concerned about the admittedly
naked aggression, and the subsequent "death" of a UN member
state, if these were the only reasons for involvement.
Clearly the commitment of over a half million American
soldiers would have been difficult, if not impossible, if
it were not rooted in healthy self-interest, in this case,
access to the region's oil at market prices. There is no
doubt that there was clear outrage and disgust over
humanitarian concerns, especially the heinous and flagrant
disregard of human rights by Iraq within occupied Kuwait.
This, however, seems to have been more of a rallying point
for public opinion, rather than a motive to action.
5. What was the American domestic political climate during 
this crisis?
Throughout the crisis, President Bush's handling of 
the situation enjoyed majority support in public opinion 
polls. Although it was at its peak in August of 1990, the 
President's approval rating for his management of the 
Persian Gulf crisis never dropped below 50 percent during 
the months leading to war fCOWR. January 5, 1991, article 
by Holly Idelson: 14). ABC News/Washington Post polls taken 
during the crisis showed continuous support for military 
action, if that was what the situation required.
Furthermore, support for such action never fell below 
65% during the crisis. On the eve of war, it was recorded 
as high as 74% (Mueller 1994: 217). As a matter of fact, it
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is believed that the slippage of Mr. Bush's personal 
approval rating in mid-to-late 1990 was due to two other 
factors. First, some of the reduction in popularity can be 
attributed to a "spillover" effect from the public's 
impatience with the President (and Congress) during 
acrimonious fighting over the budget. One may recall that 
1990 was the year that the President broke his famous "read 
my lips" pledge and allowed congressional Democrats to 
impose what was, at that time, the largest tax increase in 
United States history (Mueller, 1994: 116). The second 
force acting to depress the president's polling numbers 
were those hawks, generally more politically conservative 
voters, who did not think that Mr. Bush was going fast, or 
hard, enough in pressuring Saddam Hussein. They demanded 
more militaristic rhetoric and stepped-up preparations for 
action (COWR. January 15, 1991, article by Holly Idelson: 
16).
However, as is the case with all polling data, and 
consequently a weakness of quantitative methods, by 
changing the phasing of a question, the pollster can 
manipulate its results. For example, in an NBC News poll 
taken in early December 1990, respondents were asked:
"Would you favor or oppose the U.S.' going to war against 
Iraq if Iraq does not withdraw its troops from Kuwait by 
the United Nations deadline of January 15?" The answer was 
54 percent in favor, 34 percent opposed, with 12 percent
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undecided. However, when given a choice between force and a 
continued embargo, there was an almost even split.
Presented with yet a third scenario, should the United 
States go to war if other nations did not contribute 
"significant military forces," the numbers dropped to 34 
percent in favor, 58 percent opposed, and 8 percent 
undecided. The same poll showed that the dovish position of 
getting an agreement that would get Iraq out of Kuwait, but 
in return give Baghdad some control of the disputed oil 
fields, had the support of a slim majority of Americans. 
However, in another poll, 49% said that a successful United 
States policy must not only secure Iraqi withdrawal from 
Kuwait, but also remove Saddam from power, a position more 
hawkish than articulated U.S. policy goals (CQWR, January 
5, 1991, article by Holly Idelson: 15). Because of shifts 
such as these, pollsters cautioned against using any single 
polling question as a definitive reading of the public 
mood. (For a more detailed account of various polling data 
and their interpretation, see Mueller, 1994).
Congressional Mood 
In the immediate aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait in August 1990, there was strong bipartisan support 
for the President's policies regarding the Persian Gulf 
crisis. Even liberal Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT) 
conceded: "My own view is that at some point military 
action is probably going to be necessary" (COWR. August 4,
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1990, article by Carroll J. Doherty: 2533). The House gave 
its solid support to a hard-line policy against Iraq by 
passing a tough sanctions bill by a vote of 416-0. Although 
the Senate declined to sign on to that particular measure, 
it did pass a resolution essentially endorsing the policy 
of the Bush administration. Passing by a vote of 97-0, the 
resolution urged the President to seek a diplomatic 
solution, while conceding that a multilateral military 
action "may be needed to maintain or restore" regional 
stability. It should be noted that both houses did pass 
anti-Baghdad sanctions as amendments to farm bills irj late 
July fCOWR. August 4, 1990, article by Carroll J. Doherty: 
2533).
Democrats, however, admonished the President that 
their support in the early stages of the crisis was not a 
blank check to engage in military operations without 
congressional consent. Senate Majority Leader George 
Mitchell (D-ME) stated "approval for past actions isn't 
blanket approval for all future actions" (Doherty,
September 1, 1990: 2777). This sentiment was echoed by Rep. 
Dante Fascell (D-FL), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee: "Nobody wants to give the administration an 
open-ended commitment" (COWR. September 8, 1990, article by 
Carroll J. Doherty: 2838).
Some Democratic critics of President Bush were 
concerned, even early in the crisis, that the
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military and financial support for the action guaranteed. 
One such voice was that of Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-CO): 
"I have real questions obviously about what we're doing to 
get some real substantial support from our allies besides 
votes in the United Nations" (CQWR, September 1, 1990, 
report by Carroll J. Doherty: 2777). Senator Claiborne Pell 
(D-R.I.), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee was more adamant, stating that he would not give 
advance authorization for "unilateral" American military 
action, advocating instead a multilateral approach fCOWR. 
October 20, 1990, report by Carroll J. Doherty: 3536). Even 
influential Republican Richard Lugar (R-IN) advocated the 
establishment of an international "United Way" fund to 
underwrite the costs of deploying U.S. troops in the region 
(COWR. September 8, 1990, article by Carroll J. Doherty: 
2839).
There were, however, equally vocal critics who faulted 
Bush for not going far enough. Rep. Stephen Solarz (D- 
N.Y.), normally one of the most liberal members of 
Congress, insisted that the only acceptable American policy 
toward Iraq was one which results in the removal of 
Hussein. Solarz called any resolution that left the Iraqi 
dictator in power a "Pyrrhic Victory." In early September, 
Solarz told Secretary of State Baker that he could count on 
congressional support "for whatever steps are deemed
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
163
essential in order to liquidate the consequences of this 
aggression” (COWR. September 8, 1990, article by Carroll J. 
Doherty: 2839).
Most in Congress seemed to agree with House Majority 
Leader Richard Gephardt that the United States was the only 
nation capable of putting together and leading an alliance 
to compel Iraq to leave Kuwait. Speaking for his party in 
the response to the President's September 11, 1990 address 
to a joint session of Congress, Gephardt said: "America is 
still the leader - the only power capable of summoning a 
grand and global alliance on the scale we have seen in 
Operation Desert Shield” (COWR. September 15, 1990, 
transcript of address by Representative Gephardt: 2956).
As noted earlier, Congress passed resolutions 
supportive of deployment for Operation Desert Shield and 
the Bush policy. There was, however, a nagging fear among 
some in Congress that such on-the-record statements of 
support might be interpreted by the Bush administration as 
a 1990 edition of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which was 
used by President Johnson to dramatically escalate American 
involvement in Vietnam (COWR. September 29, 1990, article 
by Carroll J. Doherty: 3140). Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-MD), 
for example, spoke of his "strongly held view (that) the 
commitment of American forces by the President in a major 
assault to drive Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait would require
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an authorization from Congress" (COWR. October 20, 1990, 
article by Carroll J. Doherty: 3535).
There was also a concern that the President might 
attempt to present Congress with a fait accompli by not 
consulting with the congressional leadership until after 
the inflow of casualties began (COWR. October 13, 1990, 
article by Carroll J. Doherty: 3440). This feeling had some 
basis in fact when key members of Congress [specifically 
Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and William Cohen (R-ME)] were not 
consulted regarding the deployment of the United States 
armed forces. Nunn, in particular, claimed that he found 
out about the initial deployment only "after the fact."
The clamor to compel the President to invoke the War 
Powers Act as a means of obtaining a de facto declaration 
of war, however, was not universally acclaimed. Some 
members, including Rep. Fascell, were fearful that to do so 
would tie the President's hands during the crisis and 
embolden Saddam Hussein, a dictator free of such 
constraints (COWR. September 29, 1990, article by Carroll 
J. Doherty: 3142).
A constant refrain heard on Capitol Hill was "no more 
Vietnams." There seemed to be, however, no consensus about 
the meaning of the slogan as its meaning shifted from 
member to member (COWR. January 5, 1991, report by Holly 
Idelson: 14). For liberals it meant that the government 
should not engage in a war without first developing strong
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public support, although these members seem to have 
forgotten that Vietnam was quite popular up until 1967-68 
and the Tet offensive. For conservatives, the phase meant 
that if the country were to commit itself to military 
action, America should go in "to win." Specifically, this 
meant giving the army all that it believed it needed to 
carry out its mission, and then allowing it to do so 
without the war effort being micro-managed from the White 
House.
In the months leading up to January 1991, President 
Bush would not acknowledge the need to invoke the War 
Powers Act and congressional Democrats were exceedingly 
reluctant to press the issue (Keesing's, January 1991: 
37934). Up until the final debate on a use of force 
resolution, the attitude of Democrats in both houses toward 
the impending war was unclear. This was, no doubt, due to a 
no-win situation that they saw themselves in. If they were 
to sanction the use of force, the public would hold them as 
co-responsible with the administration if the war turned 
into a debacle for American forces. However, if the 
Democrats were to vote against the resolution, it would be 
yet another time they would appear unpatriotic, a charge 
that Republicans had used, with some success, during the 
Cold War. The split in the Democratic ranks became very 
obvious when the liberal Stephen Solarz not only became a
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leading advocate of war, but also a co-sponsor of the use 
of force resolution.
After passionate debate, the House approved House 
Joint Resolution 77 (the use of force resolution) by a vote 
of 250-183. As was the case in the early Reagan years, the 
winning side was a nearly unanimous Republican vote (all 
but 3 representative or 98% of House Republicans) and the 
preponderance of Southern Democrats.
In the Senate, the vote for Senate Joint Resolution 2 
was much closer, passing 52-47. There, 95 percent, or all 
but 2 GOP Senators voted to approve the resolution. They 
were joined by 10 Democrats including Senator Albert Gore 
(D-TN) (COWR. January 19, 1991, report by Rhodes Cook, 
Ronald D. Elving et al.: 190). (For an outstanding account 
of the vote and a breakdown of vote categories, please see 
Cook and Elving, et al., in COWR. January 19, 1991: 190- 
195.)
6. What was the position of the military leadership 
regarding the operation?
The initial deployment for Operation Desert Shield had 
the strong support of the senior military leadership. The 
operation largely conformed to a pre-existing Pentagon 
contingency plan: Plan 1002-90. This provided for a 
commitment of forces to defend Saudi Arabia, but provided 
for no offensive capability (U.S. News, 1992: 42-3). The 
plan called for the deployment of two combat divisions, 
plus air force planes and naval vessels. The total
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commitment of manpower under the plan was 200,000 troops.
It was estimated that it would take 17 weeks to mount this 
defensive operation (Brune, 1993: 60-1).
A controversial element of the plan as it was 
originally conceived was that it called for naval aircraft 
to carry out retaliatory air raids against the aggressor. 
Such strikes could inflict damage on the enemy, but 
unfortunately probably could not be sustained without a 
larger military presence. Early in the crisis, JCS Chairman 
General Colin Powell declared his opposition to such raids. 
Believing that such actions would either accomplish nothing 
meaningful, or worse, actually provoke an invasion of Saudi 
Arabia, Powell stated: "There was no point in doing a 
retaliatory strike...You either reverse an invasion or you 
don't. But to go pinprick at something had no relevance” 
(U.S. News, 1992: 51). During the Fall and Winter of 1990- 
91, Powell continued to favor the strategy essentially 
envisioned in plan 1002-90, that is, militarily 
"containing” Hussein's forces, while allowing the sanctions 
to slowly exact their toll (U.S. News, 1992: 157).
General Norman Schwartzkopf, the CENTCOM commander, 
however, was working on new plans. Such planning, even as a 
contingency, was necessary because both military and 
political leaders agreed that a decision on whether to take 
the offensive would have to be made early so as to allow 
for a sufficient military build-up in the theater.
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Schwartzkopf placed his faith in a group of "young 
Turk" military planners nicknamed the "Jedi Knights."
Their philosophy was that military action should 
concentrate on the maximum use of speed and mobility in 
order to defeat a larger enemy force. Haunted by the 
specter of Vietnam, CENTCOM planners decided that any 
ground campaign "must be short, sharp, and decisive, with 
minimum casualties." They believed that this could be 
achieved by making use of the allies' technological air 
superiority to soften-up Iraqi forces before the offensive 
(Tsouras and Wright et al., 1993: 89).
By October 1990, Schwartzkopf was finally comfortable 
with his defensive position in Saudi Arabia. At this time, 
President Bush ordered the build-up called for in the 
offensive plans to commence (Brune, 1993: 61).
Upon receiving the President's order, Powell asked 
Schwartzkopf, as theater commander, to define what forces 
would be required for a successful offensive (Brune, 1993: 
61). Powell and Secretary of Defense Cheney then went about 
the business of planning the outlines of the shape that the 
offensive would take. Because the Iraqis had heavily 
fortified the Kuwaiti border with Saudi Arabia, the duo 
decided to simply bypass the Iraqi defenses. In a maneuver 
dubbed the "left hook," allied forces would swing west, 
into the desert interior of Saudi Arabia and cross directly 
into Iraq. Then, armor would speed across southern Iraq and
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cut off Iraqi occupation forces from their reinforcements 
in Basra. This move, if successful, would force the 
Republican Guard to race back to Basra lest Saddam's second 
largest city fall to coalition forces.
Schwartzkopf, as the theater commander, would be given 
free reign to "fill in the blanks" of the actual execution 
of the operation as he saw fit (U.S. News, 1992: 168-9).
The final plan was presented to President Bush by General 
Powell on December 1, 1990 and the President accepted it 
almost immediately (U.S.News, 1992: 168).
One point must be clarified, to the extent possible. 
General Powell and other military leaders seem to have been 
in basic agreement that force was necessary, although there 
was disagreement regarding its timing and nature. It 
appears from most versions of the deliberations that 
Schwartzkopf believed that the conditions for action would 
be optimal in the winter, especially January and February. 
General Powell, however, argued that sanctions should be 
allowed more time to work. The result of a continued 
"siege" of Iraq would be that the enemy would become 
increasingly hard pressed to obtain spare parts and food, 
thus greatly reducing his readiness. Bush, pressed by 
political considerations, endorsed the earliest possible 
start of the offensive after the expiration of the UN 
deadline. The stage was set for war.
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7. How vas the operation actually carried out?
The long anticipated offensive, code named Operation 
Desert Storm, began on January 15, 1991 with a massive air 
attack (Keesing's, January 1991: 37936). Schwartzkopf's 
strategy, as was noted earlier, was to use the air war as a 
means of wearing down the enemy. This was especially 
appealing for four reasons. First, Iraq presented a target- 
rich environment. Second, Iraq had no experience against 
such a massive, concentrated air attack. Third, the 
availability to the coalition forces of sophisticated 
munitions gave the allies technological superiority that 
would maximize the damage inflicted while minimizing 
casualties. Finally, the relentless pounding would, as it 
later became evident, destroy morale in the enemy rear 
(Rezun, 1992: 80).
The first priority of the air campaign was to destroy 
Iraq's command and control facilities. This began 
immediately at the start of the conflict at midnight 
Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). Allied forces made use of their 
advantages, especially nightfighting capabilities (Hilsman, 
1992: 97). The opening salvos of the war were fired by F- 
117A Stealth fighters and by navy frigates in the Persian 
Gulf and the Red Sea which launched Tomahawk cruise 
missiles at targets in and around Baghdad.
The F-117A and Tomahawk strikes were aimed at "cutting 
off the head" of the Iraqi military so that it would be
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unable to transmit orders effectively to its troops in the 
field, thus making coordinated action difficult, if not 
impossible.
The second priority was to blind radar installations 
and surface to air defense missiles (SAMs). Helicopter 
gunships struck these sites almost immediately.
The third priority was to destroy factories, 
laboratories, and depots, as well as inflicting heavy 
losses on elite troops dug in the Iraqi rear, along with 
their supporting tanks and artillery. A final goal was to 
hit telephone and electrical facilities (Rezun, 1992: 89- 
93) .
The air war was the most intensive air operation in 
history. During the first 72 hours, coalition forces 
averaged one sortie per minute (Brune, 1993: 108). Allied 
aircraft averaged a total of 3,000-4,000 sorties per day 
(Rezun, 1992: 91). Air forces involved units drawn from the 
United States, United Kingdom, France Canada, Italy,
Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia (Alonso et al., 1993: 65).
Coalition forces rapidly gained control of the skies 
over Iraq. Part of the reason for this was that allied 
quantitative and qualitative advantages allowed the 
coalition to dominate the inferior Iraqi air force. As a 
result, Saddam simply conceded the skies to the coalition. 
After a drubbing in dogfights with coalition aircraft early 
in the air war, Hussein simply withdrew his aircraft from
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the battle zone. About 700 planes were moved to safety in 
northern Iraq or sent to seek refuge in Iran. The only 
defenses remaining were anti-aircraft guns and largely 
ineffective Soviet-made SAMs (Keesing's, January 1991: 
37936).
During the course of the war, air to air combat losses 
were stunningly one sided; the Iraqis lost 35 planes, yet 
the coalition lost none (Alonso et al., 1993: 70). Total 
aircraft loss figures were equally impressive. Iraq had 127 
planes confirmed as destroyed, 141 estimated losses, and 
148 flown to refuge in Iran, for a total of 416 aircraft 
lost. Coalition forces lost only 63 planes, of which only 
24 were American planes lost due to combat (Alonso and 
Watson, 1993: 228-230).
After destroying major strategic targets in Iraq, the 
focus of the air war shifted to Iraqi troops stationed in 
Kuwait and the routes used to supply them. Republican Guard 
units, 120,000 strong, were heavily attacked at their 
fortified positions just north of the Iraqi border with 
Kuwait. By February 3, 25 of the 30 bridges leading to 
Kuwait had been destroyed. The resulting bottlenecks 
allowed allied air forces to wreak havoc on the Iraqi 
supply and communication lines.
The bombing had a devastating effect. By mid February 
1991, Iraqi forces had lost an estimated 750 tanks, 650 
artillery pieces, and 600 armored personnel carriers in the
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Kuwait theater of operations (Keesing's, February 1991: 
37983-37984).
Ground Offensive
The allied ground offensive began at 4:00 A.M. local 
time on February 24, 1991. The coalition launched a three- 
prong attack over a 480 km. front. The bombing campaign had 
its intended effect as the allies encountered only light 
resistance. (Keesing's, February 1991: 37983-37984).
The goal of the allied strategy was to use its 
superior speed and firepower to engage the enemy in a short 
war with few casualties by utilizing flanking movements 
(U.S.News, 1992: 275). Iraqi forces were initially frozen 
into place by coalition diversionary tactics. Iraqi 
conventional wisdom was that the allies would open the 
ground war with an amphibious assault on coastal Kuwait, 
done with the aim of liberating Kuwait City as soon as 
possible. Schwartzkopf encouraged this belief by faking the 
preparations for such an operation. With Iraqi forces thus 
occupied, the allies were free to execute their strategy 
(COWR. March 2, 1991, article by Pat Towell, 552).
One prong of the three-prong offensive, composed of 
Arab divisions and U.S. Marines breached the so-called 
"strip of death" and drove toward Kuwait City. The advance 
forces were aided by Iraqi POWs who alerted field 
commanders as to the location of minefields and other 
defenses (Keesing's, February 1991: 37985).
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Most of the coalition's forces were committed to the 
"left hook" or the "Hail Mary," as it was popularly known. 
Rather than attack Kuwait and deal with the elaborate World 
War I vintage defenses, most of the allied forces were 
positioned west of Kuwait so as to outflank enemy forces. 
This second prong consisted of the bulk of allied armor. 
Outflanking the main enemy lines, these units drove 
straight into southeastern Iraq. There they engaged 
Republican Guard units which were dug in just south of 
Basra.
The third prong, consisting of French and American 
units, swung far to the west, advancing on the Iraqi city 
of Nasiriyah on the Euphrates River. Armored units 
destroyed an Iraqi division near the junction town of As 
Salam. Once the area was secured, 400 helicopters were used 
to set up an allied supply base 60 miles inside Iraq 
(Brune, 1993: 115).
The net result was a rapid, overwhelming victory for 
the coalition. The first prong liberated Kuwait City on 
February 27, 1991. The second prong engaged Republican 
Guard units and soundly defeated them in an intense tank 
battle. Coalition forces then drove north to lay siege to 
Basra. The third prong successfully cut off reinforcements 
from entry into the theater of operation (Brune, 1993:
117). The Iraqis were so quickly and decisively defeated 
that Schwartzkopf would later assert that if he had turned
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his forces northward, nothing could have prevented the 
capture of Baghdad.
The one-sided nature of the ground war can largely be 
attributed to the tactics that each side employed. The 
styles of warfare contrasted so greatly that it has been 
said that the Iraqis were fighting World War I while the 
coalition campaign resembled World War III. The reliance of 
the Iraqis on inferior Soviet weaponry and a war of 
attrition may have worked against Iran in the 1980s, but 
they proved no match for a modern army. The coalition's use 
of movement and its technological superiority virtually 
guaranteed an allied victory (Rezun, 1992: 94). The war's 
final major battle was to graphically illustrate this 
point.
Iraqi forces, ordered to surrender by the coalition, 
instead chose to retreat northward along the main highway 
that connected Kuwait City with Iraq. The slow-moving 
columns, heavily laden with captured booty, were spotted by 
allied aircraft. In what was described by the press (and 
some pilots) as a "turkey shoot," the Iraqis were hit on 
all sides by allied aircraft. The resulting panic caused a 
traffic jam which allowed attacking aircraft to inflict 
heavy casualties. The result was a three mile long "highway 
of death," a near apocalyptic scene of burned out tanks and 
trucks, along with perhaps thousands of charred bodies 
(Brune, 1993: 188; Keesing's, February 1991: 37985-6).
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Although these airstrikes were criticized as causing 
needless deaths, it could have been prevented if Hussein 
had ordered a proper surrender. An angry Schwartzkopf 
defended the action by reminding his critics that the 
allies would not attack any Iraqi soldiers who left their 
vehicles and offered to surrender. Those who chose to flee 
in tanks or any other military vehicles were to be 
considered as legitimate targets if they did not comply 
(U.S. News, 1992: 395-6).
The coalition victory was so overwhelming that 
President Bush, perhaps taking the sensitivities of his 
Arab coalition partners into account, decided to end the 
ground war nearly two days ahead of schedule. Bush declared 
an informal ceasefire, to take effect at 5:00 A.M. GMT on 
February 28 (Keesing's, February 1991: 37986).
8. What types and quantities of forces were used?
The total of allied forces committed in Operation 
Desert Storm numbered 700,000 (Keesing's, February 1991: 
37986). The United States contingent was the largest by 
far, as 532,000 American soldiers were deployed to the 
region. Although information concerning allied aircraft and 
carrier groups were provided above, it bears mentioning 
that the United States also dispatched 2,000 tanks to the 
Kuwait theater of operations.
The positioning of coalition forces in general, and 
American troops in particular, allowed the allies to strike
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at Iraq from virtually every direction. As noted earlier, 
carrier groups were maintained in the Red Sea, the Persian 
Gulf, and the eastern Mediterranean. Likewise, land-based 
aircraft were flown from bases in Saudi Arabia (principally 
the airbase at Dahran), eastern Turkey, and the island of 
Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean (Tsouras et al., 1993:
241). Diego Garcia had been site for the prepositioning of 
equipment, as well as a base of operation for massive 
American B-52 bombers (Brune, 1993: 54; Hilsman, 1992:
115) .
Once war had been decided upon, President Bush 
committed himself to providing the armed forces everything 
that the theater commander requested (U.S. News, 1992:
172). A wide variety of forces were used in unprecedented 
numbers, some seeing combat for the first time ever. The 
types of units deployed can most efficiently be reviewed by 
outlining the major weapons used. Units of note included 
the following:
The M1A1 was perhaps the most advanced tank on the 
battlefield. Given Iraqi chemical warfare capabilities, the 
M1A1 was especially valuable because its pressurized cabin 
would have rendered Iraqi poison gas useless in stopping an 
allied advance. It also has tougher armor than other tanks 
used (U.S. News, 1992: 166). The MlAl's most important 
asset was its superior firepower and maneuverability. Its
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longer range cannon prevents an enemy from getting close 
enough to effectively engage the M1A1 (Brune, 1993: 177).
Another weapon that was highly effective against Iraqi 
armor was the A-10 Thunderbolt. Affectionately called the 
"Warthog" because of its ugly appearance, the A-10 had the 
ability to spend up to 45 minutes over a target. This 
attribute made it ideal for hunting Scud launchers. The 
"Warthog” was built to fly even if it were heavily damaged. 
The A-10's real value, however, was in its two major 
attributes. First, it was a proven tank-killer. Its 30 mm 
nose cannon fires heavy shells made of depleted uranium and 
it can carry up to eight tons of ordinance. Among the 
weapons that it can utilize are lazar-guided bombs and 
Maverick anti-tank missiles.
Second, the A-10 provides effective close ground 
support for troops. By flying at a relatively slow 420 mph, 
it is ideal for ground cover. These planes are able to 
remain "at station" for two hours on battlefields up to 250 
miles from base. While there were only 144 such planes in 
the Kuwait theater, the A-10 flew approximately 30% of all 
combat sorties and accounted for more than 50% of the 
destruction of Iraqi field equipment (U.S. News, 1992: 160, 
322) .
The F-117A Stealth fighter again saw action in the 
Gulf. This time it was more extensively used than had been 
the case in Panama, and it proved to be extremely lethal.
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Despite its classification as a fighter, it acted as a very 
effective penetrating bomber (U.S. News, 1992: 239). Due to 
its "stealth," that is to say its radar-proof contours, it 
was consistently able to elude Iraqi air defenses. No F- 
117As were lost during the air campaign, despite the 
fighter's central role in destroying enemy air defenses 
(Brune, 1993: 174).
Although it comprised only 2.5% of the air forces used 
in the war, the F-117A was responsible for hitting 31% of 
all Iraqi targets on the first day (Rezun, 1992: 64). The 
Stealth fighter, however, was not without its 
disappointments. First, it did not prove to be as effective 
at hunting Iraqi Scuds as expected (Brune, 1993: 111). 
Second, the laser-guided bombs that the F-117A used were 
only 60% accurate, rather than the 90% originally reported. 
This lower figure, however, still represented a vast 
qualitative improvement over the conventional bombs 
utilized during Vietnam (Brune, 1993: 178).
The war in the Gulf marked the first major combat use 
of so-called "smart bombs." Originally developed as a 
weapon for use against Soviet forces in the European 
theater, they come in both laser and optically (using 
television images) guided models (Alonso et al., 1993: 75). 
There have been major disputes over how effective such 
weapons are. This is because, contrary to video presented 
to the press during the war, such weapons are not 100%
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effective. However, while laser-guided bombs accounted for 
only 7-10% of all ordinance dropped during the conflict, 
they hit their targets an impressive 80% of the time 
(Hilsman, 1992: 157).
Another Cold War weapon that saw its first combat use 
was the Tomahawk cruise missile. Originally developed as a 
highly accurate drone that could deliver nuclear warheads 
deep within Soviet territory by flying below defense radar, 
the Tomahawk was perhaps the most technically sophisticated 
weapon in the coalition arsenal. Fired from navy missile 
frigates, these missiles have on-board computers that 
contain electronic maps which help the Tomahawk closely 
follow topographical contours and allow for extremely 
specific targeting. It is reported to be so accurate that 
it can be programmed to fly through a building's window to 
strike at an internal target (Rezun, 1992: 84; U.S.News, 
1992: 222). A total of 284 Tomahawks were fired during the 
38 day air war.
Originally believed to be able to hit its target as 
much as 85% of the time, some of the Tomahawk's critics 
contend that its accuracy was probably closer to 50 
percent. However, as is the case with smart bombs, even 
this lower figure indicates an improvement in missile 
accuracy (Brune, 1993: 108, 179).
A major advantage of cruise missiles, like the 
Tomahawk, is that they greatly reduce pilot exposure over
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heavily defended targets, especially during daylight hours 
(Alonso et al., 1993: 64). Used as a means of destroying 
enemy airfields, it was also said to have been more 
effective than bombs in destroying hardened bunkers. The 
effectiveness of the Tomahawks was further improved when 
they were used in conjunction with unarmed drones which 
diverted and confused enemy defenses (U.S. News, 1992:
223) .
The weapon that is perhaps most closely associated 
with the Persian Gulf War is the Patriot Missile. Presented 
to the public during the war as an anti-missile, it was 
originally to be used as the ground-based component of the 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI or "Star Wars"). During 
the conflict, it was deployed as a defense against Iraqi 
Scud missile terror bombing against Saudi Arabia, and 
later, Israel (Rezun, 1992:84). Patriot battery operators 
man radars that track incoming missiles and then fire 
Patriots to destroy them.
In assessing the success of the Patriot, it is 
difficult to draw definitive conclusions. During the war 
itself, the weapons achieved an almost mythical fame as a 
sort of "silver bullet" that would always successfully 
intercept and destroy incoming missiles. Although some 
damage resulted due to falling debris, the Patriot acted as 
a powerful psychological tool when the United States 
deployed batteries in Israel. As such, it may have provided
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essential reassurance to the Israeli public, thus keeping 
Jerusalem from retaliation which could have threatened the 
unity of the coalition.
9. Was the conflict limited in scope?
In a word, the answer to this question is '’yes.” The 
war was successfully confined to the Kuwait theater of 
operations which included Kuwait, southeastern Iraq and 
northern Saudi Arabia. There were, of course, several 
attempts by Saddam Hussein to expand the war (Keesing's, 
February 1991: 37984). The most important of these attempts 
was the use of Scud missiles to strike civilian centers in 
Israel as a means of goading Jerusalem into intervening 
against Iraq. Saddam was convinced that by getting Israel 
to respond, he could split the coalition by transforming 
the conflict into an Arab-Israeli war. Israel, bowing to 
pressure from the United States, did not take the bait and 
this gambit failed miserably.
Although it is unclear whether this was the case, it 
is possible that the flight of Iraqi aircraft to Iran was 
actually an attempt to draw Teheran into the war as 
Hussein's ally. One can only speculate whether coalition 
violation of Iranian airspace to pursue the fleeing Iraqi 
planes would have induced the Iranians to respond.
10. What was the nature of the theater commander's power 
and influence?
In planning the prosecution of the Gulf War, the 
influence of the theater commander, General Norman
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Schwartzkopf, was great indeed. As noted earlier, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Colin Powell was in favor 
of the initial deployment for Operation Desert Shield (U.S. 
News, 1992: 65). As for the actual planning of the options 
to be used later, Powell assigned the duty to CENTCOM 
commander Schwartzkopf since the Middle East fell under his 
purview. Although the Pentagon already had a contingency 
deployment plan, which allowed Desert Shield to be 
activated as rapidly as it was, Schwartzkopf's staff 
believed that this plan provided for too small a force to 
engage in an operation capable of expelling Iraq from 
Kuwait should such action prove necessary (U.S. News, 1992: 
65) .
By mid-October 1990, General Schwartzkopf was 
comfortable with the defensive position of the coalition 
forces in Saudi Arabia. When the President was informed of 
the status of allied forces in the region, he ordered plans 
and preparations to be readied for a possible offensive. At 
this time, Powell requested Schwartzkopf to define the 
nature and number of forces that he believed would be 
required to undertake offensive action (Brune, 1993: 61-4).
General Powell believed that the key to victory would 
be the use of overwhelming force, relentlessly applied. Put 
differently, coalition troops should go "all out," defeat 
the enemy, and get out quickly (Hilsman, 1992: 96). The 
plan eventually adopted reflected Powell and Defense
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Secretary Cheney's outline for victory: a massive air 
campaign, followed by a "left hook" ground offensive (see 
above) (U.S. News, 1992: 168-9).
For his part, once he was given the general concept to 
follow, Schwartzkopf was given free reign to "fill in the 
blanks" in his actual prosecution of the war (U.S. News, 
1992: 170, 400). The "Jedi Knights," Schwartzkopf's inner 
circle of planners, believed in mobility and speed as 
essential elements of any ground campaign (see above)(U.S. 
News, 1992: 159-160). The resulting refinement of the 
Powell/Cheney plan reflected the new tactics advocated by 
Schwartzkopf and his staff. It called for a four week air 
offensive, followed by a massive ground assault. This basic 
pattern, which would be followed during Operation Desert 
Storm, had been decided upon by October 1990 (Brune, 1993: 
108).
The specter of Vietnam clearly had a strong influence 
on the planning of the offensive. Once it was underway, the 
offensive would be short, sharp, and decisive. The main aim 
was to secure a rapid victory, while keeping casualties as 
low as possible. It was considered essential by 
Schwartzkopf that the war be initiated only after the 
coalition had achieved both quantitative and qualitative 
superiority in the Kuwait theater of operations (Tsouras 
and Wright et al., 1993: 89). President Bush greatly 
sympathized and consequently authorized General Powell to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
185
grant Schwartzkopf anything he needed to achieve a rapid 
victory (U.S. News, 1992: 172).
The political decision to use force was, essentially, 
an executive decision made by President Bush. It was a 
decision made contrary to the advice of General Powell, who 
argued against an offensive, pleading for sanctions to be 
given more time. But, for the reasons outlined earlier,
Bush was convinced that the war must be initiated. Bush did 
not seek advice from his military commanders regarding the 
actual decision to go to war. The President made up his 
mind after having consulted his most trusted advisor, 
National Security Advisor Admiral Brent Scowcroft (Hilsman, 
1992: 249-50). Once the choice to begin the offensive was 
made, Bush conferred with Powell and Cheney about the exact 
time when the operation could be undertaken. They advised 
the President that the air war could commence as early as 
12:01 AM on January 16, 1991, which it did.
As for the actual prosecution of the war, General 
Schwartzkopf was given carte blanche to act as he saw fit. 
Gone was any residue of Vietnam and the micro-management of 
the war that had characterized the Johnson administration. 
Liberal critics of President Bush's policy of non­
interference in the conduct of the offensive argued that 
his failure to supervise the military more carefully was an 
abdication of his role as the commander-in-chief which 
would undoubtedly result in the unnecessary deaths of Iraqi
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civilians during the course of the fighting. As one analyst 
put it: "The long-term political consequences of a decision 
to bomb particular targets are not the responsibility of 
military leaders, nor is the military equipped to make such 
judgements by either training or experience" (Hilsman,
1992: 210).
As it turned out, however, while there were some 
regrettable civilian casualties, they were not on the 
horrendous scale that some academics had predicted. In any 
case, the President was more concerned with the opinion of 
the American public than with Iraqi sensibilities. The 
public, in turn, was concerned with very little except that 
American casualties remain low.
Not much seems to have been revealed about any 
limitations placed on engaging the enemy. The only publicly 
known restriction seems to have been that American pilots 
were required to positively identify their targets so that 
damage to civilians was kept to an absolute minimum (Alonso 
et al., 1993: 65). The liberality of the rules of 
engagement were revealed after the so-called "highway of 
death" incident, when it was announced that only if Iraqi 
forces abandoned their equipment and laid down their arms 
would they be allowed to surrender. Otherwise, they were to 
be considered as hostile and dealt with accordingly.
General Schwartzkopf1s original plan envisioned a 144- 
hour ground offensive. However, after consulting with his
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theater commander, President Bush decided to call a 
ceasefire after only 100 hours. There seems to have been 
several reasons for the decision to* terminate the 
hostilities. The most obvious was the "turkey shoot" 
incident alluded to earlier. There was a real fear that 
such carnage might split the alliance, with Arab forces 
refusing to participate further if it meant slaughtering 
brother Arabs (Brune, 1993: 118; U.S.News, 1992: 395-6).
The second major reason was a desire on the part of 
the Bush administration not to exceed the United Nations 
mandate, which was the legal basis for Operation Desert 
Storm. The UN use of force resolution simply provided for 
the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Once this was 
achieved, there was a sense of pressure on the United 
States to end the war as quickly as possible (Rezun, 1992: 
118). Much of this pressure came from Soviet President 
Gorbachev, who himself was under increasing pressure from 
hardliners in his own military. It was feared that, if 
Baghdad were destroyed, these elements in the military and 
the KGB might use it as the excuse to topple the Soviet 
leader (U.S. News, 1992: 401).
A third reason for terminating the war was a fear that 
if Iraq were too severely weakened, it could no longer 
serve as a buffer against the spread of Islamic 
fundamentalism. The power vacuum that would be created 
would almost certainly be filled by Iran. As bad as Saddam
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Hussein was, to Washington, the alternative was worse 
(Brune, 1993: 119).
Finally, there was a certain appeal, in a public 
relations sense, in ending the war at precisely 100 hours. 
When asked his opinion about the earlier than expected 
cease-fire, Schwartzkopf was quoted as having replied: "I 
have no problem with that" (U.S. News, 1992: 396-7).
Other accounts seem to suggest that, his public 
professions notwithstanding, Schwartzkopf was indeed 
unhappy about the President's decision. An aid to the 
General said that Schwartzkopf asked Mr. Bush to give him a 
few more hours so the Republican Guard units near Basra 
could be surrounded. Schwartzkopf was also said to have 
desired to clarify the situation on the battlefield. There 
was confusion about the location of key units and no 
provision had yet been made for the establishment of a 
demilitarized zone to separate the two sides (U.S.News, 
1992: 396).
In a broadcast interview, the General claimed that he, 
in fact, wanted to continue the war and remove Saddam 
Hussein from power, but that President Bush had ordered him 
to stop. Shortly afterward, this statement was recanted, 
with Schwartzkopf calling Bush's decision courageous and 
"very humane" (Brune, 1993: 118-119).
Clearly, in terms of the actual prosecution of the 
war, the theater commander had complete authority and his
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opinion carried great weight at the White House. However, 
the more political choices regarding whether to go to war 
and when to declare a ceasefire were made by the President, 
although some consultation with the theater commander was 
engaged.
11. Was there an "exit strategy?11 If so. was it adhered to?
There was no formal exit plan as such. However, during 
the course of the ground war, the Bush administration 
decided to limit the offensive to 100 hours. In a speech 
delivered shortly after the ceasefire, President Bush 
indicated that the troops would be withdrawn as soon as was 
prudent. The President stated: "I have directed Secretary 
Cheney to begin the immediate return of American combat 
units from the gulf” fCOWR. March 9, 1991, transcript of 
address by President Bush, 624) . The first group of 
soldiers returned that day.
By April 4, some 20,000 troops had arrived home and 
most returned by the summer. As American troops were 
withdrawn, they were replaced by United Nations observers 
and representatives of international relief organizations. 
Formal control of southern Iraq was transferred to the 
United Nations on April 26 and the last American troops 
left Iraq on May 6, 1991 (Hilsman, 1992: 167-8).
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12. What were the •» lnmed-i ate results of the intervention?
Military Situation
In his speech to Congress on March 6, 1991, President 
Bush declared: "I can report to the nation: Aggression is 
defeated; the war is over" fCOWR. March 9, 1991, transcript 
of address by President Bush: 632). Indeed, the immediate 
result seemed to be one of the greatest military victories 
in United States history. Kuwait was liberated, and the 
Iraqi war machine all but destroyed. Some Republican Guard 
Units, although weakened, were spared so that internal 
order within Iraq could be maintained in the aftermath of 
the conflict. It was also envisioned by the Bush 
administration that these units would be necessary to deter 
any attempts by Iran to exploit the confusion in Iraq for 
its own benefit.
Damage to Kuwait was extensive, but could not yet even 
begin to be estimated. Perhaps the most vindictive act 
committed by retreating Iraqi troops was the setting of all 
of Kuwait's oil wells ablaze. This act of environmental 
terrorism so blackened the skies that the noon sky was a 
dark as night over much of Kuwait. It would cost the 
Kuwaiti economy billions of dollars in damages and lost 
revenue in the months it would take to put all of the fires 
out (Keesing's, December 1993: 39792; Keesing's, February 
1991: 37987).
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Iraq, too, suffered heavy, inestimable damage to its 
infrastructure. Most of the phone lines and electrical grid 
had been destroyed, which, it was estimated, would take 
years to fully restore. Both Basra and Baghdad had been 
bombed so heavily that the country seemed to have been 
regressed to a pre-industrial state. There were sever 
shortages of medicine, food, fuel, and other necessities 
(Keesing's, February 1991: 37984; Keesing's, March 1991:
38082).
Iraqi casualties were staggering. It was asserted by 
some that as many as 100,000 to 150,000 Iraqis may have 
died during the conflict, although a more commonly cited 
figure was a total of 100,000 casualties, of which 35,000 
were deaths. The British Defense Ministry estimated that 
175,000 Iraqis had been captured (Keesing's, February 1991: 
37986).
At the time of the initial ceasefire on March 3,1991, 
the coalition forces were in control of 15% of Iraq's 
territory, including most of the coastal area near the city 
of Basra (Keesing's: March 1991: 38081).
The immediate terms of the ceasefire included: the 
prompt release of allied prisoners of war held by the 
Iraqis, help in locating landmines, arrangements to 
separate coalition and Iraqi forces so as to prevent 
skirmishes, Iraqi acceptance of responsibility to pay war
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damage claims, and for Baghdad to accept the terms of, and 
to implement, all UN resolutions regarding Kuwait.
During the negotiations for a formal ceasefire, the 
United Nations added several stringent conditions. Iraq was 
to renounce terrorism, Baghdad was to accept the 1963 (pre­
invasion) borders with Kuwait; it was to destroy all 
stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons; it was to 
dismantle all facilities capable of producing nuclear 
weapons; it was to destroy its Scuds and other missiles; 
and it was to pledge to never attempt to acquire such arms 
again (Hilsman, 1992; 168).
Sanctions were eased on food, medicine, and emergency 
needs, however, a request to allow Baghdad to sell its oil 
to pay for these goods was denied (Keesing's, March 1991:
38083). The UN also mandated that 25 percent of all future 
oil revenues were to be set aside to pay reparations 
(Hilsman, 1992: 168).
Economy
The massive bombing campaign that opened the war, as 
was noted earlier, inflicted extensive damage on Iraq. 
Observers described the destruction as being "near- 
apocalyptic," relegating Iraq to a "pre-industrial age" 
(Keesing's March 1991: 38082). The lack of food and other 
necessities lead to rationing. A black market soon emerged 
that made many items available, but only at staggering 
prices (Hilsman, 1992: 169). The International Red Cross
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sent emergency food and medicine to ward off starvation and 
epidemic (Keesing's, March 1991: 38082).
Sanctions were kept in force pending Iraqi compliance 
with all United Nations resolutions. It was the position of 
the United States, as well as the western allies, that Iraq 
would be allowed no oil sales or the lifting of sanctions 
until at least two major demands were met: (1) the 
dismantling of Iraqi chemical and biological weapons, 
ballistic missiles, and facilities capable of producing 
nuclear weapons and (2) Iraq payment of up to 30% of future 
oil revenues to Kuwait as reparations (Hilsman, 1992: 170).
Political Situation 
As the Gulf War ended, Iraq was instantly faced with 
the outbreak of two major rebellions that threatened to 
dismember the country. In the south, the Shiite majority 
and "Marsh Arabs" revolted, and in the north, the long- 
smoldering Kurdish rebellion flared anew.
The southern rebellion began in the Basra area on 
March 1, 1991. It quickly spread to other southern cities 
including Nasiriyha, Karbala, and Najaf, even reaching to 
the very suburbs of Baghdad itself. The reported aim of the 
rebels was to establish a state with an Islamic government, 
presumably resembling that of neighboring Iran.
On March 5, government forces began to counterattack. 
Spearheaded by the surviving units of Hussein's Republican 
Guard, armor and heavy artillery pounded rebel forces in
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fierce fighting. Saddam's forces, while gaining the upper 
hand in battle, were having trouble holding what they had 
captured, as soon as government troops pushed on from a 
captured area, rebels would reclaim much of the lost 
territory.
The rebellion was brutally repressed, as 30,000 were 
believed to have died in shortly over a week of fighting. 
Government troops were ruthless in their vengeance, as they 
executed large numbers of captured guerrillas and 
civilians. By mid-March, Basra had been re-taken by 
government forces. At the end of March, the rebellion in 
the south had been subdued (Keesing's, March 1991: 38081).
In northern Iraq, the Kurdish minority took advantage 
of the post-war disorder to resume their intermittent 
rebellion. This time, the rebellion was centered near the 
city of Mosul and the Kirkuk oil region. As in the south, 
the rebels initially enjoyed spectacular success, 
threatening to completely overrun Iraqi Kurdistan.
The tide of battle soon began to turn. Iraqi forces 
used air raids and heavy shelling in a counterattack that 
lead to the recovery of the major cities by early April. As 
a result, three million refugees retreated into the 
mountains in the extreme north of Iraq in order to escape 
certain retribution and possible genocide. The Iraqi army 
made use of fixed-wing aircraft (in violation of the UN 
ceasefire agreement) as well as chemical bombs and
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phosphorus shells against rebel forces. Furthermore, it was 
confirmed that napalm was being used against retreating 
civilians.
Kurdish guerrillas were able to check the Iraqi 
advance with heavy fighting near Sulaimaniya. Toward the 
end of April, Saddam offered to grant "limited autonomy" to 
the Kurds. Kurdish leaders, however, while open to the 
negotiations, warned that wide differences existed between 
the two sides as to the actual nature of "autonomy" 
(Keesing's, April 1991: 38126-7).
A common link between both rebel groups was the sense 
of betrayal by the United States. For months, Washington 
had not-too-subtly encouraged the rebellions, but then did 
nothing to support the insurgents. The parallels to the 
ill-fated Hungarian rebellion of 1956 were obvious.
Speaking for the Bush administration, State Department 
spokeswoman Margaret Tutweiler denied that Washington ever 
had called for an uprising against Hussein, reminding 
reporters that the overthrow of the Iraqi dictator was not 
a stated American objective.
It is undeniable that Bush had encouraged such 
uprisings through his fiery rhetoric both before, and 
during, the Gulf war. However, Bush apparently developed 
"cold feet" after the war's conclusion. The President 
realized that, despite the emotional satisfaction that 
Saddam's overthrow would provide, the collapse of Iraq
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would undoubtedly create a power vacuum that Iran, Syria, 
or both would attempt to fill. Neither of these prospects 
was in the long-term interests of the United States. The 
expansion of Iran would be particularly troublesome due to 
the fact that its brand of Islamic fundamentalism would 
then be even closer to Israel.
Furthermore, Washington's Turkish allies were alarmed 
at the prospect of an independent Kurdish state formed from 
northern Iraq. Host Kurds reside in Turkey, and therefore 
Ankara feared that calls for a "greater Kurdistan" that 
would surely follow.
The United States was also afraid, or so it claimed, 
to directly involve itself in another state's internal 
affairs. Should Washington embark on this course, it would 
both set a dangerous precedent for elsewhere, as well as 
engage it in an open-ended commitment in Iraq.
Ironically, the United States was forced to allow 
Hussein to remain in power because it could find no 
credible alternative to the Iraqi tyrant. This, perhaps, 
explains why Republican Guard units were allowed to survive 
the war. For better or worse, the status quo assured that 
internal order was maintained and that greater threats like 
Iran were kept out. In any case, the Bush administration 
could encourage a coup by disgruntled officers that would 
replace Saddam with a more acceptable military regime (New 
York Times. June 28, 1993, article by Thomas L. Friedman).
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As the Kurdish situation became more serious, Bush 
reversed his non-interference policy. Perhaps feeling a 
degree of guilt over the plight of the Kurds, the allies 
set-up safe havens along the Turkish border. Named 
"Operation Provide Relief," this effort established tent 
cities to house refugees, as well as providing food and 
medical care. To protect these camps, the United States 
declared a "no military activity" zone north of the 36th 
parallel, although the oil region around Mosul was 
exempted. Any attempt to interfere with relief efforts 
would be met with military force (Keesing's, April 1991: 
38128).
13. What was the long-term situation?
Iraq
Despite Saddam Hussein's iron-fisted rule, Iraq has 
been plagued by a degree of political instability. There 
have been reports of several coup attempts, the most 
serious of which took place in June of 1992. Rebel 
officers attempted to assassinate Hussein and seize control 
of power (New York Times. July 9, 1992, dispatch by Michael 
R. Gordon). However, a rogue Republican Guard mechanized 
brigade was intercepted by loyalist forces as it tried to 
lead or join the revolt (New York Times. July 6, 1992, 
article by Patrick E. Tyler).
The Bush administration believed that the coup attempt 
showed that Saddam's hold on power is tenuous. However,
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some experts on Iraq drew the opposite conclusion: that 
Hussein is in very effective control of internal security 
and that this is proven by his ability to root out such 
conspiracies (New York Times. July 9, 1992, dispatch by 
Michael R. Gordon). Saddam has purged military units of 
those whose loyalty has been suspect. Senior military 
officers have been systematically arrested, tortured, and 
killed.
Since 1991, the CIA has been authorized to attempt to 
destabilize the Iraqi government. To this end, covert 
contacts were made with sympathetic Iraqi citizens and 
officials. However, JCS Chief General Colin Powell has 
warned that the only way that Washington could secure 
Hussein's departure was the use of American ground combat 
forces (New York Times. July 6, 1992, article by Patrick E. 
Tyler).
Despite the concern that the war's bombing and the 
economic embargo would push Iraq back into a "pre- 
industrial” age, within a year of the end of the conflict 
an impressive reconstruction effort was well underway. By 
July 1992, telephone service had been restored in Baghdad, 
as was limited international service. Gasoline is plentiful 
and cheap, which has generated perpetual traffic problems.
According to the Iraqi government, by mid-1992, more 
than 70 percent of the damage done by allied bombing had 
been repaired, 120 of 134 bridges destroyed were again
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functioning, and most of the electrical grid had been 
repaired. The electrification of the city of Baghdad in 
mid-1992 had been restored to 90% of 1989 levels. Clearly, 
much of the phenomenal recovery is due to the availability 
to Iraq of money from secret funds abroad, as well as help 
that it has received from other states in evading United 
Nations sanctions (New York Times. July 14, 1992, dispatch 
by Paul Lewis).
On the diplomatic front, Hussein has engaged the 
United Nations in general, and the United States in 
particular, in a war of nerves. Since the end of the 
conflict, there have been numerous instances of Saddam 
challenging various aspects of the ceasefire and/or 
sanctions, only to back down when faced with the prospect 
of an armed response. Two such instances stand out from the 
others.
The first was an Iraqi attempt to assassinate former 
President George Bush. In April 1993, during a visit to 
Kuwait, Kuwaiti authorities uncovered a plot to kill the 
American statesman (New York Times. June 27, 1993, 
transcript of address by President Clinton).
In a speech to the nation, President Clinton revealed 
that both the FBI and the CIA had conducted an 
investigation which confirmed that Iraq was behind the plot 
(New York Times. June 27, 1993, dispatch by Gwen Ifil). 
Evidence included forensic data which revealed that the
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device used was consistent with those that Iraq had used in 
the past (New York Times. June 28, 1993: transcript of 
address by Madalaine Albright).
To punish Saddam, President Clinton ordered the U.S. 
Navy to fire 23 Tomahawk cruise missiles at Baghdad from 
frigates stationed in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf (New
York Times. June 27, 1993, article by Tim Weiner). The
target selected by the President was the headquarters of 
Iraqi Intelligence, the undoubted source of both the plot 
and the bomb. Mr. Clinton asserted that his response was 
consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter 
which allows for self-defense. During his speech, Clinton 
called the attempt to assassinate Mr. Bush "an attack 
against our country and against all American we could not, 
or have not, let such actions against our nation go
unanswered" (New York Times. June 27, 1993, transcript of
address by President Clinton).
President Clinton's action was based on the precedent 
established by President Bush when cruise missile were used 
to knockout an Iraqi nuclear weapons facility in January, 
1993 (New York Times. June 28, 1993, article by Eric 
Schmitt). The selection of the cruise missile was also 
based on a desire to limit civilian casualties and to 
respond in a way that would not prompt Saddam to strike 
again in an even more spectacular manner (New York Times. 
June 28, 1993, article by Thomas L. Friedman).
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The other major event was the October 1994 crisis over 
troop deployment near the Kuwaiti border. On October 12, 
1994, 80,000 Iraqi troops massed at the border within 20 
miles of the UN buffer zone separating Iraq and Kuwait. The 
alleged reason for this provocation was Hussein's desire to 
draw the attention of the international community to the 
crippling effect of UN-imposed sanctions on Iraq.
The United Nations responded by adopting Resolution 
949, which placed new restrictions on Iraqi troop 
movements. The resolution demanded an immediate withdrawal 
of Iraqi units from the southern region of Iraq and their 
subsequent return to their bases. It also mandated that 
Baghdad refrain from acting in a "hostile or provocative 
manner [threatening to] its neighbors."
On October 7, 1994, President Clinton ordered American 
warships to move into the Persian Gulf area in order to 
deter Iraq. Initially 2,000 troops were sent to Kuwait in 
order to shore up defenses. By mid-October, the United 
States had deployed 40,000 soldiers, 600 aircraft, and a 
naval task force. These forces were joined by 1,000 Royal 
Marines from the United Kingdom. After several tense weeks, 
the crisis ended when Iraqi troops were withdrawn 
unilaterally (Keesing's, October 1994: 40255).
On November 10, 1994, Iraq formally recognized 
Kuwait’s boundaries, which effectively renounced any claim 
that the emirate was a "19th province" of Iraq. The United
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States welcomed this development, yet still refused to lift 
the sanctions until all other UN resolutions were fulfilled 
(Keesing's, November 1994: 40302-3).
Iraq has formally agree to accept long-term weapons 
monitoring. A United Nations special commission stated that 
Baghdad's stock of 155 mm shells containing mustard gas had 
been destroyed. Furthermore, Iraq had begun to send 
irradiated uranium to Russia for disposal (Keesing's, 
December 1993: 39791).
Kuwait
The oil field fires ignited by retreating Iraqi forces 
were finally put out, and the wells capped, on November 7, 
1991 (Watson and Lewis, 1993: 182). The Kuwaitis then 
shifted their attention to the removal of land mines (New 
York Times. October 15, 1992, dispatch by Chris Hedges).
As in Iraq, Kuwaiti rebuilding has proceeded at a 
rapid pace. The most incredible change, however, has been 
political. Kuwait's first free parliamentary elections were 
held in October, 1992. This fulfilled a promise made by 
Emir Sheik Jaber al-Ahmed al-Sabah during the period of 
Iraqi occupation.
The result of the balloting was a huge defeat for the 
government, as opposition candidates won 31 of 50 seats. It 
is particularly noteworthy that 19 of the opposition's 
seats were won by Islamic fundamentalists. The ability of 
the opposition to effect real change, however, would appear
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to be greatly limited because of the secular/religious 
division, as well as infighting within the ranks of the 
fundamentalists. A further limit would appear to exist in 
the form of the Emir's veto power. There is a real fear 
that if the Parliament goes "too far" in exercising its 
prerogative that it will be shut down again, as was the 
case in 1986 (New York Times. October 18, 1992, dispatch by 
Chris Hedges).
14. What elements about this case are unique?
The Persian Gulf War was unique in a number of ways. 
First, and perhaps best publicized, was the introduction of 
ultra-modern Cold War-inspired weapons systems into a 
conventional conflict. High Tech weapons such as cruise 
missiles and M1A1 tanks greatly contributed to the speed of 
victory and low casualty rates. The premier of these 
weapons systems answered a question that had long been on 
the mind of defense planners: "Do these weapons really 
work?" The answer is "yes." Despite their imperfections, 
these weapons represent a great stride in military 
technology (Alonso et al., 1993: 73-76).
A second, yet associated, variable was the employment 
of the new tactics of movement. Speed and mobility were 
used, in conjunction with the high-tech weapons, to soundly 
trounce a force that was believed to be larger in size. 
Furthermore, flanking maneuvers like the "left hook" or
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"Hail Mary" were enormously successful (U.S. News, 1992: 
159-60).
A less heralded, but profoundly important, difference 
from past interventions since 1945 was that the Soviet 
Union sided with the United States. For the first time, 
America could be absolutely sure that there would be no 
counter-intervention by another superpower. Therefore, 
Washington was able to virtually guarantee victory because 
it could fight without inhibition; it could do whatever it 
would take to win decisively (Brune, 1993: 55).
Unfortunately, the Persian Gulf War introduced the 
world to two new aspects of warfare. The first was the use 
of hostages as "human shields." Hostages have been taken 
since antiquity, but, never before have civilians been so 
shamelessly exploited as when women and children were kept 
on military and industrial sites so as to dissuade allied 
forces from bombing. The second was eco-terrorism.
Partially as a tactic to fill the skies with smoke so as to 
"blind" allied airmen and partially as an irrational, 
vindictive act, Iraqi troops uncapped and set ablaze 732 of 
Kuwait's oil wells. The fires continued for months, 
blackening the skies over Kuwait. Furthermore, Iraqi 
soldiers blew apart oil lines and allowed a huge, 30 mile 
long oil slick to form in the upper Persian Gulf. Although 
it was probably intended to either block shipping or to 
foul desalination plants that provided the emirate with
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drinking water, the result was that the regional ecosystem 
was severely disrupted (Watson, 1993: 214; Brune 1993: 111- 
112). Allied bombers were able to alleviate some of the 
problem of open pipelines by bombing to seal them.
Another unique characteristic of this case was 
Saddam's use of terror bombings. Just as the Nazis had used 
V-2s 45 years earlier, Hussein used modified Scud missiles, 
not so much to hit military targets, but to terrorize 
innocent civilians in a country with which he was not even 
at war. In their modified form, Scuds were so inaccurate 
that they had no other purpose but to be aimed at cities to
kill civilians and intimidate governments (Brune, 1993:
111).
Finally, a unique and very curious feature of the war 
was that Hussein, while dramatically posturing in the world 
media, hardly put up a fight, especially during the air 
war. His concession of the skies to the coalition so early 
in the war essentially sealed his fate. The Iraqis were so 
battered, and the destruction so extensive, that when the 
ground war finally came, the Iraqi troops were all but 
waiting for the earliest possible opportunity to surrender 
to allied troops. The only troops that showed any fight in
them were the elite Republican Guard. There still is no
adequate explanation as to why Saddam did not fight back in 
the war's early stages. It may just be speculation, but 
perhaps he knew that defeat was inevitable and so he chose
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to simply endure the punishment and, hopefully, in the 
process make himself into a martyr.
15. Was the intervention "successful?11
The success or failure of the operation as a whole can 
perhaps best be evaluated by considering the fulfillment of 
goals on various levels: operational goal, officially 
articulated political goals, unofficial political goals, 
and the establishment of a New World Order.
Operational Goals
Operational goal established by military planners were 
achieved with rapid success. At the outset of the war, the 
allies were able to cut off Iraqi command and control at 
its Baghdad source. Unfortunately, the bombing campaign 
also did more damage to the Iraqi electrical grid than was 
intended, and thus the citizenry was made to suffer (New 
York Times. February 23, 1992, article by Michael R.
Gordon).
The allies were successful in gaining control of the 
skies and the relentless bombing campaign had the desired 
effect on Iraqi defenses. Baghdad's military was largely 
destroyed before it got the chance to face coalition forces 
in the ground war. Soldiers, mostly conscripts, were 
demoralized by the constant barrage and surrendered en 
masse to anyone who would take them, including western news 
crews. The United States military made skillful use of 
deception. The faked Marine landing in Kuwait succeeded in
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diverting Iraqi forces, thus allowing the allied flanking 
maneuvers to enjoy overwhelming success. Finally, the 
ground offensive managed to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait 
and allowed the coalition to move on Basra in only 100 
hours, 44 hours ahead of the anticipated schedule. The only 
operational failure was that the allies were not altogether 
successful in discovering and destroying Scud launchers and 
facilities for the development and storage of Iraqi weapons 
of mass destruction.
Officially Articulated Goals
President Bush first articulated American policy goals 
for this intervention episode in an August 8, 1990 speech, 
and they were subsequently reiterated in later speeches and 
official policy statements in the months leading to January 
1991.
The first goal, to secure Iraqi withdrawal (or, if 
necessary, expulsion) from Kuwait, obviously, was 
fulfilled. The second goal was the restoration of the legal 
Kuwaiti government. The Emir al-Sabah was, in fact, 
restored to this throne after the liberation of Kuwait by 
coalition forces. In addition, as was noted earlier, a 
limited democracy has been allowed, although its long-term 
future remains to be seen.
The protection of U.S. lives in Kuwait and Iraq was 
the third goal publicly articulated by the Bush 
administration. As far as civilian lives were concerned,
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United States citizens who were being held as "human 
shields" during the summer and fall of 1990 were released 
unharmed before the start of the war. These nearly 100 
Americans were sent home in early December 1990 (Brune, 
1993: 66). As far as American soldiers were concerned, 
military casualties were dramatically lower than predicted. 
A commonly accepted figure was that coalition forces would 
suffer up to 100,000 deaths in the war's first three days 
(Brune, 1993: 94). Actual casualty figures, however, were 
astoundingly low: 148 combat deaths, 458 combat wounded, 
and 120 non-combat deaths (Brune, 1993: 121).
The final articulated goal was that of regional 
security and stability. In this respect, the war seems to 
have been a success. For the most part, the Iraqis have 
been contained. The only aggressive act which Saddam has 
attempted outside of Iraq (the attempted assassination of 
President Bush) was a failure, and President Clinton saw to 
it that Iraq was punished for it.
Whether or not it is directly connected to the war is 
unclear, but during the course of the last four years since 
the end of the conflict, the peace process seems to have 
been revived. Israel is finally at peace with Jordan and 
has an autonomy arrangement with the PLO. Even Syrian 
dictator Hafez Assad, long an implacable foe of Jerusalem, 
seems willing at least to talk about peace.
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Finally, the United States has finally gotten 
something that it wanted under President Reagan's 
"strategic consensus" but was never able to achieve: the 
right to preposition supplies in several Persian Gulf 
states. In addition, the United States also has a security 
arrangement with Kuwait.
Unofficial Political Goals
Perhaps the most ambitious of this class of political 
objectives was the unstated, yet transparently obvious, 
desire of Washington to remove Saddam Hussein from power. 
This has been a total failure.
In direct contrast to American expectations, Iraqi 
civilians, at least publicly, assign the blame for their 
woes to the United States and the UN embargo, rather than 
their own leader and his ruinous policies (New York Times. 
July 31, 1992, dispatch by Paul Lewis). As a matter of 
fact, it seems that the worse conditions get, the more that 
the Iraqi public rallies to Hussein. There is, of course, a 
very real possibility that this is actually a reaction 
based on fear. Living in a ruthless police-state, people 
know what to say and do in public or before western news 
cameras. They save their grumblings and dissatisfaction for 
private airings with family and trusted friends.
It is, however, undeniable, that the Iraqi dictator 
appears to be at least as powerful, at least with regard to 
domestic politics, as before the war. It can plausibly be
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argued that he is perhaps even stronger and more secure 
than was the case in 1990 (Hilsman, 1992: 205). His ability 
to uncover and quash coup attempts seems to imply an 
efficient secret police apparatus (New York Times. July 9, 
1992, article by Michael R. Gordon). Despite CIA operations 
to destabilize his regime, Saddam's two-faced rule 
(ruthless, yet benevolent) appears to have earned him 
support among the Iraqi people (New York Times. July 6, 
1992, article by Patrick E. Tyler; July 31, 1992, article 
by Paul Lewis). An ongoing process of thorough purging has 
largely succeeded in keeping his military in line and loyal 
to Hussein personally fNew York Times. July 9, 1992, 
dispatch by Michael R. Gordon).
Another goal, implicit in American policy at the 
beginning of the crisis, and only later publicly admitted, 
was the destruction of Iraq's military capability. Much of 
this goal was achieved during the war, as was demonstrated 
earlier. As the war was reaching its climax, however, 
President Bush seemed to be rethinking the wisdom of 
completely disarming Iraq, especially in light of the 
regional balance of power. This may explain why the ground 
war was suspended two days ahead of schedule, allowing the 
elite Republican Guard and some of Hussein's best tank 
units to survive (Hilsman, 1992: 205). 700 Iraqi tanks were 
spared destruction (U.S. News, 1992: 412). Iraq also
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retained a considerable proportion of its fleet of 
helicopter gunships.
As regards the destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction and nuclear facilities, it seems that bombing 
did some damage to Baghdad's capabilities and United 
Nations teams are accomplishing much of the rest. Yet given 
his history, Saddam must still be closely watched in order 
to insure his compliance (Hilsman, 1992: 205). United 
Nations Resolution 715 established a permanent UN 
monitoring system, complete with surveillance cameras. Once 
this is operational, Iraqi test sites, installations, and 
weapons facilities can be more easily policed by 
international watchdogs (Spencer, 1994: 24).
The New World Order 
President Bush, like many Americans in 1991, was very 
optimistic about the role played by the United Nations in 
confronting Iraqi aggression. There was great hope that the 
UN finally had lived up to the vision of its founders. This 
optimism, combined with a certain sense of euphoric 
invincibility regarding interventionism, may have had the 
originally unforeseen consequence of encouraging American 
intervention in Somalia and Haiti, as well as NATO 
airstrikes in Bosnia.
If the New World Order were to be worthy of its name, 
it would need a leader, and clearly that leader was the 
world's only superpower, the United States of America.
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However, while American citizens are understandably 
reluctant to take on all of the responsibilities that such 
leadership entails, so too have U.S. leaders become fearful 
of ceding such authority to multilateral organization, 
especially the United Nations. As a result, over time the 
phase "New World Order" has all but disappeared from public 
discourse. The only exception is its use for the purpose of 
ridicule, along with other memorable phrases as "voodoo 
economics" or "feeling your pain."
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CHAPTER VI
OPERATION RESTORE HOPE; HUMANITARIAN RELIEF IN SOMALIA 
Introduction
The overwhelming victory of coalition force in the 
Persian Gulf War generated a sense of optimism among 
American leaders, as well as those of other countries. The 
United Nations finally seemed to be fulfilling its purpose 
of creating a better, more secure world. In Iraq, UN- 
sponsored intervention had rolled back aggression. As a 
result, President George Bush's New World Order seemed off 
to an auspicious start.
While the war in the Gulf was being fought, in the 
East African state of Somalia rebel clan militias toppled 
the 22-year old dictatorship of Mohammed Said Barre. The 
ensuing civil war and a severe drought combined to cause a 
famine of biblical proportions. Although it would not 
become clear for several months more, the New World Order 
was about to be put to an early test.
Undertaken, as it was for the highest of motives —  
humanitarian famine relief —  the American intervention in 
Somalia seemed to be a defining moment for America in her 
role as the post-Cold War era's lone superpower. Despite 
its initial success, however, Operation Restore Hope 
rapidly degenerated into a manhunt for a warlord. Somalia
213
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provides a case study illustrating the limits of
multilateral military operations and the failure of
"nation-building" in a society embroiled in anarchy.
1. What vere the prevailing conditions initially in the 
"target11 country?
In January 1991, the 22 year reign of Somali dictator 
Mohammed Said Barre came to an end when it was overthrown 
by an alliance of clan-based militia groups fCOWR. October 
16, 1993: 2826). Vast stockpiles of arms, accumulated over 
the course of three decades from Barre's Cold War patrons 
(first the Soviet Union, then from 1977 on, the United 
States), were seized by the various factions. United only 
by their hatred of Barre, the now heavily-armed militias 
began to turn their firepower on each other. The result was 
a multi-sided civil war that fragmented Somalia into a 
series of clan-based fiefdoms (New York Times. December 4, 
1992, article by Thomas Gordon).
Despite the multitude of clan-based militias, by 1992, 
four major contenders emerged. The first group was the 
United Somali Congress (USC). Led by Ali Mahdi Mohammed, it 
was based on the Hawiye clan of Central Somalia. The second 
group was Mohammed Farah Aidid's Somali National Alliance 
(SNA). Formerly a high official in the USC, Aidid broke 
away after a falling out with Ali Mahdi in 1991. The SNA 
was subsequently formed by a union between the Aidid 
faction and several other clan groups. Based in the 
Mogadishu area, the SNA drew its strength mainly from the
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Hawiye clan, although others were represented as well 
(Makinda, 1993: 26, 32).
The Somali National Front (SNF), headed by General 
Mohammed Said Hersi Morgan, was a third force. It was 
composed of forces still loyal to Barre, and its power base 
largely rested in Southern Somalia, near the port city of 
Kismayu (Bryden, 1995: 147).
Finally, there was the Somali National Movement (SNM). 
Led by Adel-Rahman Ahmed Ali, it was mostly composed of 
members of the Issaq clan (Makinda, 1993: 25). Its support 
base was in northwestern Somalia, in what was known until 
1960 as British Somaliland. In May, 1991, the SNM declared 
its territory to be the independent Republic of Somaliland 
(Keesing's, May 1991: 38182-3). The republic has received 
no international recognition.
A 1991 post-revolution peace conference named the 
USC's Ali-Mahdi as interim president. War, however, quickly 
broke out among the clans. Farah Aidid, jealous of Mahdi's 
selection, decided to challenge his leadership militarily 
(Bryden, 1995: 147).
It bears noting, however, that both Aidid and Ali 
Mahdi had limited support within the country. This was 
because in Somalia, clan loyalties have traditionally been 
stronger than any shared national identity. Only rarely, 
usually when faced by an external threat (such as the war 
with Ethiopia in the late 1970s) do the clans show any
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inclination toward unity. Even then, when the foreign 
threat recedes, such ad hoc alliances inevitably dissolve.
Despite various peace conferences, fighting continued 
among the factions. In terms of its impact on national 
politics, the most important fighting was between Aidid and 
Ali Mahdi in, and around, the capital city of Mogadishu 
(Makinda, 1993: 18).
While the conflict raged in the early 1990s, Somalia 
was further plagued by a severe drought. The result, 
predictably, was a nationwide famine fCOWR. October 16, 
1993: 2826; Makinda, 1993: 41) Starvation was said to 
threaten 30% of the Somalian population, Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs), such as the French Medecins Sans 
Frontieres. the UK-based Save The Children, and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were the 
first to respond to the crisis with relief efforts 
(Keesing's, July 1992: 38992). However, anarchy, growing 
out of the warfare engulfing Somalia, interfered with the 
humanitarian operations. Gunmen associated with the various 
clan militias looted food and medical depots, hijacked or 
blocked relief shipments, and kidnapped relief workers. The 
motive behind these callous acts was usually to gain profit 
on the black market and/or to prevent rival groups from 
receiving humanitarian relief (Makinda, 1993: 42).
By May 1992, it was estimated that 4.5 million of the 
total 6 million Somalis were threatened with starvation,
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with the crisis exacting its greatest toll in the country's 
southern and central regions (Keesing's, May 1992: 38902). 
According to UN diplomat Mohammed Sahnoun, by late July 
1992 as many as 5,000 people a day were dying in Somalia. A 
further 1.5 million were on the brink of death, with 4.5 
million more nearing starvation. Taken together, these 
figures represented almost all of Somalia's population 
(Keesing's, July 1992: 38992).
In response to the ongoing suffering, the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed UNSC Resolution 767, 
which established the first United Nations Operation in 
Somalia (UNOSOM I). The resolution created operational 
zones in Somalia for UN-sponsored relief efforts, as well 
as authorizing the Secretary General to organize an "air 
bridge" to speed relief to the famine victims (Keesing's, 
July 1992: 39992). The resolution further established a 
peacekeeping force to provide security for UN and NGO aid 
activities in the greater Mogadishu area. In an action that 
mirrored previous UN peacekeeping operations, 50 unarmed 
military observers were dispatched to monitor the Mogadishu 
"green line" which separated Ali Mahdi and Aidid's forces 
(Makinda, 1993: 62).
Ambassador Sahnoun was able to secure an agreement 
with Aidid to allow 500 armed guards to enter Somalia to 
protect food distribution centers. Sahnoun emphasized the 
food distribution mission, insisting that armed troops were
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not going to engage in peacekeeping. However, on August 28, 
1992, the UN Security Council authorized the commitment of
3,000 more armed UN troops, to be deployed as four 750- 
member strong "security units" (Keesing's, August 1992: 
39034).
The United States, too, became involved in the relief 
efforts by starting an emergency airlift that lasted four 
months. The supplies were to be shipped directly to Somalia 
if possible, otherwise the alternate route was to fly into 
northern Kenya, then tranship the goods to southern Somalia 
from there. The plan was to send 80,000 tons in the first 
six weeks, to be followed by another 145,000 tons more 
after October 1 (Keesing's, August 1992: 39035).
By October 1992, it had become clear that United 
Nations peacekeepers had failed to prevent armed gunmen 
from interfering with relief distribution. Believing it to 
be a problem of manpower, the UN proposed raising its 
peacekeeping presence to 4,200 soldiers. General Aidid, who 
at the time controlled most of southern Somalia and two- 
thirds of Mogadishu, opposed further UN deployment, calling 
it a threat to Somalia's sovereignty (Keesing's, October 
1992: 39132). Aidid's reluctance to permit a large United 
Nations presence stemmed from his negative view of UN 
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who, as Egyptian 
Foreign Minister, had been close to Barre. Believing
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Boutros-Ghali now to be partial toward Ali Mahdi, Aidid 
viewed the UN with suspicion (Makinda, 1993: 65).
Although the United Nations had approved a deployment 
of 3,500 men, most of them had not been sent due to 
objections from the various warlords in Somalia. New York 
believed that the cooperation of the various clan militia 
leaders was necessary to the ultimate success of UNOSOM I 
and, therefore, the deployment was put on hold in order to 
avoid antagonizing the chieftains. In December 1992, 
therefore, the strength of United Nations forces in Somalia 
was 564 total. This figure included 50 military observers, 
500 in a security battalion, and the remainder distributed 
as headquarters staff and logistical personnel.
UNOSOM I had very constrained rules of engagement 
(ROE). As is the usual modus operandi of such operations,
UN personnel were authorized to use force only for self 
defense. Given the size of the UN contingent and its 
restrictive ROE, UNOSOM I was largely ineffective in 
fulfilling its mission of famine relief. Because UNOSOM 
played virtually no positive role in Somalia, by December 
1992 it had become obvious that a larger, better equipped 
force would be needed if the chaotic situation were to be 
brought under control (Makinda, 1993: 67-8).
Under these conditions, President Bush offered the 
United Nations the use of a large American force in order 
to stabilize the situation in Somalia and thus make
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possible the resumption of food and aid delivery fCOWR.
October 16, 1993: 2826). On December 3, 1992, the Security
Council passed UNSC Resolution 794, which formally accepted
the American offer (Makinda, 1993: 64).
2. Why did the United States choose to get involved?
It is a generally accepted fact that President Bush
initially chose to intervene in Somalia for humanitarian
reasons. (New York Times. December 5, 1992: article by
Thomas Friedman). The key motivating factor for Bush was
the scale of death taking place. As Bush explained it in
his address to the nation:
Every American has seen the shocking images from 
Somalia. The scope of suffering there is hard to 
imagine. Already over a quarter million people, 
as many as live in Buffalo, N.Y., have died in 
the Somali famine. In the months ahead, five 
times that number, one and a half million people, 
could starve to death (New York Times. December 
3, 1992: Text of Bush address).
The President explained that "anarchy prevails" in 
Somalia, and that relief workers feared for their very 
lives. Therefore, Bush declared, "confronted with these 
conditions, relief groups called for outside troops to 
provide security so that they could feed people." As a 
result, it was now clear to Bush "that military support is 
necessary to insure the safe delivery of the food Somalis 
need to survive" (New York Times. December 5, 1992, text of 
Bush address).
Although Bush acknowledged that "the United States 
alone cannot right the world's wrongs," he argued that the
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United States must take the leading role to bring aid to
Somalia because:
Only the United States has the global reach to 
place a large security force on the ground in 
such a distant place quickly and efficiently and 
thus save thousands of innocents from death (New 
York Times. December 5, 1992, text of Bush 
address).
Bush reassured Americans: "We will not, however, be acting 
alone. I expect forces from about a dozen countries to join 
us in this mission” (New York Times. December 5, 1992, text 
of Bush address).
It is impossible to overestimate the influence 
television had on the decision to intervene in Somalia. Its 
persistent displays of grim images of human suffering 
shocked both the public and the government. The sight of 
the mass starvation of Somali children was instrumental in 
leading to American action (Makinda, 1993: 69; Bryden,
1995: 148).
Aside from the generally agreed-upon humanitarian 
reasons for American intervention, some political observers 
suggested certain less altruistic motives. One writer 
speculated that after his electoral defeat, Mr. Bush wanted 
to leave office in an upbeat, statesman-like manner (New 
York Times. December 6, 1992, article by Michael Wines). 
Others suggested that Bush viewed Somalia as the first test 
of the New World Order. According to this view, Bush was 
quite embarrassed that his scheme was now being undermined 
by the mass starvation of children in the Horn of Africa.
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If the New World Order was to become more than mere words, 
action was imperative (Makinda, 1993: 69). Finally, it was 
also suggested that, with congressional liberals demanding 
a "peace dividend," the military needed to find missions 
that would justify its being spared large budget cuts. A 
relief operation to Somalia was originally perceived as a 
low-risk means of accomplishing this goal (Makinda, 1993: 
73) .
3. What were the intended results, or objectives, of 
American intervention?
During his December, 1992, address to the nation, 
President Bush outlined the humanitarian mission of the 
U.S. intervention in Somalia. Despite the apparent 
simplicity of the two goals that the President set, he did 
not elaborate on their specifics. As a result, American 
forces operated in pursuit of rather ambiguously defined 
objectives (Keesing's, December, 1992: 39225; New York 
Times, December 5, 1992, text of Bush address).
Bush's first objective was to "create a secure 
environment in the hardest hit parts of Somalia so that 
food can move from ships overland to the people in the 
countryside now devastated by starvation" (New York Times. 
December 5, 1992, text of Bush address). The potentially 
open-ended commitment entailed in this goal was quickly 
pointed out by critics. As a New York Times editorial 
queried: "Just what is a secure environment?...On this Mr. 
Bush said nothing, despite expectations in Somalia that
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Americans will be peacemakers, not just alms-givers" (New 
York Times. December 5, 1992, Editorial).
The other objective outlined by Bush was that once 
this "secure environment" was created, the United States 
would withdraw its forces and hand over the operation to 
United Nations peacekeepers fNew York Times. December 5, 
1992, text of Bush address).
While agreeing in principle with Mr. Bush's 
objectives, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
believed that under the terms of UNSC Res. 794 which 
authorized the U.S. action, he had the right to determine 
what exactly constituted a "secure environment." The 
Secretary General argued that American and other allied 
forces could only create a secure environment by disarming 
clan militias and destroying their heavy weapons. The U.S. 
Commander for Somalia, however, argued that disarmament was 
not part of his mission and, consequently, would not be a 
high priority.
There were several reasons for this disagreement 
between the United States and the United Nations over what 
exactly constituted a secure environment. One such reason 
was that both sides had very different definitions of the 
term. For the UN, it meant leaving Somalia in a condition 
that was conducive to peacekeeping and a negotiated 
settlement of political differences between the clans. If 
the arms stockpiles were not confiscated, the militias
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would undoubtedly become reactivated shortly after the 
departure of U.S. and allied forces.
The U.S. theater commander, however, saw matters 
differently. For General Johnston, the goal of humanitarian 
relief did not necessitate disarmament per se. Supply 
corridors could be opened, and relief distributed, without 
unnecessarily engaging Somali militia groups. Furthermore, 
Washington simply did not want to take on any high risk 
ventures beyond its stated objective of opening up supply 
routes.
Another related concern was that disarming the 
militias would undoubtedly be a long-term operation 
(Makinda, 1993: 71). Even if disarmament were to be 
undertaken as an American mission, given the proliferation 
of weapons in Somalia, how would one ever know for certain 
when the goal had been accomplished? To engage in such 
operations would have the potential of keeping U.S. troops 
in Somalia long after the January, 1993, withdrawal date 
that the President had set.
These goals originally envisioned by President Bush 
would later be subject to change; they would be subjected 
to what would be called later, "mission creep." The 
evolution of United States and United Nations objectives as 
the operation continued is discussed later in this chapter.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
225
4. What was the nature of the operation?
The United States' intervention in Somalia actually 
occurred in two phases. The first was the Unified Task 
Force (UNITAF), the other was the second United Nations 
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II).
UNITAF, or Operation Restore Hope as it was called in 
the USA, ran from December 1992 until May 1993. The United 
Nations Security Council authorized the mission by passing 
UNSC Res. 794 on December 3, 1992. The terms of 
authorization were similar to those under which Operation 
Desert Storm was commissioned. Essentially, like the 
Persian Gulf War, Operation Restore Hope was ostensibly a 
multilateral UN undertaking, although once again most of 
the troops sent were American. Likewise, the mission was 
commanded by a high-ranking officer from the U.S. Central 
Command (CENTCOM); Lt. General Robert Johnston was put in 
charge of the Somalian operation (Makinda, 1993: 70).
There were, however, several differences from the 
earlier Persian Gulf enterprise. Unlike Operation Desert 
Storm which operated independently under a U.S. command, at 
the insistence of many Third World states, UNITAF was 
authorized only on the condition that the American command 
maintain a close liaison with UN headquarters in New York 
and with UN officials in Somalia (Makinda, 1993: 70) [For 
the full text of the resolution, see COWR. December 5,
1992: 3766].
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
226
Another difference between the two operations was that 
while both sought to deploy massive force in order to 
overwhelm opponents, Operation Restore Hope employed 
substantially fewer troops. Furthermore, due to its 
humanitarian nature, UNITAF envisioned the use of forces in 
a considerably more restrained manner.
UNITAF was largely a humanitarian mission within a low 
intensity war zone. It was unique in that it had no clear 
link to any discernable vital interest of the United States 
(COWR. December 5, 1992, article by Pat Towell: 3761).
By design, UNITAF had a limited operational mandate. 
American forces were only to engage in relief support 
missions in southern and Central Somalia, with a focus on 
the greater Mogadishu area (Makinda, 1993: 76). Also, as 
noted earlier, due to the consultative mechanism 
established by the Security Council in the authorization 
resolution, the UN, in the person of the Secretary General, 
had a voice in determining when the security aspects of the 
mission had been fulfilled. Only with the certification of 
the Secretary General would the Security Council allow the 
termination of UNITAF and the transition to a more 
traditional UN peacekeeping operation (COWR. December 5, 
1992, article by Pat Towell: 3762).
The United Nations successor operation, UNOSOM II, 
began in May 1993. Although American participation ended in 
March 1994, UNOSOM II continued for another year,
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concluding in March 1995. It consisted of a multilateral 
force under a direct United Nations command. Its commander 
was Turkish General Cevik Bir (Keesing's, May 1993: 39451). 
Initially, plans called for the United States to commit
5,000 troops. In the end UNOSOM II was to have 20,000 
soldiers, drawn from 35 countries (Keesing's, March 1993: 
39356). U.S. Major General Thomas M. Montgomery was named 
deputy commander of UN forces. In part, his role was to 
oversee American forces in UNOSOM II, most of whom were to 
function in supply and logistical capacities. Under this 
arrangement, Bir would decide when the troops were to be 
deployed to a particular area. Montgomery would then issue 
the orders which would carry out the mission (COWR. May 22, 
1993, article by Gregory J. Bowens: 1304).
General Montgomery also was to have direct command of 
a 1,300 troop "quick reaction force." Although it was 
intended to back up United Nations forces, this was an 
independent United States force, accountable only to 
Washington (COWR. October 16, 1993, story by Gregory J. 
Bowens: 2826). Stationed on American ships cruising off the 
Somali coast, the quick reaction force was intended to act 
as an "over the horizon" deterrent against the Somali 
militias (Makinda, 1993: 77).
The original plan envisioned that UNOSOM II would 
cover all of Somalia, a significant expansion from the 
earlier UNITAF mission (which included only 40% of the
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country). UNOSOM XI*s expanded mandate followed three major 
themes. First, UNOSOM II was to maintain the ceasefire.
This included the clearing of mines, the disarming of the 
various factions, and the destruction of confiscated 
weapons.
Second, the United Nations force was to facilitate the 
delivery of humanitarian aid. This meant securing ports and 
airfields and maintaining supply routes, as well as 
protecting UN and NGO personnel and their supplies.
Finally, UNOSOM II was to create conditions conducive 
to a political settlement in Somalia. It was this aspect of 
the mission that would substantially broaden in scope as 
the operation progressed. This was originally conceived as 
achieving national reconciliation among the various clan 
groups, but it later grew into efforts at nation-building, 
by means of UN restructuring of national institutions 
(Makinda, 1993: 76).
5. What was the American domestic political climate during 
this crisis?
Public opinion
At the outset of United States intervention in 
Somalia, the public's opinion of the operation was very 
favorable. In December 1992, a Harris Poll revealed that 95 
percent of Americans had read or heard about the famine and 
starvation in Somalia. The results of the polling question 
showed that they seemed to be very affected by the news
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coverage of the famine: 75% favored sending in U.S. troops, 
with only 20% opposed.
By and large, Americans even supported the potentially 
longer-term objective of nation-building. When asked about 
the more ambitious goal of staying in Somalia until a "new 
and more effective government is put in place, even if that 
takes a long time?," the results were surprisingly 
positive. Sixty-three percent favored staying until a new 
government was in place, while 28% favored leaving Somalia 
in the "hands of warring gangs."
Regarding general attitudes toward using U.S. troops 
on humanitarian missions, 71% favored sending the military 
"to save lives and help distribute food in countries where 
people are starving, but where U.S. national security is 
not involved." Twenty-two percent opposed this view.
Only a 48% plurality agreed, however, that the United 
States should send troops "to help restore order and save 
lives in war- t o m  countries where effective government has 
broken down, but where U.S. national security is not 
involved." A strong 42% opposed dispatching troops in this 
scenario (Harris Poll. December 10, 1992).
A February 1993 poll (taken two months into Operation 
Restore Hope) showed continued support for the mission. By 
a 77% to 20% margin, respondents favored keeping American 
troops in Somalia until authority could be transferred to a 
"reasonably stable government." The same poll found that
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71% favored the more ambitious, UN-sponsored goal of having 
U.S. troops disarm the clan militias in Somalis. Twenty- 
four percent disapproved of such a policy (Harris Poll. 
February 8, 1993).
As Operation Restore Hope continued past its 
originally forecast completion date of mid-January 1993, 
the mission's gradually expanding goals and increasing 
costs (in terms of both lives and money) caused public 
opinion to shift. Polls taken in October, 1993, shortly 
after the fighting escalated, found that two out of three 
Americans favored withdrawal from Somalia. About half 
favored recalling U.S. troops even if it meant leaving 
Somalia in turmoil, and even if a second famine resulted. 
Even after President Clinton's speech outlined the need to 
send more troops to Somalia, an ABC news poll showed that 
53% did not approve of the President's handling of the 
situation (New York Times. October 9, 1993, article by B. 
Drummond Ayres, Jr.)
A poll taken in November 1993 showed that a majority 
of 56% continued to favor sending American troops to Third 
World countries to prevent famine. By this time, however, 
the public had become wary of the type of operation that 
UNOSOM II had become. Sixty percent now opposed committing 
troops for the broader goal of restoring law and order in a 
Third World country, even if the existing government were
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to collapse (Los Angeles Times. November 2, 1993, article 
by Doyle McManus).
Congressional Mood
When it commenced, United States intervention in 
Somalia received strong, bipartisan support on Capitol 
Hill. As Speaker of the House Tom Foley (D-WA) stated at 
the time: "there is strong bipartisan support among the 
leadership for the action the president is taking" (COWR. 
December 5, 1992, story by Phillip A. Davis: 3760).
Chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee Lee 
Hamilton (D-IN), however, believed that such support should 
not preclude the Congress from giving its formal consent.
As Hamilton put it: "It seems to me Congress should act to 
put [on record) its approval or —  you can imagine the 
circumstances —  its disapproval with respect to what's 
happening" (COWR. December 5, 1992, report by Phillip A. 
Davis: 3760).
A curious feature of the early debate, one that would
become more glaring as the operation wore on, was the
apparent role reversal between congressional liberals and
conservatives. The Congressional Black Caucus was unusually
enthusiastic about the intervention. Rep. John Lewis (D-GA)
acknowledged that, especially in light of his anti-war
activism dating back to the 1960s,:
It would seem somewhat out of the ordinary for me 
to support a military effort, but after going to 
Somalia and seeing what I consider the violation 
of just human decency...there are no other
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affirmative means to alleviate the situation 
except for the use of the necessary military 
power to see that food and medical assistance be 
available to the people there (COWR. December 5,
1992, report by Phillip A. Davis: 3760).
Although not a member of Congress, Jesse Jackson may
have expressed a more underlying motive for some black
Democrats, when he stated that the effort in Somalia
"breaks new ground, because for the first time we've been
willing to risk the lives of American soldiers to save an
African people" (COWR. December 5, 1992, article by Phillip
A. Davis). Such a quote suggests that, for at least some
liberal black Democrats, enthusiasm for the intervention
was based largely on racial considerations.
Despite general approval for intervention, there were
a few early voices of dissent, mostly sounded by
congressional conservatives. Senator Hank Brown (D-CO)
believed that President Bush had committed U.S. forces
"without clear, precise military objectives." Brown was
upset that, given the absence of a clear target date for
American withdrawal, the lack of established limits to
American involvement, and hazy rules governing their
authority, U.S. troops potentially faced a situation
resembling other open-ended fiascos such as Vietnam and
Beirut. Brown also was concerned that American forces were
going to have too prominent a role in the early stages of
the operation. He believed that troops from Muslim
countries should take the lead in Somalia, since it is an
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Islamic country (New York Times. December 5, 1992, dispatch 
by Michael Wines).
Other critics were concerned that the United states 
was shouldering too large a share of the burden for the 
relief effort. Senator Larry Pressler (R-S.D.) declared: 
"there is no reason the American taxpayer should play 80 
percent of the Santa role in providing military and 
economic aid to Somalia" (COWR. December 5, 1992, report by 
Phillip A. Davis: 3760).
The wide-ranging support for intervention 
notwithstanding, the Senate did not formally consider a 
resolution authorizing American action for two months after 
the operation began. On February 4, 1993, by voice vote, 
the upper house approved Senate Joint Resolution 45, which 
authorized the commitment of United States forces to the 
UN-sponsored operation in Somalia (COWR. February 6, 1993: 
277). During the debate on the measure, some members of the 
Senate voiced concern over the lack of a withdrawal date.
In addition, the resolution called for the United Nations 
to take over the operation "at the earliest possible date" 
(COWR. February 6, 1993: 277).
The House did not take action until May 25, 1993 when 
it also passed S.J. Res. 45. The tally was 243-179 in a 
vote that divided largely along party lines. This vote gave 
retroactive approval for UNITAF (which had ended earlier
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that month) as well as authorizing U.S. participation in 
UNOSOM II for up to a year.
The House debate focussed on the congressional role in 
deploying troops. As adopted, the resolution invoked the 
War Powers Act, an aspect side-stepped in the Senate 
version. Democratic sentiment on the issue was expressed by 
Rep. Harry A. Johnston (D-FL) who argued: "My gosh, if we 
ever want this establishment, the U.S. Congress, to be 
relevant to the situation, then we must acknowledge the War 
Powers Act is the law of the land" (COWR. May 29, 1993, 
article by Gregory J. Bowens: 1373).
Republicans, by contrast, held to their traditional 
position that the War Powers Act is unconstitutional. 
Furthermore, they argued that a dangerous precedent was 
being set by placing American forces under a United Nations 
command. Rep. Henry Bonilla (R-TX) stated plainly: "I do 
not believe that the American people want us to vote to put 
the destiny and lives of American troops in the hands of UN 
commanders" (COWR. May 29, 1993, article by Gregory J. 
Bowens: 1373).
As UNOSOM II's mission began to drift from 
humanitarian relief into nation-building, and finally 
deteriorated into a vain manhunt for a fugitive warlord, 
the congressional mood shifted dramatically, especially as 
casualty figures climbed. A principal critic of the United 
Nation's mishandling of the situation was Senator Robert
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Byrd (D-W.V.). In reopening the debate, Byrd argued that:
"The United Nation's mandate to disarm the warlords and
rebuild a civil society in Somalia, approved by the UN
Security Council, was never addressed, never debated or
never approved by this body" (COWR. September 11, 1993,
report by Elizabeth Palmer: 2399).
Although done in a somewhat less strident manner,
Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) agreed:
No one wants to leave [Somalia] in shambles. No 
one wants to set up a situation where they go 
right back into the same kind of despair they had 
before. But neither do we want to set up a 
situation where the United States has committed 
its military to a mission that is very broad and 
basically has no end point and really no 
definition (COWR. September 11, 1993, report by 
Elizabeth Palmer: 23990.
Perhaps unintentionally, other members of Congress 
invoked arguments reminiscent of the Vietnam era by 
expressing concern that pulling American troops out of 
UNOSOM II would "undermine American credibility." Senator 
Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) argued: "If we pull out 
prematurely, chased out by a tin pot warlord, I believe 
that U.S. leadership, prestige, credibility, and national 
self-respect will be significantly harmed" (COWR. September 
11, 1993, report by Elizabeth Palmer: 2399).
However, President Clinton's decision to send in 
additional troops in the wake of the October 1993 slaughter 
of American Rangers, and the desecration of their dead 
bodies by Somali mobs, evoked horror from traditional
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
236
friends of the administration. Representative Patricia 
Schroeder (D-CO) reacted strongly to testimony before the 
House Armed Services Committee by Secretary of Defense Les 
Aspin, who defended the President's decision. Schroeder 
agonized: "I kept thinking 'come on Les, pull yourself 
together. Have you forgotten everything you learned in 
Vietnam? Remember the quagmire?'M (New York Times. October 
8, 1993, dispatch by Douglas Jehl).
Senator Byrd, in particular, was outraged that the 
Clinton Administration seemed to have no plan or direction 
except to follow the lead of UN Secretary General Boutros- 
Ghali. Many of his colleagues agreed with Byrd that the 
Somalia mission served no national interest. There was 
disagreement in their ranks, however, over a proper 
schedule for withdrawal (New York Times. October 12, 1993, 
article by Clifford Krauss).
Senator Byrd sponsored an amendment to the annual 
defense authorization bill (S. 1298) that would have cut 
off funding for the U.S. mission in Somalia within a month 
of passage, unless Congress explicitly authorized their 
continued deployment (COWR. September 11, 1993, report by 
Elizabeth A. Palmer: 2399) . On October 15, however, the 
Senate approved a compromise which would terminate funding 
for United States participation in UNOSOM II after March 
31, 1994. In passing 76-23, this marked the first time
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since Vietnam that either chamber had voted to cut-off 
funding for an ongoing military operation.
Furthermore, the Senate killed a measure that would
have required congressional approval before the President
could place U.S. forces under a foreign command. The final
tally was 33-65. On November 9, 1993, in a 226-221 vote
that largely followed party lines, the House approved a
non-binding resolution that endorsed the March 31, 1994
withdrawal date that the President had accepted after heavy
Senate pressure (COWR. December 18, 1993: 3457).
6. What was the position of the military leadership 
regarding the operation?
At the outset, the Pentagon had little enthusiasm to 
get involved in a humanitarian mission in Somalia.
President Bush's decision, during the summer of 1992, to 
engage in relief flights to Somalia, as well as to deploy 
Marines to the Indian Ocean, were made despite the 
reservations of the military leadership (New York Times. 
December 6, 1992, article by Michael Wines).
During the fall of 1992, after military planners 
studied various options, they decided that a relief 
operation in Somalia was feasible. This assessment was 
based on several considerations. One factor was that 
military planners believed Somali clan militias to be 
disorganized and capable only of token resistance. Except 
for a few incidents of sniping and mining, it was expected
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
238
that these groups would retreat when American troops 
arrived.
A second consideration was Somalia's desert terrain. 
Its flat, open landscape made conditions on the ground look 
more like Iraq than Vietnam or Bosnia. Since potential 
enemies would have little cover, it appeared that the 
chance of Somalia turning into a quagmire of guerrilla 
warfare was minimal (Bryden, 1995: 148).
In the official mission statement for Operation 
Restore Hope, General Powell underscored the humanitarian 
aims of the mission and went to pains to make clear that 
the United States did not seek to impose a political 
solution on Somalia. The plan itself bore a strong 
resemblance to Operation Desert Storm. It called for a 
large force to be decisively applied over a short period of 
time. Once port facilities and supply routes were secured, 
the humanitarian operation was to be quickly transferred to 
the United Nations.
General Powell publicly warned the clan militias that 
they would not be allowed to disrupt relief efforts. Unlike 
UNOSOM I, UNITAF was going to have the means and the will 
to project massive force, even taking preemptive measures 
when necessary. To quote General Powell, force would be 
imposed "in a rather decisive way so that there will be no 
question in the mind of any of the faction leaders in 
Somalia that we would have the ability to impose a stable
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situation, if it came to that, without their cooperation” 
(New York Times. December 5, 1992, report by Michael R. 
Gordon).
The plan concentrated on the delivery of assistance to 
famine victims. Although it called for the United States to 
attempt to buy weapons back from the clans, the plan 
deemphisized disarmament as a central goal. As noted 
earlier, it was feared that to make disarmament an 
operational objective would extend the mission further than 
the political leadership intended, as well as presenting 
the possibility of drawing the United States much deeper 
into Somalian politics than was desired. A Pentagon 
official explained that the main idea of the plan instead 
was that, "we will be the peacemaking force and then we'll 
turn it over [to] the UN peacekeeper...". Perhaps 
foreshadowing future complications, he further mused: "But 
how do we know when we are done?" (New York Times. December 
5, 1992, dispatch by Michael R. Gordon).
The Pentagon's plan was organized into four phases. 
Phase One began with the arrival of U.S. Marines in 
Somalia. Once ashore, they were to seize the international 
airport and the port of Mogadishu, as well as the city's 
food warehouses. Once these facilities were secured, the 
Marines would then head inland to the town of Baidoa. This 
was intended to allow the Americans to bring food overland 
to the interior of Somalia.
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Phase Two called for Army troops to join the Marines 
at Baidoa, and then to establish bases to the north of 
Mogadishu at Belet, Uen, Hoddu, and Gailalassi. Within a 
week after Mogadishu and Baidoa were secured, large numbers 
of additional troops were to arrive. In Phase Three, U.S. 
forces were to deploy to the south and west. This would 
extend relief to the southern port city of Kismayu and the 
interior town of Bardera.
Finally, Phase Four envisioned turning over the 
operation to the United Nations. However, the plan was 
vague as to the definition of a "secure environment," the 
condition under which the UN would take over the mission. 
Furthermore, there was a fear that the various clans might 
just fall back, bide their time, and then reassert their 
power shortly after the American withdrawal (New York 
Times, December 5, 1992, article by Michael R. Gordon).
The plan concentrated on southern Somalia because it 
was most severely affected by both the famine and by clan 
interference with relief efforts. The Pentagon took a "wait 
and see" attitude before it would make a decision to extend 
the mission northward (New York Times. December 5, 1992, 
dispatch by Michael Wines).
There was, however, a dispute over the projected 
duration of Operation Restore Hope. President Bush had 
envisioned a relatively short mission, with the troops 
returning home within a few weeks, probably in time for
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Inauguration Day, January 20, 1993 (New York Times.
December 9, 1992, report by Jane Perlez). An unnamed 
Pentagon official called such a timetable "ridiculous" (New 
York Times. December 4, 1992, article by Michael R.
Gordon).
In the view of the military leadership at the 
Pentagon, the complex logistics presented by the chaotic, 
barren country made it a strong possibility that the 
operation could take much longer than the President 
believed (New York Times. December 9, 1992, report by Jane 
Perlez). General Powell refused to give a specific date for 
American withdrawal, citing the uncertainty of the 
situation (New York Times. December 5, 1992, article by 
Michael Wines). He did, however, indicate that he believed 
the operation could take several months (Makinda, 1993:
72). In addressing the issue of possible withdrawal 
timetables, Powell acknowledged that a contingent of 
Marines and a naval task force would probably remain as a 
quick reaction force, after the main body of troops had 
withdrawn. Such a force would assist UN forces should 
trouble erupt later. The General also stated that "a few 
units" of ground forces would remain in Somalia as part of 
the UN operation, following the departure of American 
forces (New York Times. December 5, 1992, story by Michael 
Wines).
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7. How was the operation actually carried out?
Operation Restore Hope began on December 9, 1992, when 
U.S. Marines staged a dawn landing on beaches near 
Mogadishu. Later in the day an additional 1,800 troops 
landed (Keesing's, December 1992: 39225). Once ashore, the 
soldiers quickly gained control of the port facilities and 
Mogadishu International Airport fNew York Times. December 
9, 1992, dispatch by Jane Perlez). With the exception of a 
minor exchange of fire at the airport, the initial landing 
was a peaceful operation.
On December 9, American and French forces took control 
of much of Mogadishu and confiscated some weapons. Troops 
began quickly to seize transportation-related facilities 
and started to open up routes for relief into other coastal 
areas and the interior. The Marines captured the former 
Bali Dogle military airfield, 160 km. west of Mogadishu on 
December 13. Three days later, U.S. and French troops 
escorted a food convoy into Baidoa and seized the town's 
airstrip, encountering no opposition. UNITAF then pushed on 
to the southern port city of Kismayu. Due to a negotiated 
settlement with local factions, on December 20 American 
forces entered the city unopposed. Once secured, Kismayu 
functioned as a food distribution center for the Juba 
Valley of Southern Somalia (Keesing's, December 1992:
39225).
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Even at this early stage of the operation, there was 
evidence of "mission creep." On December 23, Brigadier 
General Tony Zinni, the U.S. military operations director, 
stated that the United States would begin to seize armed 
vehicles from Somali factions. This announcement seemed to 
indicate that American policy was moving closer to the 
United Nations version of what constituted a "secure 
environment." The United States began implementing this new 
policy on December 29, when American forces swept gunmen 
from Mogadishu in anticipation of a visit by President 
Bush. American soldiers seized weapons, armed vehicles, and 
missiles from clan militias (Keesing's, December 1992:
39226).
As a matter of practice, United States troops avoided 
the fighting among militia factions that did not interfere 
with relief operations or threaten UNITAF forces. However, 
by early January 1993, American commanders began to suggest 
that UNITAF forces might intervene if rival groups did not 
stop fighting. Furthermore, the U.S. command reaffirmed its 
policy of confiscating Somalian weapons. As Marine Colonel 
Michael Hagee stated: "Once we have a definitive location 
of those weapons, we'll remove those weapons" (Washington 
Post. January 2, 1993, dispatch by Keith B. Richburg). 
Although at the outset the United States was reluctant to 
intervene in clan fighting for fear of being pulled into 
their conflict, the change in policy seemed to be prompted
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by the ever-increasing proximity of the fighting to western 
relief centers.
Ongoing Mission: Early 1993
On January 7, UNITAF commander General Robert Johnson 
indicated that his troops had successfully opened up supply 
routes into the interior and, therefore, the operation was 
now to enter a "new phase." This appears to have meant 
undertaking more aggressive pacification operations. As 
inter-clan warfare continued, U.S. forces raided militia 
weapons facilities, destroying substantial stocks of arms 
(Keesing's, January 1993: 39255). Such operations were not 
without cost. On January 13, Marine Private Domingo Arroyo 
was killed by gunmen in an attack near the Mogadishu 
airport. This was the first American fatality of the 
operation (New York Times. October 7, 1993, chronology:
All) .
During the operation, the increasingly frequent 
accidental killings of Somali civilians began to worry 
UNITAF commanders. Fearing that these deaths may be the 
sign of a general complacency developing among his weary 
soldiers, the Marine commander in Somalia, Maj. General 
Charles Wilhelm, ordered his men to "adjust attitudes" and 
show greater respect for Somali civilians. United States 
involvement in the fighting deepened on January 25, 1993 
when American and Belgian troops intervened in order to
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halt a force loyal to deposed strongman Said Barre from 
advancing on Kismayu (Keesing's, January 1993: 39255).
UNITAF Winds Down 
The American withdrawal began on January 31, 1993, 
when 2,700 U.S. troops returned home (Keesing's, January 
1993: 39255). Early in February, Col. Fred Peck of CENTCOM 
informed Washington that the military task of restoring 
security was almost complete. As a result, during February 
United States troop levels in the theater fell from 24,000 
to 17,000. Other nations sent in additional soldiers to 
replace the withdrawing Americans.
Despite Washington's claims that the situation was 
under control, violence, often aimed at American forces, 
began to erupt. UNITAF weapons sweeps, usually directed 
against Aidid's SNA, fueled the Somali General's suspicions 
that interventionist forces were beginning to take sides in 
political quarrels. Rumors that Washington was tilting 
toward Aidid's rival, General Hersi Morgan, sparked further 
attacks against U.S troops in February.
In early March, the British newspaper Guardian 
reported that relief agencies were claiming that the United 
States deliberately acted to conceal the failure of 
American intervention in order to accelerate the withdrawal 
of American troops (Keesing's, February 1993: 39308).
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unosom IX Begins
On May 4, 1993, the United States formally turned over 
the operation in Somalia to the United Nation's UNOSOM II 
force. The U.S. withdrew all but approximately 3,000 
troops, which remained on with UNOSOM II, mostly in a 
logistical capacity (COWR. October 16, 1993: report by 
Jennifer S. Thomas: 2826). The total UN force numbered
20,000 troops and was drawn from 35 countries (Keesing's, 
May 1993: 39451).
The UNOSOM II operation was authorized by the United 
Nations Security Council on March 26, 1993 with the 
adoption of UNSC Res. 814. This resolution defined the 
mission and scope of the new operation. Derived from the 
provisions outlined in Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter (the details of which are covered later), UNSC Res. 
814 gave the Secretary General, through his field 
commander, the authority to take all necessary measures, 
including armed force, to enforce UN resolutions pertaining 
to Somalia.
UNOSOM II was conceived as a two-tiered operation. As 
such, it was to act in a peacekeeping mode where possible, 
yet engage in peace enforcement when necessary (Makinda, 
1993: 77). With a scope considerably wider than UNITAF, 
UNOSOM II's objectives included attempts to foster progress 
toward national reconciliation, and the reconstruction of
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political institutions (Keesing's, May 1993: 39451;
Makinda, 1993: 80).
In terms of its operational mandate, UNOSOM II was 
charged with doing whatever was necessary to maintain the 
peace in Somalia. The United Nations applied a broad 
construction to "maintaining peace," so that it included 
such activities as disarming the various factions, 
protecting relief workers, clearing mines, repatriating 
refugees, establishing a constabulary, and engaging in 
efforts to help rebuild the economy. It was expected that 
UNOSOM II would cover the entire country (Keesing's, March 
1993: 39356; May 1993: 39451).
Entering the Morass 
It did not take long for the clan militias to begin to 
challenge UNOSOM II. On June 5, 1993, Aidid's SNA forces 
ambushed Pakistani units assigned to the UN force. The 
result was 24 Pakistanis killed and 54 wounded. This 
firefight signalled the start of four months of almost 
daily clashes between UNOSOM II and the SNA (New York 
Times. October 7, 1993, chronology: All).
The United Nations Security Council reacted to the 
escalating violence in Somalia by adopting Resolution 837. 
This measure reaffirmed the nation-building mandate of 
UNOSOM II. In addition, it authorized UN forces to find and 
punish those responsible for the ambush (Makinda, 1993:
80). President Clinton endorsed the use of retaliatory
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strikes by UNOSOM II and the U.S. quick reaction force. He 
justified the United Nations' more aggressive posture, 
arguing that action against Aidid was necessary to restore 
order, as well as to strengthen the effectiveness and 
credibility of "UN peacekeeping in Somalia and around the 
world" (Makinda, 1993: 81). The Security Council backed up 
its words with action. On June 17, the chamber issued an 
arrest warrant for General Aidid. A raid aimed at arresting 
Aidid was launched, but failed to capture him (Keesing's, 
June 1993: 39499).
The United Nations' actions of June, 1993, were 
evidence of further "mission creep." As the nature and 
goals of the operation started to drift, the mission began 
to take on the appearance of a personal vendetta between 
Mr. Boutros-Ghali and General Aidid. This impression was 
further reinforced during the fall of 1993, as the focus of 
UN operations became increasingly fixed on neutralizing the 
warlord.
In the view of many Somalians, the United Nations 
actions seemed to validate Aidid's claim that the UN was, 
in fact, taking sides in the civil war. For this reason, 
UNOSOM II efforts to capture Aidid began to have the 
unintended result of giving the warlord a measure of 
popularity among the Somali populace. To compound the 
United Nations' problems, UNOSOM II seemed to be in a 
Catch-22. If it did not respond to attacks against it,
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UNOSOM II would invite more aggressive provocations. 
However, when it did retaliate, the inevitable result was 
civilian casualties, which only fueled Somalian resentment 
against an intervention that only months earlier had been 
viewed as the country's salvation (Makinda, 1993: 81).
UNOSOM II's problems seemed only to grow worse in 
October 1993. On October 3, United States Rangers were 
pinned down by Aidid's forces during a botched raid on his 
command compound. American losses included 18 killed and 
nearly 80 wounded. Somali losses were estimated at 300 
(COWR. October 16, 1993: report by Jennifer S. Thomas:
2826). To make matters worse, a U.S. helicopter pilot, 
Michael Durant, was captured and held hostage by the SNA.
Back in the United States, citizens were horrified by 
televised images of a beaten Durant being forced to read a 
statement obviously prepared by his captors. However, it 
was the pictures of a dead U.S. Army Ranger being dragged 
through the streets of Mogadishu in front of jeering mobs 
that most sickened the American public. This unfortunate 
episode was to be a critical turning point for United 
States participation in UNOSOM II (New York Times. October 
9, 1993, dispatch by R. Drummond Ayres, Jr.).
Under intense bipartisan congressional pressure, on 
October 7, President Clinton announced the withdrawal of 
all U.S. troops from Somalia by March 31, 1994, regardless 
of the situation on the ground. In the interim, however, he
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and 104 armored vehicles. Furthermore, an additional 3,600 
Marines were to join the American fleet off the Somali 
coast (Keesing's, October 1993: 39675). The President 
justified the deployment as a measure taken to stabilize 
the situation, reassure UNOSOM II's other participants, and 
allow for an orderly withdrawal. Employing language 
chillingly reminiscent of Lyndon Johnson during Vietnam, 
Clinton spoke of the need to avoid the appearance that 
America was going to "cut and run" from Somalia (New York 
Times, October 7, 1993, article by Thomas L. Friedman). 
Clearly, the President's actions were at least partially 
motivated by his need to deflect criticism which arose over 
revelations that the U.S. commander in the theater, General 
Montgomery, had urgently requested the deployment of 
additional armor before the October 3 battle, only to be 
refused by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin (New York Time. 
October 9, 1993, article by Steven A. Holmes).
On October 14, after negotiations between the United 
States and Aidid's forces, Durant was released. President 
Clinton took great pains to deny that a deal was made to 
secure the pilot's release. By November, however, there was 
an obvious shift in Washington's policy toward the fugitive 
warlord. The most glaring example of this occurred on 
October 19, when the President recalled 600 American 
Rangers who had been used in the effort to find and capture
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Aidid. Soon afterward, the administration was said to have 
lobbied the United Nations Security Council to suspend 
operations aimed at arresting Aidid. American policy now 
apparently sought to facilitate the public rehabilitation 
of the General, so that Washington could engage in 
negotiations with him. The talks between the two sides 
began on November 18 (Keesing's, October 1993: 39675; 
November 1993: 39721). In December, 1993, the United States 
went so far as to use its military aircraft to transport 
Aidid to a peace conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
(Keesing's, December 1993: 39768).
The United States Withdraws 
The final American pull-out from Somalia began in 
December 1993, when 2,500 U.S. troops were withdrawn 
(Keesing's, December 1993: 39768). Even though early 1994 
found American forces still involved in skirmishes with 
local clan militias, the withdrawal continued (Keesing's, 
January 1994: 39806). United States participation in UNOSOM 
II came to a close on March 25, 1994, when the final 
evacuation of U.S forces was completed. All that remained 
of the American presence in Somalia was a 60-man token 
force. Of this remnant, ten remained at UNOSOM headquarters 
in logistical support roles, and 50 stood guard at the 
United States Embassy in Mogadishu. The departure of 
American, and other western, forces left UNOSOM as 
basically a Third World operation. Until its termination in
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1995, UNOSOM II comprised mostly troops from Pakistan, 
India, Indonesia, and Egypt (Keesing's, March 1994: 39899).
8. What types and quantities of forces were used?
UNITAF
When the original United Task Force was proposed in 
late 1992, military planners believed that Somali militias 
posed no real threat. For this reason, it was not 
considered imperative to deploy troops on the scale of 
Operation Desert Storm. Because Somalia was not perceived 
to be a "combat mission" per se, it did not seem necessary 
to arm American soldiers with the full array of high-tech 
weapons used in the Persian Gulf. Still, the plans called 
for a massive presence, the aim of which was to both 
overwhelm and intimidate the local warlords so as to ensure 
their non-interference with UNITAF operations. At the 
outset UNITAF numbered 35,000 troops, of which 28,150 were 
American (Keesing's, December 1992: 39225; New York Times. 
December 9, 1992, article by Jane Perlez). As noted 
earlier, the initial landing involved 1,800 U.S. Marines.
To support UNITAF, the United States dispatched a 
naval task force, which was to remain just off the coast of 
Somalia. Leading the force was the USS Tripoli, an 
amphibious assault ship which carried 23 helicopters. Her 
air complement included 4 AH Cobra attack helicopters, 12 
CH-46 Sea Knight medium-lift helicopters, 4 CH-53 Sea 
Stallion heavy-lift helicopters, and 3 UH-1 Huey support
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and logistics helicopters (New York Time. December 9, 1992, 
diagram: A16).
Soon after this initial deployment, a three-ship 
carrier task force was diverted from the Persian Gulf to 
join the Tripoli group. The lead vessel was the aircraft 
carrier ttss Ranger. It was accompanied by the cruiser USS 
Valley Forge and the destroyer USS Kinkaid. Meanwhile
16,000 troops of the First Marine Expeditionary Force and 
some 10,000 soldiers from the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain 
Division light infantry were sent to the theater. As a 
result, UNITAF reached its peak of 38,300 troops by mid- 
January, 1993 (Keesing's, January 1993: 39356). Washington 
began to withdraw some of its forces after a few weeks in 
Somalia. In January 1993, the first 2,700 were sent home 
(Keesing's, January 1993: 39255). [For individual country 
totals, see Table 6.1 in Makinda, 1993: 73].
UNOSOM II
It was the desire of UN Secretary General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali that UNOSOM II be a peacekeeping force 
endowed with enforcement capability. In his view, such 
powers were necessary so as to avoid simply repeating the 
failure of UNOSOM I, which had been lightly armed and 
operated under extremely restrictive rules of engagement. 
The Security Council agreed with Boutros-Ghali and, as a 
result, UNOSOM II was much better equipped and better armed 
than previous peacekeeping missions (Makinda, 1993: 77-8).
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The United Nations requested the continued commitment 
of combat units from states which had participated in 
UNITAF, but few nations obliged. An exception was the 
United States, which agreed to send troops to work mainly 
on logistical tasks. The initial U.S. commitment to UNOSOM 
was approximately 3,000 soldiers. As noted earlier, 
Washington also sent a 1,300 strong quick reaction force, 
to be station off the Somali coast (Makinda, 1993: 77-8).
Following a battle between UNOSOM troops from Pakistan 
and the SNA militia in June 1993, the Security Council 
requested that UN member states send heavy weaponry, 
including tanks and attack aircraft to support UNOSOM II 
forces. The United States again complied, using carrier- 
based aircraft in retaliatory strikes against Aidid's 
forces in southern Mogadishu between June 12 and June 16 
(Keesing's, June 1993: 39499).
In response to the ambush of American troops by Aidid 
loyalists in October 1993, President Clinton ordered the 
American presence in the region beefed up. Upgrading of 
firepower came in the form of the aircraft carrier USS 
Abraham Lincoln and its battle group (New York Times. 
October 8, 1993, article by John H. Cushman, Jr.). The 
carrier has 60 warplanes, mostly fighter-bombers that gave 
U.S. forces a formidable heavy air strike capability (New 
York Times. October 10, 1993, diagram: 7). Further 
reinforcements included 104 armored vehicles, including
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tanks and armored personnel carriers (New York Times. 
October 8, 1993, report by Douglas Jehl). In addition, the 
quick reaction force was expanded to 3,600 men.
Helicopter gunships were also sent to Somalia to 
provide additional airpower. Additional transport 
helicopters provided the necessary lift capacity to afford 
greater mobility. In addition, the U.S. dispatched AC-130 
gunships, which are slow- flying planes possessing a rapid- 
fire cannon that can be used for aerial support of ground 
forces. These capabilities were placed under a U.S. command 
and were to depart when American forces withdrew in March 
1994 (New York Times. October 8, 1993: article by John H. 
Cushman).
With these additional forces, U.S. strength in the 
region jumped from 4,700 to nearly 20,000 troops (this 
figure includes U.S. forces in UNOSOM II, the quick 
reaction force, and naval personnel). This increase cheered 
American military officials who had maintained that the 
original 4,700 troops had been vulnerable (New York Times. 
October 8, 1993, story by Douglas Jehl). These senior 
Pentagon officials had never been satisfied with UNOSOM II 
arrangements. Their discontent was largely rooted in the 
fact that U.S. forces were being used in pursuit of 
objectives defined by the UN Security Council, rather than 
by America's own leaders (New York Times. October 8, 1993, 
article by John H. Cushman).
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9. Was the conflict limited in scope?
The answer to this question is yes. From the outset, 
UNITAF limited it operations to the southern 40% of 
Somalia. No attempt was made to expand its area of coverage 
beyond these hardest hit areas (Makinda, 1993: 15).
Although UNOSOM II's original mandate was to cover all 
of Somalia, it never succeeded in doing so. The desire to 
expand operations was effectively checked, as UNOSOM II 
became increasingly bogged down in fighting Aidid's forces 
in and around Mogadishu. As a result, UNOSOM II never had 
the opportunity to spill across Somalia's frontiers; even 
its plans to expand into northern Somalia never 
materialized (New York Times. March 26, 1994, dispatch by 
Donatella Lorch).
10. What was the nature of the theater commander1s power 
and influence?
UNITAF
During the UNITAF portion of the U.S. intervention in 
Somalia, American Forces were commanded by Lt. General 
Robert B. Johnston of the First Marine Expeditionary Force 
(New York Times. December 4, 1992: article by Michael R. 
Gordon).
Under the terms of UNITAF's authorization, although 
the United States retained control of the command, the 
United Nations was given an oversight responsibility. 
Therefore, while UNSC Res. 794 mandated that the United 
States inform the Security Council of what was being done
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in the name of the United Nation, the U.S. was essentially 
free of the kind of close control the UN usually exercises 
in peacekeeping operations. Washington, in turn, gave 
General Johnston the relatively free hand in the field that 
he had desired (New York Times. December 9, 1992, report by 
Paul Lewis).
Perhaps the clearest example of the freedom in the 
field that General Johnston enjoyed occurred during a 
dispute over the issue of disarming the clan militias. As 
noted earlier, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali wanted 
United States forces to stay in Somalia until they disarmed 
the warring factions, removed mines, and restored order 
(New York Times. December 11, 1992, article by Elaine 
Sciolino). General Johnston objected, arguing that 
disarmament was not part of his mission. Johnston 
maintained that disarmament and mine removal were long-term 
goals. Such goals clearly went beyond the U.S. objectives 
of securing supply routes and then removing American 
forces. Furthermore, Johnston argued, with so many weapons 
in the country it was too dangerous to try to collect them 
forcefully. Even if it were possible to do so, how would 
one know when "disarmament" had been accomplished (Makinda, 
1993: 71-72)?
President Bush and Defense Secretary Cheney agreed 
with Johnston and did not make disarmament officially part 
of the military's mission per se. They did, however, set
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the secondary goal of seizing and destroying as many 
weapons as possible. In fulfilling this goal, General 
Johnston and his subordinates were allowed considerable 
discretion regarding whether to buy weapons from the 
various factions (New York Times. December 11, 1992, 
article by Elaine Sciolino).
Although the extent to which Johnston was included in 
the original planning seems unclear, he appears to have had 
considerable authority in the theater. It was, for example, 
his pronouncement that his forces had succeeded in opening 
up relief supply routes that triggered the start of U.S. 
troop withdrawal. General Johnston was also allowed to take 
action in the field as he saw fit. At the outset, Joint 
Chief Chairman Colin Powell indicated that American forces 
under Johnston would be allowed to take preemptive action 
if the situation called for it. UNITAF's actions in early 
1993 (such as aggressively engaging gunmen and preliminary 
attempts at disarmament) showed that Johnston did, in fact, 
exercise the full authority delegated to him (Keesing's, 
January 1993: 39255).
The rules of engagement under UNITAF also indicate the 
wide discretion granted to the theater commander (New York 
Times, December 5, 1992, report by Michael Wines). In the 
case of self-defense, unlike UNOSOM I, UNITAF forces were 
not compelled to wait until shot at before firing on 
hostile forces. Leaflets dropped on Mogadishu in late
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December 1992 clearly warned the Somalis that anyone 
pointing a weapon at members of the multinational forces 
would be shot (Keesing's, December 1992: 39226). Although 
UNITAF soldiers were given strict orders to fire only in 
self-defense, because of the chaos in Mogadishu, the troops 
were allowed personal discretion in judging each 
potentially dangerous situation. As one colonel stated "If 
an individual vehicle shows hostile intent, we'll take away 
its ability to do that...we can disarm it or we can 
vaporize it" (New York Times. December 9, 1992, dispatch by 
Eric Schmitt). President Bush underscored this "wide 
leeway" policy for his commanders by stating that they and 
their troops "have the authority to safeguard the lives of 
our troops and the lives of Somalia's people" (New York 
Times. December 5, 1992, report by Michael Wines).
Perhaps as a reaction to the rules of engagement (ROE) 
used in the past, which were seen as so restrictive that 
they interfered with the ability to accomplish the mission 
at an acceptable cost (as in Beirut, Vietnam), the 
engagement guidelines followed in Somalia left troops 
relatively free to determine for themselves when they could 
resort to force. Some military legal advisors believed that 
in Somalia, American soldiers had been granted more leeway 
than ever before outside of a traditional combat zone 
(Washington Post. January 25, 1993, article by Keith 
Richburg).
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UNOSOM IX
As both deputy commander of UNOSOM II and the 
commander of United States forces in the Somalia theater, 
Maj. General Montgomery had the power to question any order 
that was opposed by the United States fCOWR. February 20, 
1993: 395; March 6, 1993, article by Carroll J. Doherty: 
529). As stated earlier, Montgomery also had unilateral 
U.S. command over a quick reaction force stationed on 
American ships off the Somali coast (Makinda, 1993: 78).
General Montgomery appears to have been in substantial 
agreement with UN goals, particularly the capture of Aidid, 
which he saw as important to the entire humanitarian/ 
nation-building enterprise. During congressional hearings 
on Somalia, Montgomery would later say that he "thought it 
made sense to take Aidid off the scene," because, he 
believed, that if the warlord had been apprehended, the 
Somali resistance might have crumbled (CQWR, May 14, 1994, 
article by Richard Sammon: 1234). In another interview, 
Montgomery reiterated his support of UN efforts to capture 
Aidid, but expressed slight disagreement with the methods 
used. Montgomery declared: "I would have done it, but not 
announced it" fA&E Investigative Report: "A Soldier's 
Peace." air date: April 23, 1995).
In the fall of 1993, the extent of Montgomery's 
influence was put to the test. After the ambush of UNOSOM 
II forces on September 9, General Montgomery sent the
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Pentagon a request for heavily armed M1A1 tanks and Bradley 
Fighting Vehicles. Montgomery said that they were needed to 
help escort convoys, break through barricades, and patrol 
more dangerous areas of Mogadishu (New York Times. October 
5, 1993, dispatch by R.W. Apple, Jr.).
General Montgomery's request was declined by Defense 
Secretary Les Aspin, who feared congressional objections 
(New York Times. October 9, 1993, article by Steven A. 
Holmes and October 8, 1993, article by John H. Cushman). 
After the deaths of the American Rangers in October, Aspin 
would admit that he made a mistake by not honoring the 
request.
As noted earlier, in response to the killing of the 
Rangers, President Clinton virtually doubled the American 
presence while dispatching ample firepower, all of which 
was placed under Montgomery's direct command. Most of the 
criticism for the events leading to the Rangers' deaths 
fell on Defense Secretary Aspin, who later resigned, in 
large part as a result of the incident.
11. Wa3 there an »exit strategy?" If so. was it adhered to?
No clear timetable was ever articulated for either 
UNITAF or UNOSOM II. Before UNITAF, President Bush declared 
that he wanted the troops out of Somalia by January 20,
1993 which was also to be his last day in office. Defense 
Secretary Cheney and General Powell, however, indicated 
that the troops might have to stay longer. President-elect
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Clinton agreed with their assessment (Keesing's, December 
1992: 39225). Even after Operation Restore Hope was 
underway, the withdrawal date remained unclear.
The Security Council resolution authorizing UNITAF 
stated that force was to be used to establish "a secure 
environment." Only when this task had been accomplished to 
the satisfaction of the Secretary General and the Security 
Council would the United States be withdrawn (New York 
Times. December 4, 1992, article by Paul Lewis).
This policy, however, was exceedingly vague and could 
be construed as permitting an open-ended engagement for 
Washington. It may be recalled that there was considerable 
disagreement between the United States and the United 
Nations over whether a "secure environment" was contingent 
on disarming the clan militias. The U.S. maintained that 
the goal was simply to establish sufficient order so that 
relief could be distributed. As a practical matter, 
Washington's veto power in the UN Security Council could 
effectively stop any attempt to keep the U.S. in Somalia 
any longer than it wanted to be there (New York Times. 
December 11, 1992, report by Elaine Sciolino).
When, in January, 1993, American commanders began to 
certify the security of relief operations, the troops 
started to return home (Keesing's, January 1993: 39255). On 
March 5, Boutros Boutros-Ghali proposed May 1, 1993, as the 
date that the United States could turn over the operation
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in Somalia to the United Nations (Keesing's, March 1993: 
39356).
Despite the completion of the United States mission in 
May 1993, some American forces remained in Somalia under 
UNOSOM II and in the quick reaction force. At the time, 
General Powell stated that he had "no date in mind" for the 
final withdrawal of all American forces. He declared , 
however, that "we'll keep [American forces in Somalia] as 
long as its serving a useful purpose" (Washington Post. 
April 6, 1993, article by Keith Richburg).
UNOSOM II
Backed by American support in the Security Council, 
Secretary General Boutros-Ghali set several ambitious goals 
for UNOSOM II. Among the new objectives were: to maintain 
the ceasefire, to facilitate the delivery of relief 
supplies, and most ominously, to create conditions 
conducive to a political settlement. This latter goal 
carried an implied commitment to building a new state 
apparatus that could function effectively and maintain 
order (Makinda, 1993: 76). But this seemed to beg two 
important questions: First, how does one develop stable 
political institution out of anarchy? (Makinda, 1993: 31). 
Second, could military intervention compel the Somalians to 
address these issues? Such questions, especially those 
concerning basic identity (i.e. loyalty to clan vs. shared
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nationality) are not easily answered, and certainly cannot 
be imposed.
A more basic question was never addressed. 
Specifically, given the anarchy and intense inter-clan 
hatreds, is "unity" a goal even worth striving for? If the 
clans cannot live together, why not encourage the creation 
of two, or more, Somalian states?
The pace of events soon compelled a revised timetable 
for withdrawal. The killing of the Rangers on October 3, 
1993 sparked tremendous outrage within the public and the 
halls of Congress. Under intense pressure, President 
Clinton devised a new policy, the bottom line of which was 
that U.S. troops would be withdrawn no later than March 31, 
1994, regardless of the state of conditions within Somalia.
The President unveiled four new missions for American 
forces in the interim period. The first was self-defense 
for U.S. personnel. The second was to keep open 
communication routes for UN relief operations. The third 
objective was "keeping the pressure" on local irregular 
forces which had attacked American troops. Fourth, and 
finally, to maintain the security necessary so that 
"through that pressure and the presence of our forces, [we 
can] help [make] it reasonably possible for the Somali 
people...to reach agreement among themselves so that they 
can solve their own problems" fCOWR. October 16, 1993, 
report by Pat Towell: 2823).
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In support of this new policy and withdrawal schedule, 
President Clinton doubled the size of the American military 
presence (New York Times. October 8, 1993, Editorial). 
Citing possible damage to U.S. credibility, Clinton 
declared that "It is my judgement and that of my military 
advisors that we may need up to six months to complete 
these steps and to conduct an orderly withdrawal" (New York 
Times. October 8, 1993, text of Clinton address). These 
fears notwithstanding, United States troops were finally 
withdrawn from Somalia on March 25, 1994, almost a week 
ahead of schedule (New York Times. March 26, 1994, dispatch 
by Donatella Lorch).
12. What were the -Immediate results of the intervention?
At the time of the final withdrawal of United States 
forces the situation in Somalia remained largely unsettled. 
The American record had both accomplishments to be proud of 
and major deficiencies.
On the positive side, by March, 1994, the famine had 
ended. Relief efforts had been, for the most part, 
successful. Life in the Somalian countryside had largely 
returned to a "normal" routine. Relief workers could take 
pride in the fact that many Somali children had been 
vaccinated against disease. Furthermore, the United States 
and United Nations had successfully completed numerous 
public works projects; many new wells and roads had been 
built. Due to military protection provided by U.S and UN
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intervention, agriculture had begun to return to Somalia's 
few arable areas.
On the political front, in March 1994, fifteen clan 
groups, including the two major factions (those headed by 
Ali Mahdi and Aidid) met in Nairobi, Kenya. At the 
conclusion of the conference, they signed a pact that 
seemed to give hope for a peaceful future. The terms of the 
document included: (1) a ceasefire among the factions, (2) 
a repudiation of violence, and (3) a set date for a 
national unity and reconciliation conference (New York 
Times. March 26, 1994, article by Donatella Lorch).
However, the immediate post-intervention situation 
also had its negative aspects. By April, 1994, the peace 
process mentioned above had collapsed, as the scheduled 
reconciliation conference failed to take place. With both 
major factions accusing the other of undermining the 
Nairobi agreement, it was clearly evident that the two 
sides were still far apart (Keesing's, April 1994: 39948).
In March, 1994, although the initial problem of famine 
was under control, a new problem, pestilence, appeared in 
the form of a major cholera outbreak. By late March, more 
than 1700 cases had been reported, with at least 100 deaths 
confirmed.
Operationally, the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces 
left UNOSOM II in the hands of substantially less well 
trained and equipped units from Third World countries. In
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fairness, it is difficult to say what the immediate effect 
of this development would be for Somalia because after 
July, 1993, U.S. and UN forces rarely ventured out of their 
secured compounds for fear of taking more casualties. A few 
patrols were dispatched, but they studiously avoided 
certain hazardous areas. In fact, some new roads were built 
around dangerous sections of Mogadishu so that American 
tanks could bypass them. The relative absence of UNOSOM II 
patrols allowed a noticeable increase in banditry and 
looting.
Although the American withdrawal removed a substantial 
number of troops from the operation, in March, 1994, UNOSOM 
II still had approximately 19,000 troops in the country. 
However, the departure of the United States removed 
substantial firepower and a coercive presence that had 
acted as a psychological deterrent. There was a pervasive 
fear, both in Somalia and outside it, that in the absence 
of a Somalian political settlement, conditions would soon 
deteriorate (New York Times. March 26, 1994, dispatch by 
Donatella Lorch).
13. What was the long-term situation?
Unfortunately, in the period since the American 
withdrawal, the situation in Somalia has not substantially 
changed. Fighting among the various factions continues. The 
leadership of the northern breakaway Republic of Somaliland 
has asserted that it will never rejoin Somalia.
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For a year, UNOSOM II remained and continued to take 
casualties in a war seemingly without end. In August, 1994, 
UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali finally 
acknowledged the possibility that the operation might not 
achieve its objectives. Furthermore, the few UNOSOM II 
troops that had been allowed into Somaliland were expelled 
and the civil war there resumed (Keesing's: March-December 
1994). In March 1995, United States forces returned to 
Somalia, this time to evacuate safely the remaining UNOSOM 
forces, thereby abandoning Somalia to its fate.
In the period since all foreign troops had withdrawn, 
inter-clan fighting has continued unabated. As was the case 
before western intervention, the conflict is inconclusive, 
with no one group able to achieve a decisive advantage 
(Bryden, 1995: 151).
14. What elements about this case are unique?
Perhaps the most unique element of this case was the 
motive behind the intervention. Although altruistic 
rationales are often applied to American military ventures 
abroad, in Somalia this truly seems to have been the case. 
The claim that Operation Restore Hope was undertaken for 
humanitarian reasons is validated by the fact that there 
was no discernable American national interest at stake in 
Somalia. In earlier years, American involvement on the Horn 
of Africa had been motivated by its strategic location and 
the need to have a client state in the region to balance
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Soviet influence. However, with the demise of the Cold War, 
these justifications are no longer relevant.
It seems in this case that the scale of human 
suffering, presented night after night on the evening news, 
motivated the President's action and gained him a large 
reservoir of support in both the public and Congress (New 
York Times. December 5, 1993, text of Bush address).
A second unique element of this case was the 
anarchical environment in Somalia. In his speech explaining 
initial U.S. intervention, President Bush accurately 
declared: "There is no government in Somalia. Law and order 
have broken down. Anarchy prevails" (New York Times. 
December 5, 1992, text of Bush address). Somalia presented 
no "enemy" to defeat, only conditions (e.g. famine, civil 
war) to deal with; therefore, it was difficult to define 
goals and determine their fulfillment.
Third, Somalia represented the first time that the 
United Nations had ever used Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
to justify an invasion of a member state (Makinda, 1993:
70). This authority arises from Chapter VII, Article 42 of 
the Charter which states that the Security Council, when 
necessary, "may take such action by air, sea, or land 
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security" (United Nations, 1979: 
389). A broad construction of the concept of "international 
peace and security" apparently was accepted by the Security
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Council, allowing it to utilize these provisions of the 
Charter.
Chapter VII, therefore, was the underlying 
justification for both UNITAF, and later, UNOSOM II. As a 
case in point, UNSC Res. 794, which authorized the initial 
UNITAF mission, utilized Chapter VII by granting the 
military operation the right "to use all necessary means to 
establish as soon as possible a secure environment for 
humanitarian relief operations" (emphasis added)(Makinda, 
1993: 70). In comparison to earlier UN
peacekeeping/humanitarian operations, the authority granted 
in this case was broadened considerably, representing a 
virtual "blank check." Secretary General Boutros-Ghali saw 
to it that this authority was later extended to UNOSOM II,
I
making it a peacekeeping operation with enforcement power. 
Because of its concern with peace and international 
security. Chapter VII was also seen as a way of evading 
Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, a provision which 
prohibits outside interference in the domestic affairs of 
another state (Makinda, 1993: 70).
A fourth distinction is that UNOSOM II marked the 
first time that U.S. forces were placed under a foreign 
command. As noted earlier, 3,000 U.S combat-capable troops 
served under the direct command of Turkish General Bir. 
Although U.S non-combat forces have served under the United 
Nations flag in the past, Somalia represented the first
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time that combat-capable forces have operated outside of 
the American chain of command. Although the additional 
quick reaction force remained under a U.S. command, it too 
often followed the UN's lead into action (COWR. May 22, 
1993, article by Gregory J. Bowens: 1304).
Finally, this operation was very unusual in that it 
was initiated in a very open manner. Usually, to hold 
casualties to the lowest possible number, the exact 
location and time (H-Hour) of a landing are closely guarded 
secrets. Even the soldiers involved are kept in the dark 
until the last possible minute. By contrast, in Somalia, 
United States officials were sent to Mogadishu the day 
before the landing in order to meet with the two main clan 
militia leaders. It was hoped that by explaining the 
humanitarian nature of the UNITAF mission, American 
officials could secure the militias' cooperation during the 
initial deployment. The equally unusual result was that the 
December 1992 landing represented one of the few times that 
an "opponent" ordered his forces to welcome U.S. troops as 
"friends" (New York Times. December 9, 1992, dispatch by 
Jane Perlez).
15. Was the intervention "successful?11
UNITAF
UNITAF, which represented the initial American 
intervention, was generally quite successful. President 
Bush had outlined only two goals, and they were largely
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fulfilled. The first was to create a secure environment for 
relief operations. As early as February, 1993, it was clear 
that UNITAF was having its intended positive effect 
regarding this objective. Ports and airports in Mogadishu 
and southern Somalia were secured, greatly facilitating 
increased shipments of food, medicine, and other relief 
supplies. Likewise, virtually all supply routes through 
south and central Somalia were cleared and made usable. 
Furthermore, bandits had all but disappeared from 
Mogadishu. The looting of relief supplies was stopped.
As a result of the success of these military 
operations, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
was able to engage in various public works projects.
Perhaps the most important indicators of American success 
was that the death toll from starvation dropped 
dramatically. In sum, United States forces succeeded in 
establishing a secure environment for relief efforts in 
areas where U.S. troops had been deployed (Makinda, 1993: 
74).
The other official American objective —  the rapid 
withdrawal of U.S. forces after the establishment of the 
"secure environment" —  was accomplished during the spring 
of 1993, culminating with the turning over of operations in 
Somalia to the United Nations in May 1993.
Despite clashes between American troops and Somali 
gunmen, casualty figures remained quite low. As a result,
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and as long as that remained true, U.S. public opinion 
viewed the UNITAF operation as having an acceptable cost 
politically. This is to say that there was a sufficiently 
low number of casualties in relation to the minimal (in 
terms of the nation's vital interests) importance of the 
objectives pursued.
Although some relief agencies claimed that American 
officials had attempted to cover-up Operation Restore 
Hope's alleged "failure'' in order to hasten the pace of the 
U.S. withdrawal, when considered in terms of fulfilling the 
objectives originally set by Washington, the mission was a 
success (Keesing's, February 1993: 39308). It is 
interesting to note also that many of the relief workers 
who originally complained about UNITAF eventually came to 
see it as a success and requested that it stay longer 
(Makinda, 1993: 74).
UNOSOM XI
UNOSOM II, the United Nation's successor mission to 
UNITAF, is generally considered a failure. Starting with 
the ambitious goal of rebuilding the Somali nation, it 
rapidly degraded into little more than a manhunt for 
General Aidid.
UNOSOM II was originally conceived as a new type of 
United Nations operation: peacekeeping with the power to 
use force to ensure the fulfillment of Security Council 
resolutions. It was, however, handicapped from the start.
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Despite its unprecedented enforcement authority, in terms 
of both its armaments and manpower quality, UNOSOM II was 
substantially inferior to the U.S. force that it replaced. 
Although a quick reaction force was available to assist 
UNOSOM II, it remained under an American command.
UNOSOM II's original mandate was to cover all of 
Somalia. In practice, however, it never succeeded in doing 
so. UNOSOM II's effectiveness largely remained confined to 
southern and central Somalia. The cause of this immobility 
was two-fold. First, southern and central Somalia were the 
regions hardest hit by the famine. Second, the fighting 
between the two main clan militias increasingly centered on 
Mogadishu.
In reviewing the ambitious goals that the Security 
Council set for UNOSOM II, the extent of its failure 
becomes more evident. The objective of disarming the clan 
militias was never realized. Given the proliferation of 
weapons throughout the country, this goal was never very 
realistic from the start.
In terms of the broader goal —  fostering peace and 
national reconciliation so that Somalia could be rebuilt —  
the mission also failed. The United Nations sponsored at 
least three major peace conferences. Despite the huge 
expense associated with them (in the "five to six figures" 
according to a western diplomat), nothing constructive ever
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resulted from these meetings. Afterward, fighting continued 
unabated.
Although it assumed control of the port and airport in 
Mogadishu from the United States, UNOSOM II had difficulty 
maintaining the supply routes from these facilities into 
the famine-stricken interior areas. Indeed, American forces 
attached to UNOSOM II actually had to build roads around 
parts of Mogadishu so that clan strongholds could be 
avoided.
UNOSOM II was unable to maintain the peac«. , which was 
one of its central objectives. To make matters worse, when 
UNOSOM II did engage in firefights with clan militias, it 
often took unacceptably high casualties. As a result, UN 
forces all but abdicated their peacekeeping role, spending 
the last few months of their mission inside the secure 
confines of their fortified bases in order to avoid further 
casualties. When the United Nations force left Somalia in 
March 1995, the capital was still so torn by fighting among 
the rival gangs and militias that even relief workers 
withdrew.
UNOSOM II's one major success seems to have been 
famine relief. Aid workers believe that intervention may 
have saved as many as 300,000 people from starvation. So 
complete has the recovery been for Somalia that the country 
now produces almost enough food to fulfill its domestic 
consumption needs. It has even begun to export modest
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quantities of livestock and fruit. These exports form the 
basis for Mogadishu's slow return as a regional trade 
center (New York Times. March 3, 1995, article by Donatella 
Lorch).
The political situation is still greatly fractured and 
unstable. Elections promised for 1995 have not taken place. 
The effort of the United Nations to act as an agent of 
Somalian national reconciliation failed miserably, in some 
measure undone by a personal vendetta that developed 
between Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and General 
Aidid (New York Times. March 3, 1995, dispatch by Donatella 
Lorch). The Security Council clearly erred in making the 
fugitive warlord’s capture a central part of the mission. 
The other and more important United Nations objectives 
became subordinated to this goal, as UNOSOM II's "mission 
creep" allowed the operation to degenerate into a manhunt.
The efforts to apprehend Aidid led to U.S. losses, 
when in October, 1993, American Rangers were killed by 
Aidid's militia. This incident may have had unforeseen 
long-range implications for future UN peacekeeping 
missions. Appalled by the casualties in what was originally 
characterized as a low-risk operation, the Congress and 
the American public demanded that U.S. troops be withdrawn, 
a move which greatly diluted the quality of forces 
available to UNOSOM II. More importantly, however, the 
United States may well have become permanently soured on
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the idea of committing troops to any future multilateral 
operations that are not under direct American command. This 
disenchantment with United Nations operations seems at 
least partially justified. Boutros Boutros-Ghali was a poor 
steward of United States military resources; and toward the 
end of UNOSOM II operations, he seemed to be more driven by 
his own ego than by stated policy objectives.
In this case, however, the failings of the United 
Nations are also largely the failings of Washington's 
policy. UNOSOM II*s operations were overseen by the UN 
Security Council, where the U.S. was a permanent member 
with veto power. Therefore, Boutros-Ghali could actually do 
no more than the United States would allow. In fact, the 
American Ambassador to the United Nations, presumably 
taking her orders from President Clinton, supported and 
loudly praised the Security Council's policies (New York 
Times, March 3, 1995, report by Donatella Lorch)!
Even the President's own revised, and more narrowly 
defined, post-October 1993 mission goals remained largely 
unfulfilled. The additional forces and equipment dispatched 
to Somalia after the killing of the Rangers did allow U.S 
forces to protect themselves until they were withdrawn, as 
promised, in March 1994. The Clinton Administration failed, 
however, to accomplish its other "revised" policy goals (of 
maintaining pressure on local irregular forces and 
maintaining sufficient security in Somalia) that would
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afford a breathing space to permit the formulation of 
solutions for the multitude of political problems that 
existed in Somalia.
UNOSOM II, and the U.S. role in it, were perhaps best 
summed up by Senator Bill Bradley (D-N.J.), usually one of 
President Bill Clinton's staunchest allies in Congress. 
Bradley condemned the venture as "a series of ad hoc 
decisions, divorced from any overall strategy, [that] led 
our troops into an ill-defined, poorly planned, and open- 
ended mission'1 (New York Times. October 16, 1993, article 
by Clifford Krauss).
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CHAPTER VIX
CONCLUSION: EVALUATING THE INTERVENTIONIST TYPOLOGY 
Introduction
During the course of the preceding six chapters, this 
work has touched upon issues that cross the breadth of the 
discipline. Although the chief focus has been within the 
field of international relations, this study also contains 
elements of comparative politics (e.g. civilian-military 
relations, military doctrine) as well as aspects of 
American politics (e.g. domestic public opinion, U.S. 
executive-legislative relations).
The primary theoretical contribution of this study, 
however, is in the subfield of conflict, specifically 
direct military intervention by the United States. It 
considers the efficacy of direct military intervention: 
when it will work, when it will not, and how to undertake 
such action in a manner that will bring rapid victory at an 
acceptable political cost.
Although much has been written on the general subject 
of military intervention, most of the literature centers on 
other aspects and problems related to the use of force, 
such as deterrence and coercive diplomacy. As was pointed 
out in Chapter I, there is a dearth of literature dealing 
systematically with the preconditions that need to be
279
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fulfilled before an interventionist policy can successfully 
be undertaken. Much of what has been written largely deals 
with intervention in the abstract; that is to say, dealing 
with the subject from a theoretical perspective and 
unapplied to actual cases. Our purpose here has been to 
fill this gap in the literature by identifying the specific 
criteria that favor the success of direct military 
intervention.
With the policy of the United States more inclined now 
toward the use of direct military force than during any 
other time in the post-Vietnam period, this concern with 
the preconditions necessary for successful intervention 
acquires unusual urgency. Clearly, military intervention 
requires more preparation than other policy options if it 
is going to fruitful. The investment that such a policy 
entails, in terms of money, hardware, and human lives, is 
so great that the failure to execute it skillfully and 
successfully may greatly curtail its availability as a 
future policy option.
Review of Elements of the Typology
The typology's criteria basically fall into four broad 
categories. The first (covering items 1-6, and 12) are 
situational variables. These criteria are concerned with 
the nature of the situation confronting the United States 
and call for identification of American interests in each 
case. This group of variables first requires the
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enunciation of a clear and attainable set of goals. On the 
basis of these criteria, these recommendations are made 
about how to proceed under certain specific circumstances. 
These precepts include admonitions against engaging in 
peacekeeping operations, against involvement in 
humanitarian missions in war zones, against intervention in 
civil wars, and against placing American troops under 
multilateral commands. Finally, collectively these criteria 
suggest that military force should only be used to defend 
tangible assets or other narrowly-defined vital national 
interests.
The second category (items 8-11, 13) consists of 
operational variables. These deal with how a particular 
mission is actually carried out. The criteria are concerned 
with such issues as the American society's willingness to 
support forces in the field, as well as the quantity and 
quality of troops and weapons deployed. Other criteria deal 
with the need to consider alternatives beyond the use of 
air power, such as the possible need to deploy ground 
forces in the theater.
The third category (14-15) concerns the dynamics of 
civilian-military relations. These criteria require that 
the theater commander be integrated into the decision­
making process. This is to be done by giving him input into 
strategic decisions, as well as allowing him discretion and 
initiative in the pursuit of the war effort.
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The final category concerns the public and 
congressional reaction to military intervention. It 
acknowledges that, as a general rule, intervention requires 
the support of both the public and its representatives at 
the Capitol. The larger the scale of the proposed 
operation, the greater the need for such support. There 
are, however, several ways that the president can 
circumvent this requirement. As was the case in Panama, the 
president can quickly and secretly insert the troops into 
the theater, effectively presenting potential critics with 
a fait accompli. This acts to impose on Congress an 
acquiescent silence, since few members would dare to 
criticize the war effort with American troops under fire 
and thus risk being perceived as "anti-American." Finally, 
the president can also initiate action while Congress is in 
recess, making it difficult for the legislative body to 
react independently.
Evaluating the Typology
In this section the typology will be evaluated by 
relating the cases presented in the previous chapters to 
the criteria set forth in Chapter III. Although few in 
number, these cases provide an adequate test of the utility 
of the various criteria identified in this dissertation.
The cases represent mixed results, with Panama and 
Iraq representing generally successful interventions, while 
Somalia illustrates the failure of such a policy. However,
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as will become readily apparent in our evaluation, the 
typology's criteria are effective predictors of the outcome 
of a post-Cold War interventionism by the United States. 
Consequently, the results of this study will demonstrate 
that success is associated with adherence to these 
principles and that failure is a likely product of their 
violation.
1. A clear and attainable goal of U.S. policy exist.
This condition is vital because it provides a 
rationale for the proposed mission. It explains what needs 
to be done, thereby establishing a standard which, once 
fulfilled, allows the interventionist action to be 
concluded and the troops brought home.
In both Panama and Iraq, clearly formulated and 
precise goals were articulated. The goals in Panama were to 
apprehend Noriega, to restore the democratically-elected 
Endara government, to secure the Panama Canal, and to 
safeguard American lives in the country. In Iraq, initial 
policy goals included the ejection of Iraqi occupation 
forces from Kuwait, the restoration of the legitimate 
Kuwaiti government, the protection of American lives, and 
the establishment of security in the Persian Gulf region. 
Once the fighting began, however, this concern with 
security was construed to included the destruction of 
Iraq's destructive capabilities, and, although never 
articulated publicly, the possible removal of Iraqi
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dictator Saddam Hussein. As the crisis continued, the 
regional security goal was expanded into an envisioned New 
World Order intended to govern the future conduct of 
international relations.
As was indicated in the preceding chapter, Somalia 
involved two different missions. The initial American 
intervention, UNITAF, had as its objective the 
establishment of adequate security within the country (the 
so-called "secure environment"), so that famine relief aid 
could be safely and effectively distributed. As soon as the 
requisite level of security was reached, U.S. troops were 
to withdraw and turn the operation over to United Nations 
peacekeeping forces. From the outset, however, there was 
controversy between the United States and the United 
Nations over what precisely constituted a "secure 
environment," as well as what role, if any, the disarmament 
of the various clan militias in Somalia played in creating 
such conditions.
The United Nations' successor operation (UNOSOM II) 
was even less clear in its objectives. UNOSOM II had goals 
that were significantly more ambitious than previous UN 
peacekeeping operations. However, these ends were so 
ambiguously defined that they would certainly require a 
commitment of forces for an indefinite period.
The mission's original intent was to effect the 
disarmament of clan militias and to rebuild civic
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institutions so that, at some unspecified date, authority 
could be transferred to a viable Somalian government. 
However, within months, this ambiguity of purpose created 
real problems, as United Nations policy began to show signs 
of "mission creep." There occurred a gradual, yet clearly 
evident, shift from the nebulously-defined goal of nation- 
building to an almost obsessive manhunt for fugitive 
warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid. The unintended consequence of 
this development was to transform UNOSOM IX from an 
impartial peacekeeper into a de facto participant in the 
Somalian civil war.
As noted in Chapter III, an ancillary concern to the 
existence of achievable goals is the development of an 
effective plan for military withdrawal or "exit strategy." 
Such plans serve an important function in domestic 
politics, since they reassure both Congress and the general 
public that there is no ongoing or permanent commitment of 
American forces. However, some critics of such strategies 
argue that they are too restrictive, setting an arbitrary 
schedule that may be unrealistically optimistic. The result 
is that as the date for withdrawal passes unfulfilled, 
there is a tendency to see a Vietnam-like quagmire where 
none exists. In reality, it may simply be that from the 
start, the operation was going to take longer than the 
White House calculated or thought prudent to reveal.
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In all three cases, the development and articulation 
of such exit strategies was unsatisfactory. From the 
evidence presented, it appears that plans for the 
withdrawal of American forces are often developed on an ad 
hoc or impromptu basis. In Panama, for example, it was not 
necessary to draw up a detailed plan of withdrawal because 
most of the troops used during the 1989 invasion were 
permanently stationed on American bases in the former Canal 
Zone.
In Iraq, again, there seems to have been no formal 
pre-arranged exit strategy. President Bush had only 
promised to bring home American troops as soon as possible. 
Withdrawal began almost as soon as the truce had been 
formalized. Most U.S. forces were returned by mid-summer 
1991.
In Somalia, there was no exit strategy worthy of the 
name until near the end of the U.S. presence. During the 
original UNITAF mission, President Bush proclaimed that 
United States forces would be home by the time he left 
office in late January, 1993. However, Pentagon and 
administration officials, as well as Bush's critics, said 
that such an optimistic assessment was unrealistic, 
especially in light of the pursuit of such an ambiguously 
defined goal as establishing a "secure environment." 
Agreeing to oversight by the UN Security Council only
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complicated matters and made it more difficult to establish 
a firm date for an American withdrawal.
During the second phase, UNOSOM II, once more there 
was no pre-arranged plan for the departure of American 
troops. According to the United Nations, UNOSOM II would be 
pulled out only after the fulfillment of its goals (see 
above). Considering the wide scope of UN objectives, the 
practical effect of such a policy was to give UNOSOM II a 
virtually limitless mandate. There was even some discussion 
of reestablishing a UN trusteeship over Somalia during the 
nation-building process. It was only after the October, 
1993, slaughter of the American Rangers in Mogadishu that 
Washington finally devised an exit strategy. Actually, this 
plan, articulated by President Clinton in October, 1993, 
was more of a forced withdrawal than an "exit plan," since 
the President's hand was being forced by an angry Congress 
which had voted to cut off funding for the operation. These 
arrangements constituted a de facto admission of 
intervention's failure, because the withdrawal was to be 
accomplished regardless of the situation on the ground.
2. The intervention is not a peacekeeping operation.
This condition is important for four reasons. First, 
peacekeeping operations by their very nature often require 
an ongoing, open-ended commitment of forces. Second, 
hallmarks of peacekeeping are often a lack of strategic
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objectives and the pursuit of nebulously-defined goals that 
have a great potential for leading into a quagmire.
Third, peacekeeping operations generally require a 
degree of restraint, both in terms of action and armaments, 
that puts the troops involved in danger. Such restraint is 
perceived as necessary so as to avoid presenting a threat 
to the opposing sides; but the result often is that such 
passive and lightly armed units are vulnerable and unable 
to function as anything more than a "tripwire." Finally, 
trained as they are for combat, U.S. troops lack the 
specialized training required to carry out peacekeeping 
operations.
Of the three case studies, only Somalia was a 
peacekeeping operation. In that case, all of the above 
concerns were present. The usual perils were compounded by 
the fact that Somalia was in a state of total anarchy. By 
definition, there was an absence of a government with which 
the intervening powers could cooperate.
Somalia was embroiled in a multi-sided civil war.
There was, in fact, no peace to keep. Furthermore, most of 
the provocations directed at UNOSOM II came from one side 
(Aidid1s SNA). As a result, military action to keep the 
peace increasingly focussed on capturing Aidid and 
disarming his militia. Consequently, to many Somalis, the 
conflict became to be seen as one between UNOSOM II and 
Aidid. Ironically, despite the official mission of
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peacekeeping, throughout the operation the level of 
violence spiraled upward. When American, and later UN, 
forces withdrew, the situation was as bad, if not worse, 
than when foreign troops arrived!
3. The intervention is not a humanitarian mission within 
a war zone.
This admonition is critical because often the 
intervening power is tempted to look beyond the immediate 
humanitarian situation and try to resolve what it sees as 
the root (usually political) cause of the nation's 
instability. As a result, what started as a relief 
operation may end up as direct involvement in the local war 
in a well intended, but greatly misguided, effort to impose 
lasting stability.
This caveat does not apply in the Panama or Iraq cases 
except in a very general sense. Only in Somalia was such a 
concern the central motive for the intervention. From the 
outset, American intervention had as its primary purpose 
the delivery of relief aid for the victims of the famine 
which gripped the country. Such action was deemed necessary 
because of the widespread looting of relief supplies and 
the kidnapping of aid workers by gunmen belonging to the 
warring factions had made humanitarian relief efforts all 
but impossible.
As noted above, the UN Security Council came to see 
the general anarchy and chronic warfare in Somalia as the 
root causes of the famine. As a result, UNOSOM II was given
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significantly broadened objectives to pursue in the search 
of a long-term political solution. Consequently, willingly 
or not, UNOSOM II became deeply involved in the civil war 
as a de facto ally of Ali Mahdi against General Aidid.
Gradually, therefore, the original humanitarian aid
mission became subordinated to the political goal of
rebuilding a Somalian nation-state. However, with American
and allied casualties mounting as a result of the low
intensity warfare, the widespread sympathy and compassion
for conditions within Somalia that had inspired the initial
intervention dissipated. In the United States, popular
bitterness over the apparent ingratitude of the Somali
people, along with the ever-increasing level of violence,
led Washington in time to wash its hand of Somalia.
American troops were ordered home no later than March 31,
1994, regardless of the situation on the ground. The
failure of the humanitarian relief mission in Somalia
appears to have had the effect of making such intervention
less likely in the future. For example, despite the graphic
images of massive human misery in Rwanda which, like
Somalia before it, were presented nightly on the evening
news, the reaction of the American people this time was
significantly more limited and restrained.
4. United States forces are not subject to a multilateral 
authority.
On the basis of the evidence of these cases, there 
are compelling reasons why the United States should avoid
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committing its forces to combat under a multilateral 
command. Since the orders that the American troops will 
follow will emanate from a source other than Washington, 
there is a real chance that once U.S. forces are sent into 
combat they will become, in essence, hostages to the agenda 
of the multilateral entity. Even if the United States 
retains a degree of control over its troops, the fact that 
Washington seeks the imprimatur of a multilateral entity, 
such as the United Nations, places it in the uncomfortable 
position of having to potentially subordinate all or a 
portion of its policy goals to the decisions of the 
international organization. The mandate that the 
multilateral command is granted may be either too narrow or 
too broad to serve American policy interests.
These concerns do not apply to the Panama case, which 
was a unilateral United States undertaking. In Iraq, 
although the United States obtained the UN's blessing for 
the operation, the was no direct military UN role. All 
American forces remained under the Pentagon's command. 
Washington determined how the war was to be conducted and 
chose the operational goals to pursue.
The United Nations was not, however, without its 
influence over developments in Iraq. An officially 
unannounced, yet plainly obvious, American objective was to 
depose and/or kill Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein if 
possible. As a result, U.S. bombing missions targeted
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locations from which the Pentagon believed he could be 
conducting the war effort. However, when the ground 
offensive finally got underway, the United Nations mandate 
for the use of force (which was narrowly constructed to 
include little more than the ejection of Iraqi forces from 
Kuwait) acted as a political constraint, preventing 
President Bush from entertaining the possibility of 
allowing American troops from marching on Baghdad and 
removing Saddam from power. Consequently, Hussein is still 
in power, still posing a threat to the Gulf region, and 
evidently still pursuing the acquisition of weapons of mass 
destruction.
In Somalia, the resolution authorizing the original 
UNITAF intervention was similar to that identified with the 
Persian Gulf mission. A key difference, however, was that 
this time the Security Council maintained an oversight role 
over the operation. Almost immediately, in the case of 
Somalia there were disputes between the UN and the American 
command over what was meant by a "secure environment." This 
disagreement ultimately lead the United States to begin 
engagement in an unplanned operation to disarm clan 
militias. As indicated earlier, the result was the start of 
a long process of "mission creep," entailing a delay in the 
departure of American troops until May 1993.
In the UNOSOM II phase of the Somalia intervention, 
the UN command allowed, if not compelled, U.S. troops
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committed to it to become involved in the increasingly 
partisan fighting in Mogadishu. As a result, American 
troops took mounting casualties in what was rapidly 
becoming UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 
personal war against Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid. 
The Clinton administration found it increasingly difficult 
to justify these losses to the American public, which was 
becoming more and more restive as the operation progressed.
It does need to be pointed out, however, that the 
Clinton administration bears a measure of the 
responsibility for the policy disaster that Somalia became, 
because the administration was far too willing to follow 
the lead of the UN Secretary General. As a permanent member 
of the Security Council, the United States possessed a veto 
which it could have used to stop, or at least slow down, 
the pace of the mission creep that was overtaking UNOSOM
II. Instead, Clinton virtually abdicated his role as 
commander-in-chief in favor of the Security Council and 
Boutros-Ghali. Within the Security Council, U.S. 
representative Madeleine Albright gave an American 
endorsement to the increasingly frequent retaliatory raids 
that the council authorized against Aidid. Despite his 
potential ability to influence misguided United Nations 
policies in Somalia, Clinton did not publicly challenge 
Boutros-Ghali's handling of the mission until October, 1993
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—  and then only after the Congress forced his hand by 
voting to cut off funding and recall U.S. troops.
Judging by the public and congressional reaction to 
the Somalia misadventure, any future action in which the 
United States allows its forces to serve under a foreign 
and/or multilateral command, with the exception of NATO, is 
highly unlikely.
The case studies have brought to light two additional 
concerns with multilateral operations that were not 
discussed in Chapter III. First, the fact of the matter is 
that no country sends its best units to participate in UN 
operations. Although it is not always the case, often 
peacekeeping responsibilities fall on the shoulders of 
units from the Third World that simply are not up to the 
task. In any case, such UN missions often reflect lesser 
quality manpower and inferior firepower than the armies 
that they are drawn from. In turn, these weaknesses invite 
challenges from potential adversaries.
Second, no one has raised the important constitutional 
issue of whether the president can pull forces from the 
American chain of command and place them under a completely 
foreign leadership. Is not such an act both a violation of 
U.S. sovereignty and an abdication of the president's role 
as commander-in-chief?
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5. Force is used to defend tangible assets or other vital 
national interests.
This point is best summarized by recalling the 
definition of vital national interest established in 
Chapter III: "any asset (e.g. oil), place (e.g. Europe), or 
principle (e.g. the freedom of navigation in international 
water), the unavailability of which places a state at a 
strategic or severe diplomatic disadvantage, if not 
directly threatening its independence and/or national 
security."
In both the Panama and Iraq cases this criterion was 
fulfilled. During the 1989 invasion of Panama, the use of 
force was undertaken with the aim of securing the Panama 
Canal and associated installations, in the process shutting 
off Panama as a conduit for the flow of illegal drugs to 
the United States and toppling Panamanian dictator Manuel 
Noriega from power. Noriega's removal was considered 
necessary because he was seen as a root cause of the above 
mentioned concerns, as well as posing a security threat to 
the region because of his increasingly close embrace of 
Communist dictators Fidel Castro of Cuba and Daniel Ortega 
of Nicaragua.
Washington's interests in the Persian Gulf area were 
long-standing and well known. Most important was the 
security of the region's oil supply, and its continued free 
flow at market prices. A related concern was the continued 
freedom of navigation by U.S. and western shipping in the
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Gulf itself. The Bush administration also was motivated by 
a strong desire to contain, if not remove, Saddam Hussein 
so as to protect allies in the region. Adding to American 
worries was Baghdad's drive to obtain weapons of mass 
destruction (biological, chemical, and nuclear).
Hussein had already built up what was thought to be an 
impressive military machine. Iraq's acquisition of such 
weapons posed a grave threat to American interests in the 
region, and with an adequate delivery system, beyond to 
NATO territory.
In Somalia, however, no such compelling national 
interest imperative existed. Although Berbera had served as 
a host for American naval vessels in the 1980s, with the 
end of the Cold War Somalia all but lost its strategic 
value for Washington. The sole basis for United States 
intervention was compassion for famine victims. As noted 
earlier, despite this laudable motive, because no vital 
American interests were at stake, intervention in Somalia 
became increasingly difficult to justify (in term of both 
lives and money) to an increasingly skeptical public and 
Congress.
6. The political situation in the target country is not 
one of civil war.
Again this condition was not present in either Panama 
or Iraq. Somalia, however, was an extreme case. As 
originally formulated, this criterion presupposed a civil 
war as a situation in which a government fights against a
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rebel faction contesting its authority. Somalia was unique 
in that all authority had collapsed and anarchy prevailed.
This fact notwithstanding, the basic premises advanced 
in Chapter III remained: It was often difficult for 
interventionist forces to distinguish hostile gunmen 
clearly from the general population. The result was a high 
rate of civilian casualties, which had the effect of 
promoting the increasing alienation of the Somali people, 
who only months earlier had greeted American troops as 
saviors.
As noted earlier, the United States was placed in an 
increasingly difficult situation as mission creep drew 
UNOSOM II ever deeper into the civil war. In light of the 
original humanitarian which prompted the initial commitment 
of U.S. forces, Washington seems neither to have 
anticipated the type of Somali opposition that evolved nor 
the possibility that the United Nations would become so 
actively involved in what was essentially domestic Somalian 
politics.
7. There is a strong probability of public support, or at 
least indifference.
Opposition to intervention from the Congress, the 
public, or both, may have the effect of undermining the 
president's policy abroad. There is a danger that attempts 
to "purchase" support for intervention may hold the war 
effort hostage to domestic concerns. For example, it has 
been argued that President Johnson used Great Society
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programs as a means of attempting to buy support for the 
effort in Vietnam. Furthermore, there is the real 
possibility that the opponent may attempt to exploit 
American domestic divisions for its own benefit. For 
instance, there is no doubt that anti-war rallies on 
American college campuses during the 1960s were a boon for 
North Vietnamese propaganda.
With regard to Panama, the public mood had long been 
hawkish with respect to President Noriega. There was, 
however, no consensus, among the public or within Congress, 
for military intervention to topple his regime. When, in 
December 1989, the United States invaded Panama, President 
Bush had executed a fait accompli, as both Congress and the 
general public were largely taken by surprise.
Interventionism against Iraq, by contrast, always 
enjoyed wide public support, never commanding less than a 
majority in most polls. There was, however, significantly 
more disagreement in Congress over America's response to 
the crisis in the Gulf. In both houses, while there was 
wide support for President Bush's initial decision to 
deploy forces to Saudi Arabia, there was bitter debate 
about how, or even if, to commit American forces to combat 
against Iraq. Even as late as January 1991, there was still 
strong sentiment to give economic sanctions more time to 
work. A resolution authorizing the use of force passed both 
houses of Congress, but the strong division of opinion was
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especially evident in the Senate, where it passed by a slim 
52-47 vote.
Initially, there was broad public support for the 
humanitarian intervention in Somalia. Only after the 
October, 1993, battle that resulted in the deaths of the 
American Rangers did opposition sentiment begin to develop 
in earnest. Soon, the public demanded an immediate 
withdrawal, and the Congress passed a resolution compelling 
an exit by no later than March 31, 1994. This vote marked 
the first time Congress had ever voted to cut off funding 
for an ongoing military operation.
Basically, then, this criterion was met in all three
cases, at least at the outset. Only in Somalia was there a
major reversal of opinion, and even then not until the
killing of the Rangers and the subsequent revelation of the
mismanagement of the operation, exemplified by Defense
Secretary Aspin's refusal to grant the theater commander's
urgent request for additional armor.
8. The proposed intervention has the support of the 
military leadership.
The approval of senior military officers is essential 
if the success of intervention is to be assured. Pentagon 
officials are very (some believe overly) cautious in 
advocating a resort to force as a policy instrument,
General Clauswitz' famous dictum notwithstanding.
Therefore, the assessment of senior officers, based on 
their study and understanding of the technical aspects of
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warfare, should be of crucial importance in the decision to 
commit military forces to action. Their approval indicates 
a relatively high probability of success at an acceptable 
cost. Furthermore, the cooperation of the military is 
essential for the development of usable military options.
In Panama, SOUTHCOM commander General Woerner was 
originally opposed to intervention. However, his opposition 
stemmed more from political, than from military, reasons. 
When General Woerner was replaced by General Thurman, and 
General Powell was appointed the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, at this point the military leadership gave 
its support to an operation against Noriega. Generals 
Powell and Thurman reworked the cumbersome existing 
contingency plans into what became the highly successful 
Operation Just Cause.
From the outset, high-level military officials 
strongly supported the initial Desert Shield deployment as 
a deterrent against further Iraqi expansion. There was also 
general support in the Pentagon for the later direct 
intervention that would be called Operation Desert Storm. 
During the Fall, 1990, Generals Schwartzkopf and Powell, 
Defense Secretary Cheney, and their staffs developed a plan 
that would be ready to be implemented by the United Nations 
deadline of January 15, 1991.
As the deadline approached, General Powell was largely 
alone in urging President Bush to allow sanctions more time
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to take their toll on the Iraqi economy and military. For a 
variety of reasons, Schwartzkopf pushed for a winter, 1991, 
offensive, which was the plan that was eventually followed 
By contrast, from the very start of the airlift of 
August, 1992, the military was extremely apprehensive about 
getting deeply involved in Somalia. Yet, despite Pentagon 
warnings, a workable plan of intervention was developed, 
with emphasis placed on a quick entry and an equally rapid 
exit from the theater. Military officials especially 
disliked UNOSOM II because of its pursuit of ill-defined, 
often-changing UN goals.
In all three cases, the military devised workable 
options. Only in Somalia did the military seem worried 
about any potential problems. As early as December 1992, 
Powell correctly predicted that there would be an American 
involvement long after the completion of the UNITAF 
mission.
9. A willingness exists to support forces in the field.
If the military is to accomplish its mission, there 
must be a commitment on the part of Congress and the 
president to provide the troops in the field with what they 
need, when they need it.
In Panama, such a concern was never really at issue 
because of the massive permanent U.S. military presence in 
the country, as well as the extraordinarily short duration 
of the military action.
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During the Persian Gulf War, once the debate over the 
use of force was concluded in January, 1991, Congress was 
in basic agreement about supplying U.S. troops what they 
needed. Both Republicans and Democrats vowed that the armed 
forces would be given everything they needed to win quickly 
and decisively.
In Somalia, there was no debate regarding Somalia and 
the nature of the mission until after the operation was 
well underway, but Congress nevertheless gave its assent 
and support. The Clinton administration, however, was 
afraid to go too far in calling for support for the troops, 
out of fear of provoking the local warlords and 
unnecessarily arousing congressional criticism. Only after 
Secretary of Defense Aspin's rejection of a request by the 
theater commander for additional armor resulted in the 
October, 1993, Ranger disaster did President Clinton decide 
to make a full commitment to support the military 
operation.
10. A recognition mu3t exist that air strikes alone may not 
be sufficient to accomplish the policy goals 
established.
The efficacy of air power has its limits. Although 
useful in inflicting damage and/or "sending a message" to 
the adversary, the nature of warfare often requires the use 
of ground forces to clear and claim an area from enemy 
forces. Stated directly, air power can damage enemy forces, 
but it may not, in and of itself, be capable of ejecting an
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entrenched opponent. Policymakers must remain mindful of 
these limits, because a reliance on the air option alone 
can often result in an unpleasant choice: backing down or 
escalating involvement by using ground forces.
Because of its focus on removing Noriega from power, 
from the very beginning Panama was conceived as a ground 
operation. Therefore, the concern addressed in this section 
was never an issue in this case.
To the contrary, in Iraq, there was a recognition of 
this issue from the start. When the Bush administration was 
reviewing its options in August, 1990, General Powell 
argued that air strikes would serve to inflict punishment 
on Iraqi forces, but that ground forces were going to be 
necessary to roll back the invasion force.
In Somalia, awareness of the limits of an air option 
was never really an issue due to the relief/peacekeeping 
nature of the mission. Helicopters were used in both 
transport and aircover support roles. Fixed wing aircraft 
were largely absent from the theater until late into the 
UNOSOM II mission.
11. A willingness exists to utilize ground forces if 
necessary.
This criterion is the logical extension of the other 
issues addressed in the immediate previous section. To rule 
out the use of ground forces per se is to give the enemy a 
substantial advantage. Because an adversary now knows that 
there is a limit to American intervention, it can tailor
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its strategy accordingly. As was stated earlier, such a 
concern was not a factor in either Panama or Somalia since 
by their very nature both required the use of ground 
forces.
In Iraq, however, it was clear from the outset that 
ground forces would be utilized. The accepted strategy 
called for a thorough air war lasting up to four to six 
weeks, followed by a massive, 144-hour ground offensive.
The only dispute that emerged concerned when and for how 
long ground forces should be used, as President Bush and 
General Schwartzkopf disagreed over when to terminate the 
ground war.
12. The war is limited in geographic scope.
The main point of concern here is that the intervening 
power keep the fighting confined geographically so that 
there is no spill-over into the territory of other 
countries. Such an expansion of the conflict could have 
unintended consequences, not the least of which is possible 
counter-intervention by other great powers.
In all three cases considered here, the intervention 
remained confined within the original theater of operation.
13. There is a willingness by officials in Washington to 
commit adequate forces to accomplish the established 
goals.
This point concerns the scale of the intervention. It 
asks if the quantity and nature of the forces being
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utilized are sufficient to complete the mission in a timely 
manner.
In all three case studies, it became clear that a new 
post-Cold War doctrine of the use of force has emerged; 
entailing overwhelming numbers, well armed troops, and 
force decisively applied. First developed by Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, this new 
doctrine was aimed at remedying the perceived failure of 
the policies of incremental escalation and tactical 
restraint relied upon in Vietnam. This new approach called 
for the use of superior numbers, backed by the use of the 
ultra-modern weapons developed during the Cold War, to 
energetically engage and defeat an enemy force. The 
expectation was that victory could be swiftly achieved, 
while greatly reducing casualties on both sides. This new 
doctrine placed a high premium on mobility of forces, 
calling for the reliance on helicopters for both their lift 
capacity and their firepower.
The application of this new doctrine was clearly 
evident in the cases of Panama and Iraq, with the Persian 
Gulf War serving as a textbook example. Furthermore, Panama 
witnessed the first combat use of the F-117A Stealth 
fighter. Iraq, however, was where the full range of Cold 
War conventional warfare capabilities saw its first combat 
test. Included were such advanced weapons systems as the F- 
117A, the M1A1 tank, laser and optically guided "smart”
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bombs, Tomahawk cruise missiles, and the Patriot anti- 
ballistic missile.
In Somalia, the initial UNITAF mission employed what 
was believed to be an overwhelming force, with 28,150 of 
the 35,000 troops contributed by the United States. Because 
UNITAF was perceived as a largely non-combat relief 
mission, most of the heavy equipment was left at home.
UNOSOM II, by contrast, was a fairly large operation 
(22,000; 3,000 U.S) and better armed than most previous UN 
peacekeeping operations. However, this force still lacked 
the quality of firepower, armor, and aircraft usually 
employed during unilateral United States interventions. The 
quick reaction force, while under a direct American 
command, was not very heavily armed. The military disaster 
of October 1993 finally prompted the dispatch of firepower 
qualitatively comparable to that used in Panama and the 
Persian Gulf. However, with the withdrawal of United States 
forces in March 1994, the quality of both the manpower and 
firepower available to UNOSOM II experienced a dramatic 
decline. As a result, when the fighting escalated, UNOSOM 
II preferred to remain largely confined in its bunkers 
rather than risk taking more casualties.
The quantity and quality of American forces and arms 
clearly accounted for the rapid and complete victories in 
Panama and Iraq. By contrast, the failure of the efforts in 
Somalia demonstrate the problem inherent in assembling and
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deploying a United Nations force. UN operations are 
handicapped by four factors that ultimately place American 
troops at risk: (1) The force is assembled by soliciting 
contributions from member nations, but most countries, 
especially the major powers, will not send their better, 
more combat ready units. (2) Often UN peacekeeping forces 
are drawn from Third World countries, which by and large 
are inferior in their training and arms to their U.S. 
counterparts. (3) Because of their generally lower level of 
military professionalism, these other forces may get into 
trouble from which they must be rescued by better armed and 
better trained American troops. Finally, (4) by the very 
nature of their profession, most soldiers lack training in 
peacekeeping. As a result, they are not adequately prepared 
for the situation to which they are committed, with 
unnecessary bloodshed as the result.
14. Theater aoimnanders must be allowed input into
decisions related to the conduct of the war effort.
This stipulation recognizes that the theater commander 
has first-hand knowledge of the situation in the arena of 
conflict. Because of his unique perspective, the field 
commander usually possesses a clearer understanding of the 
situation on the ground than his superiors in Washington or 
at the Pentagon. By sharing his insights, the theater 
commander is instrumental in helping policymakers to make 
decisions better based on the most complete information 
available.
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In both Panama and Iraq, the theater commanders had a 
central role in planning operations. During the execution 
of the mission, their insights carried great weight within 
the Oval Office. It was General Schwartzkopf1s preferences 
that largely determined the timing of the start of the 
offensive against Iraqi forces. The only time that it 
appears that the theater commander was overruled, in either 
case, was when President Bush decided to reduce the length 
of the ground war against Iraqi forces from 144 to 100 
hours. This decision, however, was made only after the 
military victory had essentially been won.
In Somalia, the degree to which General Johnston was 
included in the planning for the UNITAF mission appears 
unclear. He was, however, given wide leeway in the pursuit 
of his mission. When the United Nations challenged his 
conduct of the operation, his position was fully backed by 
the Bush administration.
As deputy commander of UNOSOM II, General Montgomery 
was authorized to question any order that might seem unwise 
or place American lives at undue risk. However, his counsel 
did not seem to carry much weight with the Clinton 
administration. When Montgomery requested Washington for 
more heavy weapons, his request was ignored at first, then 
later refused. The commander's influence seems to have been 
enhanced only after the events of October 1993.
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15. The theater commander must be alloyed discretion in the 
pursuit of the war effort.
This condition is a conscious reaction to the failure 
in Vietnam. It demands that theater commanders be granted 
liberal rules of engagement so that they can achieve 
victory in the most effective and least costly manner 
possible. Furthermore, it urges the administration in 
Washington to avoid the temptation to micro-manage the war 
from the White House and simply let the military do its job 
as it sees fit. This condition was present, to varying 
degrees, in all three cases.
In Panama, General Thurman was allowed to develop his 
own rules of engagement. The major guiding principle was 
that he use the minimum amount of power needed to achieve 
victory, but there was no pre-set limit imposed by 
Washington. Although the individual rules followed by 
American soldiers in Panama were fairly restrictive, they 
were set by the theater commander who had carefully 
tailored them to the situation there.
In Iraq, Schwartzkopf was given carte blanche to 
pursue the war as he saw fit. The operation had only one 
restriction on engagement: pilots had to get a positive 
identification of their targets before bombing so as to 
avoid unnecessary civilian casualties. A clear example of 
how unrestricted the rules of engagement were is presented 
by General Schwartzkopf's order that Iraqi soldiers, even 
if in retreat, were to be considered hostile if they did
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not lay down their weapons and abandon their equipment. 
Failure to disarm would make them fair targets and they 
would be fired upon. As noted above, the only time 
Schwartzkopf1s freedom to act was restricted was when the 
President ordered an early ceasefire.
In Somalia, General Johnston also was permitted 
liberal rules of engagement. UNITAF soldiers were allowed 
to consider anyone even pointing a weapon at them as 
hostile, and as such were allowed to fire first. U.S. 
Marines were told only to fire in self defense, but were 
allowed very wide latitude in determining when, in fact, 
they were in danger.
As for UNOSOM II, there is not much information on the 
authority of General Bir as the UN theater commander. What 
is known, however, was that his orders could, under certain 
circumstances, be questioned by his deputy commander, U.S. 
General Montgomery. In addition, Montgomery retained a 
quick reaction force under an independent American command, 
which could be deployed at his discretion.
Clarifications and Refinements
These three cases appear to validate the criteria 
established in the typology. Panama and Iraq clearly 
demonstrate that a successful outcome is related to 
adherence to these precepts. Somalia, by contrast, shows 
that failure is associated with a failure to be guided by 
these principles. Despite this correlation between the
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criteria and the cases, a few clarifications and 
admonitions are in order.
First, UNOSOM II, a mission run under the direct 
command of the United Nations, was a clear failure.
However, both UNITAF and the anti-Iraq coalition, remaining 
under direct U.S. control, were both successful 
multilateral operations. Bearing these facts in mind, its 
seems justifiable to revise the fourth criterion by 
narrowing its scope, to hold that: U.S forces will not be 
placed under a direct non-American multilateral command.
Second, the criterion dealing with the need for public 
support or at least indifference should perhaps be expanded 
to include public ignorance (This criterion would now read: 
"There is a strong probability of public support, 
indifference, or ignorance") . Although the pervasiveness 
of the news media is such that it is increasingly rare that 
the public can be kept in the dark about preparations for 
interventionist action, the Panama case shows that the 
president can still occasionally take the public and 
Congress by surprise. Action can in some cases (usually 
smaller interventions) be taken before the public and 
Congress can either form or articulate an opinion. This is 
not meant to advocate the conduct of secret wars from the 
basement of the White House. To the contrary, the statement 
entails a simple recognition of the fact that, if the
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operation is small enough, it can successfully be concluded 
before domestic opposition has a chance to crystalize.
Third, in point #8, it was contended that it is 
necessary that the operation have the support of the 
military establishment. It is more accurate, perhaps, to 
redefine this necessary "support" as the absence of any 
substantive opposition from senior officers. Opposition to 
some of the technical elements of the operation, such as 
its timing or composition of forces does not necessarily 
indicate material or decisive opposition to a particular 
mission. Conversely, the development of usable options does 
not necessarily imply an endorsement of a proposed mission, 
only the availability of a contingency plan. In some cases 
there are even disputes among military leaders or between 
the Pentagon and the theater commander regarding the 
requirements and/or the wisdom of a specific mission. 
Therefore, it is necessary not to have an endorsement per 
se, but rather a lack of opposition from senior military 
officers.
Finally, it appears possible that the requirement to 
commit adequate force to accomplish the goals set (#13) may 
be permanently fulfilled by the new post-Cold War doctrine 
of the use of force: overwhelming number, well armed, 
decisively applied. It remains to be seen if the Clinton 
administration will continue official adherence to this 
philosophy.
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Additional Considerations
There are a few points regarding post-Cold War direct 
military intervention by the United States that, while not 
directly related to this typology, do impinge on it to a 
degree. These ideas are presented below.
First, the United States does not have a uniform 
policy on humanitarian intervention. Washington seems 
content to await the arrival of a crisis and then formulate 
its reaction on an ad hoc basis. The result is that policy 
tends to be driven more by emotion than by clear thought.
On the basis of experience, it is almost certain that there 
will be no such formally articulated doctrine by the time 
the next "Somalia" appears on the horizon.
Second, as noted earlier, judging by the public and 
congressional reaction to the UNOSOM II fiasco in Somalia, 
it seems clear that American participation in future United 
Nations controlled operations is highly unlikely. This 
belief has been reinforced by the events in Bosnia in 1995. 
Even though the United Nations Protective Force (UNPROFOR) 
has issued ultimata, air strikes and military action has 
been handled almost exclusively by independent U.S. and 
NATO forces.
This leads to a third and related consideration. If 
the United States is reluctant to commit forces to a UN- 
commanded operation and, conversely, the United Nations 
will not authorize American actions that it cannot control,
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then when the next major crisis arises clearly the U.S. 
will have to act either unilaterally or in concert with its 
NATO allies. Therefore, it seems that NATO may need to 
develop a new military doctrine or rationale to address its 
role in the post-Cold war era.
Fourth, a word regarding the overreliance on airpower 
as a military option. American officials must remain 
mindful that if airstrikes are used, there is a real 
possibility that the planes could be shot down and the 
pilot captured. The realization of such a prospect leaves 
officials with a choice between two unpleasant options: 
either humbly ask the enemy for the return of the downed 
flyer or escalate the level hostilities as a means of 
punishing the adversary for firing on American aircraft.
A fifth concern regards the defense budget and the 
overextension of American power. Somalia notwithstanding, 
the fairly short duration of recent American interventions 
and their relatively low cost, in human terms, seems to 
have fueled a newly found enthusiasm among some in 
Congress, particularly liberals, for military intervention 
to solve the world's injustices. If the military is 
expected to carry out missions of dubious value, while also 
having its budget cut, there can be no doubt that 
eventually military readiness will suffer as a result.
As a final insight, in the post-Cold War era, the 
willingness of American officials to intervene in a
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particular situation appears to be determined by the 
following equation: a high level of severity of the crisis, 
a low level of military risk, and a demonstrable national 
interest.
Conclusion
Much has been written on the general topic of military 
intervention, although most of it is embedded in literature 
dealing with deterrence, coercive diplomacy, and other 
related topics. Surprisingly little, however, has been 
written concerning preconditions that favor the success of 
interventionist policies, with most of it tending toward 
the abstract and theoretical. There appears to be no 
existing literature which identifies specific operational 
and analytical preconditions which would promote success in 
intervention, a need that is more urgent given the 
resurgence of direct military intervention as an American 
policy option in the post-Cold War era. It is this gap 
which this study has endeavored to fill.
Although its criteria will no doubt undergo refinement 
as circumstances change, this typology seems to be 
essentially correct in its assumptions. While it is 
recognized that the number of case studies examined has 
been quite limited, nevertheless, they clearly demonstrate 
that when the criteria advanced here are followed, success 
has been the result. Conversely, when these precepts were 
largely ignored, the result was political and military
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failure. It is the author's firm belief that, with the 
passage of time, our typology will retain its heuristic 
value.
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